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A

DISCOURSE

Concerning the

Nature of MAN,

BOTH IN HIS

Natural and Political Capacity:

Both as he is

A Rational Creature,

AND

Member of a Civil Society.

With an Examination of ſome of

Mr. Hobbs's *Opinions*

relating hereunto.

By *JA. LOWDE*, Rector of *Settington* in *Yorkſhire*, ſometime Fellow of *Clare-hall* in *Cambridge*.

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TO THE

Moſt Reverend Father in GOD,

JOHN,

By Divine Providence,

Lord Archbiſhop of *Canterbury*,

Primate of all *ENGLAND*,

and Metropolitan,

AND

One of Their Majeſties Moſt Honourable Privy-Council;

THIS

TREATISE,

With all Duty and Gratitude,

Is moſt Humbly Dedicated by

His GRACE's

Moſt Obedient, Faithful,

and Obliged Servant,

Ja. Lowde.

THE PREFACE TO THE READER.

NOtwithſtanding the many, tho' undeſerved Reproaches caſt upon Mankind, as if Man by Nature was a very Wolf or Tyger; yet I ſhall at preſent ſo far preſume upon the falſeneſs of theſe Scandals (hoping hereafter to prove that they really are ſo) as freely to expoſe this ſmall Treatiſe to thy more favourable reception. I would willingly ſuppoſe thee, and the reſt of Mankind, as good and gentle as poſſibly I could, ſo far as with Truth and Prudence I might do it; yet I do not here go about to flatter thee into good nature, or to impoſe upon thy Judgment, by beſpeaking thy Affections.

'Tis true indeed, if we conſult the preſent ſtate of Affairs, if we look into our ſelves at

home, or conſider the Practices of the *World* abroad, we ſhall not find ſuch an univerſal Love and Benignity to prevail therein, as the Poets deſcribe in their Golden Age, or ſuch as we might certainly have experienc'd, had Man continued in Innocence. But then, to aſſert Humane Nature in general, as the great Patroneſs of all Vice and Villany, becauſe 'tis now faln from its original perfection, and adulterated with ſome vicious mixtures, is juſt as if we ſhould ſay, that there is no Gold in the maſs of Ore, becauſe mixt with greater quantity of Droſs or Sand. That which I here deſign, in reference to Humane Nature, is Likeneſs, rather than Curioſity: So that I muſt not ſo far favour thee, as to repreſent thee without any Deformity or Imperfection; nor yet be ſo injurious, as to draw both Mankind in general, and thee in particular, ſo much like Devils, as ſome have gone about to do.

I ſhall not here make any Apology for the publication of theſe few Papers, nor trouble thee with thoſe many pretended Reaſons, the commonneſs whereof makes 'em ſuſpected, even then, when perhaps they may be real: If upon thy peruſal thou canſt find any tolerable ground of excuſe for me, it will be more proper for thee to make, than

for

for me to plead in my own defence. And thus to thy own Candour I ſubmit 'em; nor do they go about to enter into compacts for their own ſecurity; nor are they ſo ſollicitous about their own preſervation, as to deſire any one common Reader to transfer his Right of judging and condemning too, if he ſo think fit.

As for thoſe learned perſons, from whom I differ in ſome particulars, I know that nothing, unleſs it be their Learning, is greater than their Candour and Ingenuity; therefore, I hope, they will not attribute this my freedom of declaring my own ſentiments, to any ſpirit of contradiction, or to any pleaſure I take in oppoſing theirs: But there can be no greater Friend to Truth and the Common-wealth of Learning than he, who with calmneſs and unconcernedneſs, far from Paſſion and Perſonal Reflection, ſeriouſly debates things of this nature: And though I may err in my Opinions, or miſtake in my Reaſonings, yet I will not be confident in 'em; ſo that I ſhall ſtill reſerve a fair opportunity of changing my Mind, when either by any kind notice from others, or by my own maturer thoughts, I ſhall be better inform'd: However, I do not pretend to ſet up

up for ſingularity ; if I do err, I err with very good company.

The Argument here handled has already been variouſly treated of by learned men, yet the Subject ſeems not ſo wholly exhauſted, but that others yet may, with profit both to themſelves and others, employ their Meditations hereupon.

The knowledge of our ſelves, and of Human Nature, was always counted a good Foundation both of Piety towards God, and of Juſtice and Charity towards Men ; and 'tis probable, that a great many of the Errors that have crept into Religion it ſelf, have been occaſion'd by the want either of the true knowledge, or due conſideration of our Natures, as rational, and of the Duties and Obligations that lye upon us therefrom ; for the Scripture doth every where exhort us to the practice of Moral Duties, but doth not go about to explain the natures of 'em, as ſuppoſing that ſufficiently known to us already.

There is nothing of greater force, even if poſſible to patronize Vice and Error, than thoſe powerful Names of *Nature* and *Reaſon* ; thus thoſe that have gone about to diſparage the one and oppoſe the other, have yet done it under the plauſible pretences of

ad-

advancing both. Thus the *Stoicks*, whoſe Tenents were the moſt contrary to Human Nature, rightly underſtood, yet did they prevail above, and grow more numerous than any other Sect, and that probably for no other reaſon than that of their conſtant boaſting of living κατὰ φύσιν, *according to Nature.* Thus the Atheiſts of our Age oppoſe Reaſon to Religion, and think they may juſtly reject the one, ſeeing they are ſuch devout Proſelytes, or at leaſt ſuch great Pretenders to the other. So that there ſeems to be nothing, wherein all ſorts of men, tho' otherwiſe differing both in Principles and Practices, do more agree than in this, *That there is a certain due Reſpect owing to the Dictates of Nature and Reaſon.* Of what great concernment therefore is it, rightly to underſtand both theſe, leſt the Devil and his Inſtruments make uſe of thoſe very Faculties, which GOD implanted in Man, on purpoſe to promote the Deſigns of Virtue and Piety, to the carrying on his own baſe Ends of Vice and Error.

Thus we may be ſure there is ſome falſity in the Citation, or ſome Malice in the Deſign, when the Devil quotes Scripture: And the like may be ſaid, that ſome fallacy is in the Argument, when Reaſon and Nature are

are made uſe of to patronize Vice and Error.

My Deſign then here is, to vindicate the Honour and Innocence of thoſe great and worthy Names, *Nature* and *Reaſon*, from the bad uſage they meet withal, when challenged by thoſe unjuſt Pretenders.

The nature of the Subject will neceſſarily engage me in the examination of ſome of Mr. *Hobbs*'s Opinions, which I ſhall do with as much fairneſs and impartiality as poſſibly I can. He has indeed made ſeveral ingenious Obſervations upon *Human Nature* in general, but that wherein he ſeems very often to fail, is, either that he doth not carefully avoid thoſe Faults himſelf, which he hath juſtly blam'd in others, or that he ſometimes draws univerſal concluſions only from particular obſervations; and ſometimes from the meer Fact he infers the *jus* of a thing; and from the more general practice of moſt men, he goes about to juſtifie that which is not in it ſelf lawful.

'Tis the *Obſervation* of a learned man, that a ſlight and ſuperficial ſtudy of Nature and Natural Cauſes, may encline a man to Atheiſm; but a full and perfect underſtanding of 'em fixes him more firmly in the Principles of Religion and Piety. Thus 'tis probable

bable that it was only Mr. *Hobbs*'s ſuperficial obſervation of Human Nature that betray'd him into thoſe miſtakes and falſe notions of it; if he had, by a profounder ſtudy and impartial ſearch, enquired into the inward receſſes of it, he would then have found Man not altogether ſo void of all natural Principles of Virtue and Goodneſs, as he has repreſented him.

His political Principles ſeem to be founded upon no better or ſurer grounds than the obſervation of the vicious Inclinations of ſome, and the prudent and cautious Practices of others, becauſe ſome men are violent and injurious, and make no conſcience of doing Wrong; others are wary, and accordingly arm themſelves, as much as they can, againſt the receiving of any: From hence he would infer the State of Nature to be a State of War, and all the evil and falſe conſequences that follow thence.

So that the approbation that his Principles have met withal in the World, was the reſult of Mens vicious Inclinations, and natural proneneſs to believe ſuch Opinions, rather than any ſolid Ground or Reaſon, on which they were founded.

It

It might perhaps be ſome mitigation of his fault herein, if by ſuppoſing men worſe than they were, he hereby laid the Foundation of Humility and Amendment: But it has been well obſerved of him, that *he ſuppoſed Men worſe than they are, and made 'em worſe than otherwiſe they would be*, thus making 'em more the *Children of Wrath*, than they were by Nature.

Mr. *Hobbs* has well obſerv'd, "That Arguments ſeldom work upon Men of Wit "and Learning, when they have once engaged themſelves in a contrary Opinion; "and that, if any thing will do it, it is the "ſhewing them the Cauſes of their Errors. I ſhall accordingly here intimate ſome few things in general, and leave them to thy own conſideration, whether they might not be ſome ways influential, either as Cauſes or Occaſions of his Miſtakes.

And firſt, Has he not digged for Principles out of his own Fancy, without conſulting the univerſal Conſent of Mankind, or the more conſtant received Opinions of the beſt and wiſeſt both Moraliſts and Politicians? For the true knowledge of Human Nature doth not conſiſt only in the ſearching of our ſelves, but it alſo requires a full and perfect underſtanding both of Men and Books.

Books. Thus we ought to conſider what the beſt and wiſeſt Men of all Ages have left upon Record concerning their apprehenſions of it, and by our own Obſervations both of our ſelves and others, either more fully confirm, or prudently correct, what they have deliver'd. And though, 'tis true, there may be, as it were, a mechanical uſe of Books, an enſlaving a Man's Reaſon to his Reading, without a due examination or juſt digeſtion of what we read, into our own Reaſon and Judgment; yet there are ſome who have fallen into Miſtakes, by being more converſant with their own Meditations, than with other mens Writings: Or, if he hath been a great conſulter of Authors, yet doth he not ſeem rather *afferre quàm auferre ſenſum*, doth he not come to 'em with Prejudice, and with a Reſolution rather to elude, than fully to anſwer their Reaſons? How doth he ſometimes ſeem to march boldly into his Enemy's Country, and leave their greateſt ſtrength behind him, never regarding to anſwer the Reaſons upon which the contrary Opinion is founded? Doth he not ſeem alſo to ſuit his Principles to the Times wherein he writ, rather than to the Truth of things, yet always in obedience to, and purſuance of his own grand Prin-

Principle of *Self-preſervation?* Seems he not ſometimes to affect Novelty more than Truth, being perhaps more deſirous to be the Author of a New Error, than the Aſſerter of an Old Truth?

In his Introduction to the *Leviathan*, he tells us, "That there is a Saying much uſurped of late, That *Wiſdom is acquired not by reading Books, but Men*; conſequently here upon thoſe perſons that for the moſt part can give no other Proof of being Wiſe, take great delight to ſhew what they think they have read in Man, by uncharitable Cenſures *behind their Backs.* But doth not he himſelf here lye under his own laſh? Doth he not ſeem to pleaſe himſelf in uncharitable cenſuring of what he thinks (but without juſt grounds) he hath read, not only in Particular Perſons, but in Human Nature in general? Here we may obſerve how, like the troubleſome Fly, he is always buſie about the Sores of Human Nature; not with an intent to cure 'em, but to make 'em worſe. How much more worthy of a Man, a Philoſopher and a Chriſtian too, was *M. Antoninus*'s Advice, *lib.*6. *Whenſoever thou wouldſt rejoyce thy ſelf, call to mind the ſeveral Gifts and Virtues of thoſe whom thou doſt daily converſe with*, viz. *the Induſtry*

Induſtry of one, the Modeſty of another, the Liberality of a third, &c. *for nothing can ſo much rejoyce thee, as the Reſemblances and Parallels of ſeveral Virtues eminent in thoſe that live with thee,* &c.

Here we may alſo obſerve the many Straits and Difficulties he is ſometimes put to in defending his Opinions, what inconſiſtency of Notions and Expreſſions he is forced to uſe in making out his Aſſertions, or anſwering the Objections that are brought againſt 'em; ſo that ſometimes his Notions ſeem to lye a-croſs his Brains, as the Cudgels of his natural Stateſmen did to each others Heads. Thus, when 'tis objected, "That "if a Son kill the Father in the ſtate of Na- "ture, he doth him an injury; he anſwers, "That we cannot at any time ſuppoſe a Son "in the ſtate of Nature, as being under the "power and command of thoſe to whom "he owes his Protection, as ſoon as he was "born. But ſeeing we cannot ſuppoſe the propagation of Mankind any other way, than by Father and Son, and that there is a natural obligation incumbent on a Son to his Father, may we not with more reaſon ſay, That there never was, nor could be, ſuch a ſtate of Nature as he deſcribes, rather than that therein there can be no Son ſuppos'd?

2. Tho' Sons be under the power and command of thoſe to whom, under God, they owe their Beings and Preſervations, doth this take away their Obligations, as Sons? Do they therefore ceaſe to be Sons, becauſe now they are alſo become Subjects? This way of reaſoning cannot hold good, unleſs we ſuppos'd Men in the ſtate of Nature to ſpring out of the Earth, like Muſhromes.

That which at preſent I would only infer from hence, is a great preſumption, at leaſt, of the falſeneſs of ſuch Principles, ſeeing Truth always lyes ſo plain and eaſie, eſpecially in things of this nature, ſo conſiſtent with our natural Apprehenſions, and with all other Truths, both natural and revealed, that it ſtands not in need of ſuch perplexed ways and methods for its own defence.

Nor is Mr. *Hobbs* the only man that hath made falſe repreſentations of Human Nature; there are alſo ſome foreign Philoſophers, who have been very obnoxious in this Particular. *Cuperus*, in his *Arcana Atheiſmi*, 9. & 10. *cb.* 2. *lib.* denies all Natural Knowledge of God, and all Natural Difference betwixt Good and Evil: And in his *Proeme*, *p.* 2, 3. he makes Natural Reaſon to be *ratiocinatio ex innatis homini affectibus & paſſionibus legitimè deducta*: And this

this farther account he gives of these Affections, *p.* 3. *Affectus & passiones Jesu Christi mandatis contrarias, sive quæ nos ad ea, quæ ipse prohibuit, sectanda stimulant, per se & suâ naturâ non esse malas, nec ex peccato originali malâve consuetudine ortas existimo.* These seem but bad Principles for Human Nature to proceed upon: And as for right Reason, *Rectam & sanam rationem appello ratiocinationes ex claris & apud neminem controversis sacræ Scripturæ sensibus, vel ex expressis verbis in scripturâ contentis vel per legitimam consequentiam elicitas.* This indeed is true, but right Reason, in the just and full nature of it, is of larger extent than arguing meerly from Scripture. And *P. Poiret*, in his *Cogit. ration. de Deo, lib.* 3. *cap.* 10. makes all the Reasons of Truth and Goodness to depend wholly upon the Divine Decree; and that nothing is in it self either good or evil, but only as God has been pleased to make it so, and might also, if He had so pleased, have made it quite otherwise. These I shall make some short Reflections upon, and leave the fuller examination thereof to some abler Pen.

I have not had recourse to Scripture, to prove my Assertions, because my design here is to speak of Man, as guided rather

by Reaſon than Revelation; and becauſe thoſe I have here to deal with, do more eſpecially appeal thereto: Yet here I cannot but take notice of the ſtrange Humour of ſome men, who reject ſome things for thoſe very Reaſons, for which they ought to receive 'em: thus, when they are urg'd with Scripture, they look upon that only as ſomething that would impoſe upon their Underſtanding, and oblige 'em to a blind Obedience, as if it deſigned only to erect an arbitrary government over the Minds of Men, without giving any reaſon of its Commands. But though they will not give theſe Writings the credit and authority juſtly due to 'em, upon account of their divine Revelation, yet it would be unreaſonable to reject 'em, and the things therein contained, before they have enquir'd into the Reaſons, and credibility of 'em; which if they vouchſafe to do, I doubt not but, as our Saviour ſaid in another caſe, *If ye believe not me, yet believe my Works:* So here, tho' they believe not the Scriptures for their authority, yet they will at leaſt be convinc'd by the Reaſon contain'd in 'em. Thus a learned *Prelate* of our Church; *Tho' ſacred Authors have little authority with Atheiſts, ſpeaking as meer Witneſſes, yet when their Teſtimony is attended*

tended alſo with the higheſt Reaſon, thoſe Reaſons muſt be acknowledg'd and anſwer'd, though the Author be rejected. Nor do I here inſiſt much upon the authorities even of Heathen Authors, being willing ſo far to comply with the Humours of ſome of the preſent Age, as only to appeal to mens unprejudic'd Reaſons, whether what is here humbly propos'd to conſideration be true or no; for, if what is writ by any one be not in it ſelf reaſonable, I know no authorities great enough to make it ſo: Only, if any think that the concurrent Teſtimonies of ſuch Authors may add any ſtrength to the things here handled, I doubt not, but they, who have been but moderately converſant in thoſe Writers, may eaſily furniſh themſelves with ſuch authorities from their own reading and obſervation.

I ſhall here advertiſe the Reader one thing further, That whereas I have frequent occaſion of making uſe of theſe words, *Vice* and *Virtue*, I there take 'em according to the acceptation of our old Engliſh Dictionaries, and in the ſenſe wherein the ancient moral Philoſophers formerly took 'em, that is, to ſignifie much what the ſame thing with Good and Evil, Sin and Duty, as ſuppoſing 'em founded upon ſomething more

fixt and certain than the Cuſtom of Countries, or the Mode and Faſhion of thoſe with whom we do converſe.

I ſhould have counted this a needleſs Advertiſement, but that I find the ingenious Author of the *Eſſay of Human Underſtanding*, *p.* 158, 159, *&c.* telling us, That *the meaſure of what is every where called and eſteemed Virtue and Vice, is his Approbation or Diſlike, Praiſe or Blame, which by a ſecret and tacite conſent eſtabliſhes it ſelf in the ſeveral Societies, Tribes and Clubs of Men in the World; ſo that Virtue is every where that which is thought praiſe-worthy; and nothing elſe but that which has the allowance of publick eſteem, is Virtue.* And here he quotes *Cicero, Tuſc. lib.* 2. *Nihil habet natura præſtantius, quàm honeſtatem, quàm laudem, quàm dignitatem, quàm decus*: Which he ſays, *are all Names for the ſame thing.* But here we may obſerve, that he puts *Honeſty* in the firſt place, then *Praiſe, viz.* ſuch as is conſequent hereupon; *quàm dignitatem*, that is, that Dignity of Nature, which is the greateſt Ornament of a Man. The ſame Author of that Eſſay hath much better explain'd the ſenſe of the old Heathen Philoſophers upon this Subject, *p.* 17. *If one of thoſe had been asked,* (here, I ſuppoſe, the Queſtion ſhould not have

have been propounded, as before, Why a Man muſt keep his *word*; but rather thus, why a Man ſhould not break his *word*) *he would have anſwer'd, becauſe it was diſhoneſt, below the Dignity of a Man, and oppoſite to Virtue, the higheſt perfection of Human Nature.*

By *the Dignity of a Man*, I ſuppoſe, was here meant the ſame that *Tully* meant by his, that is, the Dignity of Human Nature, conſider'd in it ſelf, not with reſpect to the accidentally good or bad Opinion that Men might entertain of it. But he further tells us, *p.* 159. That *the Exhortations of inſpired Teachers have not feared to appeal to common Repute. Whatſoever things are lovely, whatſoever things are of good report, if there be any virtue, if there be any praiſe*, &c. Phil. 4. 8. But the Apoſtle doth not here appeal to common Repute *abſolutely*, but with a certain reſtriction and limitation, that Men do not confound the notions of Good and Evil, *whatever things are of good report*, with this Proviſo, that there be any Virtue, or any ſuch Praiſe as is *virtutis comes*, then we are to think on 'em.

But then he ſays, That *ſince nothing can be more natural than to encourage with Eſteem and Reputation that wherein every one finds his advantage, and to blame and diſcountenance the contrary*; *'tis no wonder, that Eſteem and Diſ-*

credit, Virtue and Vice, ſhould in a great meaſure every where correſpond with the unchangeable Rule of Right and Wrong, &c. But then ſuppoſe Men ſhould ſo far miſtake themſelves, as to place their Commendation or Blame on that ſide that really deſerves it not, (and ſuch a thing may poſſibly ſometimes happen) would this alter the nature of things, and make Vice Vertue, and Virtue Vice?

Laſtly, Tho' thou doſt not find in theſe Papers that profoundneſs of Thought, that depth of Reaſoning, that may be elſewhere met withal; yet, I hope, what is here offered is free and natural, eaſie and obvious, and therefore probably not leſs true, but more uſeful; for I never look'd upon Intricacy and Obſcurity either as any certain ſign of Truth, or any ways to promote the Benefit and Advantage of the Reader.

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CHAP. VII.
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CHAP. VIII.
Some ſhort Obſervations upon Mr. *Hobbs*'s Firſt Chap. of his *Kingdom of Darkneſs.*

Mr. Hobbs *inconſiſtent with himſelf in his Diſcourſes concerning Phantaſms: the Church in a proper ſenſe the Kingdom of Chriſt: Mr.* Hobbs's *notion of a Covenant no ways applicable to God Almighty: his Anſwers to thoſe places of Scripture, which are commonly brought to prove the Immortality of the Soul, no ways ſufficient. Appendix to the 7th Chapter.*

THE

CHAP. I.

Of the Nature *and* Excellency *of the Knowledge of a Man's Self.*

THE true *Worth* and *Value* of a Thing, conſiſts either in its Intrinſick Nature, or in the Relation it bears to us; either that it is in it ſelf Excellent, or to us Uſeful: Now both theſe meet together in the *Knowledge of a Man's Self*; this being that which ſo nearly concerns us, that no one ought in Honour to be ignorant of it. Thus thoſe whoſe ancient Families, or perſonal Merits, have Entituled to a *Coat of Arms*, do uſually think themſelves bound, at leaſt, to attain to ſuch a degree of Skill in *Heraldry*, as to be able to *Blazon them*. So would it be a Diſparagement to a Man, as ſuch, to be Owner of ſo many and great *Excellencies of Nature*, and not rightly to underſtand them; not to be able to derive their Deſcent from their *firſt* and *divine Original*; not fully to know, and duly to conſider that nobleneſs and generoſity of Action, which even his Order obliges him to.

Now ſince there is no more effectual Way or Method to recommend a Thing truly Excellent, than only fully to explain it; I ſhall therefore ſhew wherein the Nature of this *Knowledge of a Man's Self* conſiſts.

Mr. *Hobbs* in his *Introduction to his* Leviathan, hath juſtly found fault with thoſe, who ſo underſtand that ſaying, *Noſce te ipſum*, *As hereby either to countenance the barbarous State of Men in power towards their Inferiours, or to encourage thoſe of a low Degree, to a ſawcy Behaviour to their Betters:* But then whether he has been as happy in aſſigning the true meaning of it himſelf, as he was in obſerving the falſe Interpretation thereof in others, may be juſtly doubted: his Interpretation is this; "This, *ſays he*, "teaches us, that from the Similitudes of "Thoughts and Paſſions of one Man, to "the Thoughts and Paſſions of another, "whoſoever looks into himſelf, and con-"ſiders what he doth, *when he thinks*, "*reaſons*, *opines*, *hopes*, *fears*, &c. *and* "*upon what Grounds*, he ſhall hereby read "and know, what are the Thoughts and "Paſſions of all other Men upon the like "Occaſions.

Now

Now this Explication of his ſeems liable to this Inconvenience, that it makes each Man in particular the Rule and Meaſure of Humane Nature in general, by attending to the Grounds and Reaſons of his own Thoughts aed Paſſions, to judge the very ſame of all others; ſo that according to this, Humane Nature muſt appear to the World, according to the falſe Notions or vicious Affections of thoſe who repreſent it; according to the accidentally good or bad Diſpoſitions of thoſe who undertake to give an account of it. Thus, becauſe the blood-ſhot Eye of one Man's mind repreſents all things in red Colours; therefore muſt Cruelty be the immediate and univerſal Dictate of Nature. 'Tis true indeed, in the very next Sentence he adds: "*I ſay*, The Similitude of Paſſions which "are the ſame in all Men; *Deſire*, *Fear*, *Hope*, "*&c.* Not the Similitude of the Objects of "the Paſſions, which are the Things de-"ſired, fear'd, hoped, *&c.* For theſe the "Conſtitution individual and particular E-"ducation do ſo vary, and they are ſo eaſie "to be kept from our Knowledge, that the "Characters of Man's Heart are legible "only to him, who ſearcheth the Heart. But how can we poſſibly gather the Simi-

litude of other Men's Thoughts and Paſſions from our own, without any relation they bear to their reſpective Objects; for from the conſideration of our Thoughts and Paſſions abſtracted from their Objects, we could only infer the Similitude of ours with other Men's, meerly as bare Acts and Operations of the Soul; that is, that the Soul in its reſpective exerciſe of its Thoughts and Paſſions, acts or ſuffers after the ſame manner in all Men: but now this would be nothing to his purpoſe. But further, when he ſays, *Whoever looks into himſelf, and conſiders what he doth, when he thinks, opines, hopes, fears, &c. and upon what Grounds.* Now how can a Man conſider upon what Grounds and Reaſons he deſires, or fears, without reſpect to the Objects of thoſe ſeveral Paſſions; for Men deſire or fear, either becauſe the Things deſir'd or fear'd, are really *good* or *bad* for 'em, or at leaſt apprehended as ſuch: Nor can any juſt or full Account be given of our Paſſions abſtracted from their Objects. So that Mr. *Hobbs*, by his ſeemingly diſtinct ſtating of the *Queſtion*, takes only the greater pains to blunder the whole Matter. But to return:

This

This *Knowledge of our ſelves* includes in it theſe following Particulars:

1. It includes the *Knowledge of our ſelves*, as conſiſting of two diſtinct Principles of *Soul* and *Body*, together with a right underſtanding of the Nature and Properties of both.

2. A right underſtanding of the mutual Relations and reſpective Influences, that each hath upon the other by vertue of their Union: Hence are we taught not to miſtake the briſker Motions of the Blood, or a more florid temper of Body for the Influences of the holy Spirit; nor the more black melancholy temper of Mind, for a ſevere and religious Reſervedneſs, with ſome; or for the Frowns of the *Almighty*, or the Teſtimonies of the *Divine Diſpleaſure* againſt us, with others.

3. It includes in it the *true Knowledge of our Original Perfections*, and how far they are impair'd by the Fall, both what God made us at firſt in the ſtate of *Innocence*, and what we have now made our ſelves by our *Sins*.

4. The *Knowledge of the right uſe of our Faculties*, as alſo a due conſideration of the *Ends*, for which God gave us ſuch *Souls*,

and a due care of acting in Conformity thereunto.

5. It conſiſts in a juſt and due regard and reverend eſteem of our Selves, not ſuch as is the reſult of *Pride*, or the affectation of *Popularity*; but in a true vertuous Care of doing nothing unworthy the Dignity of our *Natures*.

Thus Simplicius *prays, that he may be mindful of this Nobility of Nature.*

6. It implies a due conſideration of thoſe Relations we ſtand in to *God*, *our Selves*, and *Others*, ſo as that we may lead a *ſober, righteous and holy life in this preſent World.*

Now, that which further ſpeaks the *Excellency of this Knowledge*, is, That it tranſcends not the ordinary Capacities of a finite Underſtanding, nor diſcourages us with the Difficulty, much leſs with the Impoſſibility of the Thing; the *Knowledge of God*, ſo far as he has any ways *made known himſelf to us*, and the *Knowledge of our Selves* in the utmoſt extent of it: This God hath made our Duty, and therefore hath not plac'd it out of the compaſs of thoſe *Powers* and *Faculties* which he hath given us. Not but that there are ſome Things in this leſſer, as well as in that greater *World*, which are above our *Knowledge*,

ledge, viz. *The Mode of the Union of our Soul and Body*; *whether our Souls præexiſt, or no, &c.* But theſe few Things which are unknowable, ought not to diſcourage us in the ſearch of thoſe Things we may know, eſpecially in Things of a more practical Concernment: only here we may conſider, That thoſe *Natural Myſteries* of Humane Nature, if I may ſo call 'em, may be made uſe of to teach us Modeſty and Submiſſion of our *Underſtandings* in Things of a more *Divine Concern*. Thus even *Philoſophers* tell us, *That God on purpoſe conſtituted ſome unſolvable Difficulties in Nature, to teach men not over-highly to value their own Underſtandings.*

2. This *Knowledge of our Selves* is founded upon ſurer Principles, than any other Study Men commonly give themſelves unto, particularly than thoſe two *famous Miſtreſſes* of moſt Men's Courtſhip, *Philoſophy* and *Philology*: as for *Philoſophy*, though, I believe, that it has arriv'd at as high a degree of Perfection in this Age, as in any known Age of the World; (and it is to no purpoſe to talk of what might poſſibly be in thoſe other, of which we have no Hiſtory, no Records remaining;) yet it may be juſtly queſtion'd, Whether *Truth* it ſelf

was ever yet pull'd out of that Pit, in which the *Ancients* plac'd it, conſidering the ſeveral *Hypotheſes* now extant in *Philoſophy*, each embrac'd with equal eagerneſs, and as their reſpective Followers think, with equal appearance of Reaſon: And *Philology*, that labours under theſe two Diſadvantages, that it is commonly founded upon no better Grounds, than meer Conjecture and Probability; ſo that it muſt be *great good Fortune*, if its *Archers* chance to hit the *Mark*.

2. The Subject-matter of thoſe *Enquiries* are many times of ſuch ſmall Concernment, that it is no great matter whether they do or no: only both theſe are then beſt employ'd, when they are made uſe of to *explain* or *confirm* ſome *moral* or *divine Truth*.

3. The *Knowledge of our Selves* doth naturally lead us to the Knowledge, 1. *Of the Being of God.* 2. *Of the Nature of God.* 3. *Of the Worſhip of God.*

1. Thus we come to the *Knowledge of the Being of God*, in as much as at firſt he ſtamp'd ſuch *lively Characters of Himſelf upon our Minds*, as ſpeak their *Author*: Thus both *Reaſon* and *Religion* tell us, *That God did not leave himſelf without a Witneſs either in the greater or leſſer World.*

I know

I know there are ſome, who deny any ſuch Natural Notions or *Idea's* at all, and particularly, *this of God*; but I hope the contrary hereof, in the Sequel of the Diſcourſe, will appear both *piouſly* and *rationally credible*. God at firſt Created us after *His own Image* or *Similitude*; more eſpecially in reſpect of the *intellectual* and *moral Endowments of the Mind:* Now this ſeems moſt naturally to ſuppoſe ſomething actually exiſtent in the *Soul*, wherein this Similitude or Reſemblance ſhould conſiſt, and not only in a *bare capacity* or *poſſibility* of the *Thing* afterwards.

And by reflecting upon theſe, we come to the *Knowledge of him, whoſe Image and Superſcription they bear:* Thus do we ſometimes more perfectly behold the *Sun*, by looking downwards into the Water, than we can poſſibly do with a direct Eye.

I ſhall not here enter into a particular examination of that Argument; *How far the* Idea *or Notion of God in our Minds doth prove his real Exiſtence:* This being already ſo excellently done by the *Learned Biſhop of* Worceſter, *in his* Orig. Sacræ, *and by Dr.* Cudworth *in his* Syſteme, &c.

Only we may obſerve, That ſince *Moral Arguments* do not, as *Mathematical ones do*, force

force Aſſent; but ſuppoſe certain Diſpoſitions of the Subject, upon which their Prevalency doth in a great meaſure depend: therefore I conceive, the perſwaſive force of this Argument, is greater to a ſober and conſiderate Perſon within himſelf, than perhaps it will appear to others: For that which is very apt to prevail with ſuch an one, is to conſider, how agreeable this Notion of a *Deity* is to all his *Faculties*, how conſiſtent with all thoſe Principles of *Truth* and *Goodneſs*, which he any ways finds lodg'd in his *Soul*: So that from the Conſonancy of theſe, how they mutually defend and ſupport each other; nay, how there could ſcarce be any Notions at all either of *Truth* or *Goodneſs*, without the ſuppoſition of a *God*: Hence a conſiderate and ingenuous Perſon is much more confirm'd in the belief of the *Thing*. Thus D. *Cartes* was more fully perſwaded of the Truth of his *Philoſophical Principles*, becauſe they were ſo conſiſtent with the preſent *Phænomena* of *Nature*, and gave ſuch eaſie *Solutions* of 'em.

2. From the *Knowledge of our Selves*, we come to the *Knowledge of the Nature of God*, for we are conſcious to our ſelves of ſome Actions; *viz. Thoſe of Cogitation, beyond the*

the power of Matter to perform, and therefore to be aſcrib'd to ſome Being of greater *Excellencies* and *Perfections*, than meer *Matter* is capable of, that is, to a *Spirit*. Hence we infer, firſt, the *Immateriality of our own Souls*, and then the *Spirituality of the Divine Nature*; becauſe what ever real and abſolute *Perfection* we find in our ſelves, that in the higheſt degree muſt we *attribute to God*. Here I ſhall firſt prove the *Immateriality of our own Souls*; and then make good the Conſequence; when from thence we infer the *Spirituality of the Divine Nature*. 1. The *Immateriality of our own Souls*, or what is the ſame, that *Matter* cannot think; and this one would almoſt think a needleſs undertaking, to prove that which the common ſenſe of *Mankind* doth generally agree in; that being a thing in a great meaſure ſelf-evident, it will be the more difficult, by any other Argument, to prove it. The moſt effectual, if not the only way to do it, is to ſhew the ſtrange and abſurd Conſequences that would follow from the contrary Aſſertion. There ſeems no greater Argument againſt the *poſſibility of Matters thinking*, than the *unſucceſsfulneſs of their Attempts*, and the *improbability of their Ways and Methods*, who have gone about to explain

plain it. First, They grant that *Matter* it ſelf, unleſs ſo and ſo *modify'd*, cannot *think*; and it is altogether *unconceivable*, how either the *tenuity of the Parts*, or the *moſt vigorous Motion* ſhould add to it any *principle of perception*, which otherwiſe of its own *nature* it was deſtitute of: nor is it render'd the more *intelligible*, by placing, as Mr. *Hobbs* doth, the *Nature* of it in *Re-action*, this being only ſuch a particular kind of *motion*, with reſpect to the terms *à quo*, and *ad quem*; as if *Reflection in the Soul*, which is an inward conſciouſneſs to our ſelves of our *Thoughts* and *Actions*, was the ſame with, or could be any ways explain'd by *Re-action* or *Reflection in Matter*. I might as well argue thus, That becauſe *Angulus reflectionis eſt æqualis angulo incidentiæ*: Therefore if *Matter* cannot *think* in its *direct*, neither can it in its *reflected motion*.

Nor is it any ways conceivable, how ſenſeleſs Atoms ſhould grow into greater Wits, only by jumping and running their heads againſt one another: nor will Organization any whit help the matter: for ſuppoſe a Company of plenipotentiary particles ſent from the material Univerſe to the no leſs material Soveraign the Soul, to treat about ſome grand affairs of State; theſe

theſe while they rid on briskly in a direct Road, might perhaps have their heads full of Intrigues, and Politicks: but then when they came into thoſe many croſs Ways, which they muſt neceſſarily meet withall in Organized Bodies, they will then probably either loſe themſelves, or forget their Errand; and when they came to Court, find their heads fraught with nothing, but ſome certain croſs queſtions, which they pick'd up by the way.

Further, It would be very hard, for the Patrons of this Mechanick Hypotheſis to aſſign the reſpective Modes of action and re-action to the ſeveral modes of Cogitation; what kind of Motion it is that cauſes aſſent, what diſſent; what kind of agitation of the particles is required to cauſe underſtanding, and how diſtinguiſhed from that of the Will: and then ſuppoſing that after a great deal of ill plac'd pains, they compaſs their deſigns, and be able to ſolve all the modes of cogitation, as *Des Cartes* has all the variety of Colours, only by the various motions, figures and diſpoſition of the particles; beſides the improbability of the thing, it can never arrive at greater certainty, but that whatever way they pitch upon, we may, with as good reaſon, aſſign the juſt

juſt contrary. Now ſeeing, according to this Hypotheſis, Aſſent and Diſſent, Affirmation and Negation, *&c.* muſt conſiſt in ſuch a reſpective motion and agitation of the particles; how can any one ſecure himſelf or others, that a faction of the diſſenting Particles (for Example) or ſuch a motion, as cauſes diſſent, may not riſe up, when the nature of the thing requires the contrary aſſent; and by this means erect a *Babel* in Man, and bring all into confuſion.

Further, If Cogitation conſiſt only in the various motion and diſpoſition of the Atoms, then *Phaeton* might poſſibly produce a greater and more undoubted Deity out of his flaming Chariot, than that of his Father *Phœbus*. If this Hypotheſis be true, then *Ex quovis ligno fiat Mercurius*, and the Chair may be as infallible, as he that ſits in it; and this perhaps might gratifie ſome Men in the World, all other methods failing, thus to ſolve Infallibility by mechanick Principles. Pardon me, if in a ſerious argument I thus ſeem to trifle, ſeeing, thoſe I have here to deal withal, firſt taught me the way. For herein they ſeem rather to give an Eſſay of their own extravagant Fancies, than to perſwade others, that they themſelves believe their own Aſſertions. But to return.

Theſe

Theſe Men muſt either aſſert, That there neither is, nor can be any ſuch thing as Spirit in the World; or if there be, that it is impoſſible for ſuch a being to cogitate; neither of which will they be ever able to prove. As for the being of a Spirit, they do indeed, with as much ſtrength of confidence, as weakneſs of Reaſon, tell us, that the Notion thereof includes in it a Contradiction; tho' this they do not as much as attempt to prove any other way, than firſt by ſuppoſing a material Univerſe, and that nothing but matter is contained in it. But this is to beg, not prove the Queſtion.

But the Eſſences of things being unknown, the Notion of a Spirit ſeems as obvious and intelligible, as that of matter: for we may as eaſily conceive of one thing, to which we attribute cogitation, as its immediate property; as we do of another, to which we aſcribe extenſion and impenetrability. And then ſuppoſing a Spirit, Cogitation ſeems the natural reſult of ſuch a being; Tho' I do not here go about to explain the particular way and manner, how Spirits think; for it is hard to conceive, how their own Native penetrability, or the reduplication of themſelves upon themſelves does any ways explain the manner of Cogitation. We muſt

muſt ſatisfy our ſelves with this which is as far as our moſt exact Searches will extend to, That firſt and immediate properties are not demonſtrable of their Subjects, neither as to the things themſelves, nor as to the modes.

Indeed *Sharron*, in his *Book of Wiſdom*, *lib.* 1. *ch.* 7. tells us that Spirits and Devils, *according to the opinion of all Philoſophers, and our greateſt Divines, are corporeal*: Here he cites *Tertullian*, *Origen*, St. *Baſil*, *Gregory*, &c. The Names he mentions, but not their Aſſertions, or the Places, where they ſay ſo: But this being a general accuſation, we may as eaſily deny it, as he aſſert it. But as for thoſe places which perhaps may ſeem to favour his aſſertion, I doubt not but they may, and have already receiv'd eaſy Solutions from one of theſe general conſiderations: 1. That either they aſſerted the opinion of the *Platoniſts*, who yet were no favourers of an univerſal corporeity, *viz.* That Souls were never in a perfect State of Separation from all Body, but had certain etherial Vehicles; and ſo in that reſpect might partake in ſome Senſe, of a Corporeal Nature. Or 2. He doth not rightly interpret thoſe places of the Fathers, where perhaps ſometimes body or matter may be aſcribed

aſcribed to the Soul or Angels: but then by Body, there, is to be meant nothing but Subſtance or Eſſence. So that their Senſe was good and orthodox, though their Expreſſions might be liable to exception: and yet, I think, it is only *Tertullian* that expreſſes himſelf in that manner.

The ſaid *Sharron* goes on and tells us, That *Whatever is Created, being compared with God, is groſs, corporeal, material; and only God incorporeal.* I would willingly here be ſo charitable, as to think that ſuch was his awful reſpect and veneration of the Divine Eſſence, that he would not eaſily grant any thing elſe to partake of the ſame generical nature. Far be it from me to ſpeak any thing, that may in the leaſt derogate from the excellency of the Divine Eſſence; only we may conſider, that it is no honour done to that, to depreſs other things below that juſt Order wherein God has placed them. This ſeems but a piece of Will-worſhip, and ſomething like the Opinion of thoſe, who think they cannot ſufficiently magnifie God's love to ſome, unleſs they abſolutely damn all the reſt: thus alſo, as if we could not ſufficiently magnifie the Spirituality of the Divine Nature, unleſs we diſpoſe all other beings into the rank and Order of Corpore-

ity. 2. Though I do not assert this, yet I would propound it to consideration, whether it may not be possible for the nature of a Spirit to admit of degrees of excellence, *as to the very Essence and Substance thereof*: and not only in respect of its more accidental perfections; yet so, as that which we suppose of the lower order, to be perfectly Spiritual, and contain nothing of Corporeity in it: and perhaps the *Logicians* meant this, when they called God *Super-Substantia*.

But he says further, if it appear, *That Spirits change their place, the very change shows they are moveable, divisible, subject to time, and the successions thereof*, &c. *Which are all qualities of a Body.* But here I would only ask, Whether the existence of a Spirit be possible, or whether God could have created such a being, or no? If he could, then his argument proves nothing: for supposing such a being, it must move, and be in a place just in such a manner, as we now suppose Souls and Angels to be and move: and the argument would have the same force, if we either suppos'd, or were on all sides assur'd of the actual being, that it has now. So that it either proves the impossibility of a Spirit, or else nothing at all to the purpose; this being only such an objection or such a difficulty,

culty, as would lye againſt an acknowledged truth.

I ſhould now *Secondly* ſhow, how from hence we juſtly infer the Spirituality of the Divine Nature. But I ſhall not need to ſpend any time herein: for though there have been ſome, who, granting the immateriality of the Divine Nature, have yet aſſerted the Corporeity of the Soul; yet there never was any, who granting the Soul to be immaterial, ever aſſerted God to be Corporeal. As for thoſe who aſſert a material Univerſe, and a Corporeal Deity, they may perhaps *nomine ponere*, but indeed they do *re tollere Deum*. For a Corporeal Deity is inconſiſtent with the Notion we have of God, uncapable of the Perfections we aſcribe to him; and unable to perform ſuch actions as do properly belong to ſuch a being: But however thoſe, who thus ſuppoſe a Corporeal God, do alſo ſuppoſe a Corporeal Soul.

Thus from the *Knowledge of our Selves* we come to the Knowledge of the Divine Nature.

3. From hence alſo we come to the Knowledge of the true Nature of the Divine worſhip, that ſeeing we conſiſt of Soul and Body, therefore muſt we offer both to God, as our reaſonable Service for external Solemnity; and outward performances are not

to be excluded out of the Divine Worſhip.

Firſt, Becauſe thoſe immoderate pretences to Spirituality are either the natural cauſes, or neceſſary reſults of Enthuſiaſm and Fanaticiſm.

Secondly, By excluding thoſe outward decent Teſtimonies of our inward Devotion towards God, we give occaſion of Scandal to Heathens and thoſe that are without; for they would be apt either to entertain low and mean thoughts themſelves; or at leaſt think that we did ſo, of that God, whom we, for ought they perceiv'd, did ſo rudely worſhip. But then on the other hand, we muſt have a more eſpecial regard to the Soul, for without this, all our other performances are nothing but mere formality and hypocriſy.

CHAP. II.

Of Man, *as compounded of Soul and Body.*

WHAT was the State and Condition of the Soul before its Union with the Body, whether it enjoy'd any State of Præexiſtence, or was then firſt created, when firſt

firſt put into the Body; or if it did præexiſt, then in what manner, whether in a pure ſeparation from all matter, or in conjunction with an etherial Vehicle, is not my deſign here to examine: only 'tis obſervable, that in things of this Nature, where inclination rather than any cogent Reaſons of belief take place; in things where Providence hath not thought fit to give us a certain or determinate truth of things, there Men are uſually determin'd to this or that ſide of the queſtion, by very accidental conſiderations (as in this caſe of Præexiſtence) by the more or leſs favourable apprehenſions they may have receiv'd of the Platonick or Peripatetick Philoſophy; or by thoſe previous notions they have entertain'd of Providence, to which they think this or that Opinion may ſeem more agreeable.

Nor, *Secondly*, ſhall I conſider Man in his Natural or Phyſical capacity; that which I here deſign being an Eſſay of Moral or Political, rather than of Natural Philoſophy: I ſhall not here enquire into the more explicable modes of Senſation or Intellection; much leſs ſhall I attempt to explain thoſe natural Myſteries of Humane Nature, *viz.* The particular mode of the Souls union with the Body: being diſcouraged therefrom, by

the difficulties of the thing, and the unſucceſsful attempts of ſome who have endeavoured to effect it.

Claubergius hath a diſcourſe particularly *de conjunctione Animæ & Corporis*; but whether he has left it any whit more plain and intelligible than he found it, I ſhall ſubmit it to the judgment of thoſe, who will take the pains to peruſe it. His way is this, The Soul, ſays he, is united to the Body by thoſe mutual actions, that paſs betwixt 'em; but more eſpecially by thoſe more confuſed operations of ſenſe, and by the leſs diſtinct perceptions of mind. And in his 37th *chap.* he tells us, that *homo alius alio, & idem ſeipſo, diverſo tempore, magis minúſve homo cenſeri debet:* For according to him, the denomination of a Man, as ſuch, conſiſts chiefly in ſuch an union of the Soul and Body, which is more eſpecially perform'd by the operations of Senſe. Now I ſee not, why that eſpecially ſhould denominate us men, wherein we come the neareſt to the nature of Brutes: nor is there any reaſon why a Contemplative Perſon, one who enjoys a more quick and lively exerciſe of his higher faculties, why ſuch a one ſhould not be counted as much, yea more a Man, than he that lives more by ſenſe. That the Soul doth make uſe more eſpecially

ly of the Body and Bodily repreſentations in theſe actions of ſenſe, is very true; but if we enquire farther how it is joyned to the Body even in theſe more confuſed operations, the difficulty would perhaps ſtill return.

Nor ſhall I here diſpute, whether the Soul immediately upon the diſſolution of the whole Frame, or of the more principal Parts of the Body, doth thereupon by its own activity quit its ſtation, and launch into thoſe other unknown Regions: or whether beſides this, there be not alſo requir'd (which ſeems as probable) as immediate an act of God, to take it out, as there was to put it into the Body: only we may obſerve, that God, both by the light of Nature and his reveal'd Law, hath made the union of the Soul and Body ſo ſacred, that it now becomes abſolutely unlawful for us, by laying violent hands upon our ſelves, to ſeparate thoſe, whom God hath thus ſtrictly joyned together; that whatever natural tye it is under, as to the Body, 'tis certain it ought not to quit its Station, without a lawful Warrant from its great Commander.

I ſhall here rather ſtate the queſtion betwixt the *Stoicks* and *Epicureans*, and ſhow their ſeveral errors and miſtakes on either hand: the one by aſcribing too little to the

Body, and too much to the Soul; the other by attributing too much to the Body, and too little to the Soul, in the Accounts they give of humane Nature. The *Stoicks* would make Man ſo wholly rational, that they will ſcarce allow him to be ſenſible, and would wholly exclude all natural affections and bodily paſſions out of humane Nature: and the *Epicureans* on the contrary, make all the moſt noble Actions of the Soul meerly ſubſervient to the deſigns of ſuch Pleaſure, as is really below the true happineſs of the Soul. By the Body here I underſtand all thoſe paſſions and affections of the mind, which belong to Men more immediately upon account of the Body, all thoſe motions and inclinations of the inferiour appetites, ſo far as they are natural.

The Deſign therefore of the *Stoicks* to root theſe Paſſions out of Humane Nature, is, *Firſt*, impoſſible: *Secondly*, it would be prejudicial thereunto, were it feiſible; for theſe when duly regulated, become the ſubject matter of moral Vertue, and alſo add Vigour and Wings to the Soul in its purſuits of Vertue.

Among the many charges brought againſt *Stoiciſm*, that of Pride and Arrogance ſeems the moſt obvious, and the moſt unanſwerable,

ble, it naturally tending to beget ſuch haughty thoughts of ones ſelf, as are indeed inconſiſtent with the State and Nature of a frail and depending Creature.

What a prodigious thing do they make their Wiſe Man, far above any thing that is called Mortal, and in ſome reſpects equal to God himſelf. As for Repentance, they look upon that as a mean thing, far below the height of their attainments. Innocence indeed is better than Repentance, but for them to pretend unto it, argues a great deal of Pride, founded upon a bad underſtanding of their own State. But this deſcription which they give of a Wiſe Man, is of ſome thing which perhaps they may fancy in their minds, but not of any thing really extant in Nature. Theſe were their undoubted opinions and apprehenſions herein; but whether their own natural Pride of temper, was the cauſe of theſe their extravagant opinions; or whether ſome other falſe Scheme of Principles, which they had entertain'd, had in ſome ſort betray'd 'em into this exceſs of ſelf-conceit, I ſhall not here determine.

Tho' perhaps the ignorance of a future ſtate of Rewards and Puniſhments after this life, joyn'd with their attempt to give an account of that great queſtion, which ſo much

much puzled the Heathen World, *Cur bonis malè, & malis benè.* This perhaps might, in ſome meaſure, oblige 'em, being not fully aſſur'd of a future State, to entertain ſuch falſe opinions of Man's ſelf-ſufficiency; ſo placing all things within his own power, that he needed not to be beholden to any other aſſiſtance, but from himſelf; or to any future expectations to make him happy.

As for the calamities that befal Men here in this Life, they no ways alter the caſe in reference to happineſs or unhappineſs: for thoſe, they ſay, only reach the Body, which, according to them, has no nearer relation to the Soul, than their Cloaths have to it.

Thus the *Stoicks* plac'd their happineſs, where ſome ſort of *Phanaticks* among us place their Holineſs, meerly in the inward Man, without any regard to the outward: as if we could be either Happy or Holy, without any reſpect at all to one of the eſſential Parts of our Conſtitution; as if the inward Man of the one could be holy in the midſt of all outward Debaucheries; and the inward Man of the other happy in the midſt of bodily torments. Thus tho' we grant the Soul to be the Soveraign, yet the Body may juſtly challenge the Liberty of the Subject.

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The other Sect of *Philoſophers*, who have erred in the other extream, is that of *Epicurus*, who attributes too much to the Body: But this, may ſome ſay, is too favourable an expreſſion; when as indeed he doth deſtroy both all Soul in Man, and excludes God out of the World. But my charge here doth not riſe ſo high, it is ſufficient for my purpoſe, what is generally granted by all, that in the account he gives of Man, the Body is too predominant; and the indolency of the Body, ſeems far to ſurpaſs the tranquillity of the mind. For it cannot be made appear, That *Epicurus by his tranquillity* meant that peace of Conſcience and Serenity of Soul, which is the reſult of a Vertuous and Holy Life; but only that quiet of mind, in oppoſition to the diſturbance of buſineſs; or thoſe perplexities of mind, which may ariſe either from Bodily Diſtempers, or ſome ſecret fears and jealouſies. Now if that peace and comfort of a good Conſcience, in the ſenſe before deſcribed, be not meant by tranquillity of mind; then tho' perhaps the word may ſound well, yet indeed it falls ſhort of the true and real happineſs of the Soul, and riſes little higher than the concerns of the Body. We do naturally either make our ſelves, in ſome meaſure, like him whom we worſhip;

ſhip; or we fancy him, whom we worſhip, like our ſelves. Thus *Epicurus* placing the happineſs of the Deity in an idle unconcern'd freedom from buſineſs, did hence probably aſſert ours to conſiſt in the ſame; or elſe being firſt ſtrongly perſwaded of the excellency of the thing, and being mightily pleaſed with the agreeableneſs thereof himſelf, did thence aſcribe it alſo to the Deity, as that wherein all happineſs both Humane and Divine did conſiſt.

It is indeed unreaſonable and uncharitable to urge the conſequences of an opinion upon the Author, when he does expreſsly deny thoſe conſequences to be his opinion: yet, I think, that he that in words acknowledges a God, and yet his Principles are ſuch, as are generally embrac'd by real Atheiſts; ſuch an one is not capable of any juſt Apology. For there is not the ſame Reaſon of all conſequences; ſome are next and immediate, others are diſtant and remote: theſe of the laſt ſort ought not to be urg'd upon the Author of the opinion, but thoſe of the former may.

That *Epicurus* did aſſert the Being of God, and entertained great and honourable thoughts of his Nature, is very certain, as appears out of *Diog. Laertius*. So that none

ſo

ſo charge him with Atheiſm, as if he did not in words acknowledge a God: that which is here aſſerted is this, that that opinion of God, which flatters him with high and honourable thoughts concerning himſelf, his own intrinſick excellencies, his own happineſs and immortality, which yet are but irreſpective Attributes, ſuch as bear no relation to us; and in the mean time to aſſert, that he no ways concerns himſelf at preſent, nor will hereafter take any notice to puniſh or reward Humane Actions. This notion of God lays no Obligation on a Man to holineſs of Life, or Obedience to that God, whom in words he thus admires; and is ſuch a Notion of God, as even an Atheiſt, provided he be not a perfect Mad Man, ought to aſſert: both becauſe perhaps it may ſome ways tend to ſtill and quiet the clamours of natural Conſcience, and alſo as it is ſafe and cuſtomary in reſpect of thoſe with whom he lives. For we never yet heard of a Kingdom or Common-wealth of Atheiſts, ſuch as make it their buſineſs poſitively and openly to aſſert and defend the Opinion of Atheiſm.

But here 'tis reply'd, That whatever his Principles were in themſelves, or what ever bad uſe others might make of them; yet that he

he for his part, was a ſevere practiſer of Vertue and Religion. But it may be juſtly queſtioned, whether the joynt belief of a Corporeal God and a mortal Soul had ever any good influence upon an holy Life. But ſuppoſe *Epicurus* in general to be a very Vertuous and Pious Perſon, and that thoſe contrary imputations of Vice and Luxury were mere Scandals caſt upon him by the *Stoicks*; yet we muſt conſider how far, and upon what grounds, and for what ends he thus led a vertuous life: Now it doth not appear, that it was any further than only in order to a pleaſant Life; and tho' 'tis true, that Religion and Vertue are the moſt proper means in order to this end; yet it is not probable, that he ſo underſtood his own principles, nor indeed were they capable of being ſo underſtood. For ſuppoſing that there lyes no obligation upon us to any duty any further than as it promotes a pleaſant Life, in that ſenſe wherein he takes it; it is eaſily conceivable how ſome degrees of Vice may conſiſt with theſe Principles, provided that they ſo partake of this days pleaſure, that they do not incapacitate themſelves for thoſe of to morrow. And tho' he tells us, that the Gods are delighted with the Vertues of Men: yet this is but cold encouragement to the

the practice of the more difficult Duties of Religion, ſeeing tho' they do ſo far take notice of Mens vertuous actions, as therewith to delight themſelves; yet not ſo far, as for the ſake thereof, to reward the Men.

So that if *Epicurus* was vertuous beyond theſe degrees, that we muſt impute to the Man, rather than to the *Philoſopher*; rather to his vertuous temper, than to his principles: So that whatever he was, as to his own perſon; yet, I believe, his followers made but right conſequences from his falſe principles, when they inferr'd, *Let us eat and drink, for to morrow we dye.*

Nor can the particular excellencies of ſome of that Sect be any juſt vindication of any falſe principle or wicked practice in the firſt Founder of it; any more than *Alexander*'s great Courage and Conduct in War can be made uſe of, as an argument to prove the truth of his Maſter *Ariſtotle*'s opinion, concerning the Eternity of the World. *Marcus Antoninus* was as great an example of all natural and moral excellencies in the Sect of the *Stoicks*, as any other could poſſibly be in the Sect of the *Epicureans*; and yet in reſpect of any ones particular endowments being able to vindicate an error in his Founder, we may ſay here, as it was proverbially ſaid of

of a deſperate and ruin'd ſtate, *Ne Martius quidem.*——

And whereas 'tis ſaid, That *Epicurus* took great ſatisfaction at his Death, by reflecting upon his Life *and his* (I ſuppoſe Phyſiological) *Inventions*; the greateſt invention that he ſeem'd remarkable for, was his ſolving the liberty of the Will meerly by the motion of ſenſeleſs Atoms declining uncertainly from the Perpendicular: now this ſeems no ſuch pious invention, as to take ſuch ſolid comfort in at his Death.

I ſhall here only add theſe two general Obſervations.

Firſt, That Vertue, according to his principles, muſt be founded on very weak and uncertain grounds and reaſons, eſpecially as to the more difficult duties of an holy Life; they being at preſent both unpleaſant and afterwards unrewardable. So that if the *Epicureans* did give themſelves to the practice of ſuch Vertues, out of an abſolute ſenſe of Duty, or from the conſideration of the excellency of the thing it ſelf; then were they the moſt Heroickly Vertuous, not only of any ſort of *Philoſophers*, but alſo of any other People in the world: for then were they vertuous without either hopes of reward, or fear of puniſhment. Beſides, I know not what

what motions ſuch men can have, according to thoſe principles, to return to the Practice of an holy Life; who, by a conſtant and habitual courſe in a well regulated extravagance, have made ſuch a degree of Vice eaſy and pleaſant to 'em.

Secondly, Happineſs, according to *Epicurus*, is impoſſible: for he founds it in an impoſſible condition, in rooting out all fear of Death and all doubtful ſuſpicions that may ſucceed it. Now the hopes and fears of future good and evil are anticipations ſo implanted in us, that the rooting them out, is a thing abſolutely impoſſible: now he tells us, that we cannot attain ſincere pleaſure without Phyſiology; that is, I ſuppoſe, ſuch an Hypotheſis of Natural Philoſophy as his own, which excludes all Divine Providence out of the World, and takes away the immortality of the Soul; *Neq; prodeſſet aliquid humanam ſibi parare ſecuritatem, cum ſuperna, & quæ ſub terrâ ſunt, ſuſpecta eſſent*; Diog. Laert.

Now what the *Stoicks* were among the Heathens, that, in ſome reſemblance, are the *Enthuſiaſts* among Chriſtians: and then as for the *Epicureans*, we have a ſort of Men amongſt us, who cannot be ſaid ſo properly to reſemble 'em, as really to be the ſame.

Now whereas the great deſign of the Goſpel was to root out ſin, and plant the moſt exemplary Vertue and Piety in the World; the *Enthuſiaſts*, inſtead of this, make the deſign thereof, *to conſiſt* in ſomething, pretendedly, above it.

As *Firſt*, In a Pompous ſett of high flown Notions, and ſpeculative Truths, as if the Sun of Righteouſneſs came only to enlighten the underſtanding; but not either to regulate the Will, or warm the Affections: as if it was enough to be ſeraphical in our underſtandings, tho' in the mean time our Wills be vicious and irregular. Though this is not ſo to be underſtood, as if it was indifferent for us, what we believe, provided that we be careful and conſcientious in the way we are in. For it is impoſſible for us to lead a truly good and holy Life, without a firm belief of the Chriſtian Articles: but then we muſt not reſt in a bare belief of Truth; for Truth without Practice, becomes not only uſeleſs, but of bad conſequence to us.

Secondly, The *Enthuſiaſts* place a great deal of Confidence in vain pretences to Divine Revelation; as if their Souls were the only Seats of the Deity, and as if they were the only Miniſters of State here below, and Heavens great Privy Councellors:

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As if God's written Word were only a dead Letter, unleſs enlivened by their Interpretations: all which, tho' different Comments, muſt be of greater Authority than the Text it ſelf, not only when they contradict that, but alſo one another.

Thirdly, The *Enthuſiaſts* entertain ſuch an imaginary Opinion of Perfection, as ſtates 'em, not only above all Humane, but Divine Laws; as if their Wills and Actions were the only Rules of Right and Wrong, and that, what ever they did, was therefore good, becauſe done by them: Thus are they grown ſuch Giants in Religion, as that they have baffled all checks of Conſcience and Obedience to Laws, which they look upon, as mean and low diſpenſations, quite to be laid aſide, when once Men arrive at this State of Perfection.

Fourthly, *Enthuſiaſm* conſiſts in an ill-guided Zeal, prodigiouſly Partial and Indulgent to thoſe of its own perſwaſion; but Furious and Cruel to thoſe, who differ from 'em.

Now as the *Stoicks* pretended by their falſe Opinions of Humane Nature to be more than Men; So the *Enthuſiaſts* by the like miſtakes concerning true Religi-

on, pretend to be more than Chriſtians: tho' indeed they both come ſhort of what they ſeverally pretended to.

Having thus briefly ſtated the Queſtion betwixt the *Stoicks* and *Epicureans*, I ſhall here further enquire, how far God makes uſe of the lower faculties of the Soul in the communications of himſelf to Mankind. I ſhall not here go about to explain the manner, how God now under the Goſpel works upon the minds of Men by the gracious influences of his Holy Spirit; for theſe may be more happily experienc'd, than ſucceſsfully explain'd: however I conceive it would be a very prepoſterous method to do it by beginning at the lower faculties of the Soul; for theſe are not immediately, and in the firſt place wrought upon, but by the mediation of an enlightned Underſtanding, and a rectifi'd Will: and from thoſe Fountains is Grace and Goodneſs deriv'd into the Soul. Thus our Remedy is apply'd in a way anſwerable to our Diſeaſe, the Corruption and Depravation of our Nature: Now this conſiſts more eſpecially in theſe two things, in ignorance of the Underſtanding, and impotence and irregularity of the Will: anſwerably hereunto in the Reſtitution of Man; God firſt informs

informs his Underſtanding, then aſſiſts and inclines his will by his Grace, and ſo applys himſelf to his inferiour Appetites in a way ſuitable to their Natures, in bringing them under the Power and Government of Reaſon and Religion.

I ſhall here rather enquire how far God made uſe of the Fancy and Imagination in the Communications of himſelf to his Servants under the Law by way of Prophecy: and this I ſhall rather do, becauſe of the dangerous Opinions that ſome Men have of late vented on this Subject, thereby endeavouring to undermine the very Foundation of all Divine Revelation, truly ſo call'd. For they think, if they can but once ſufficiently diſparage the manner of God's revealing himſelf to the Prophets under the Old Teſtament, they will be hereby better enabled to reject all Divine Revelation under the New. I ſhall here therefore make ſome ſhort reflections upon the Author of *Tractatus-Theol. Polit*: in his two firſt Chapters of Prophets and Prophecy. In Order thereunto I ſhall premiſe, 1*ſt*. God in the Communications of himſelf to Mankind is not ty'd to any either Natural or Moral qualifications of the Perſons he pleaſes to make uſe of; For what ever is wanting, either

as to the vigorouſneſs of the Fancy, or ſtrength of underſtanding, God can ſupply the defects hereof ſome other way, or act more immediately by himſelf in abſence of them all. 2*dly*. Yet notwithſtanding, God commonly makes uſe of Second Cauſes, and of Inſtruments duly qualified, in order to the effecting his Deſigns in the World, particularly in Prophecy. According to the conſtant Opinion of the *Jewiſh* Doctors, there were certain previous preparatory diſpoſitions in order to it, and theſe were of three Sorts, Natural, Acquir'd and Moral. 1. A good Natural Complexion and Temper of Body, a due mixture of the Humours, without any predominancy of Melancholy, a Mind naturally Calm and Chearful, a Fancy Active and Vigorous, an Underſtanding Clear and Strong, without any Crazedneſs or Inconſiſtency. 2. All theſe improv'd to the higheſt Degrees of perfection by Study and Induſtry. 3. To theſe muſt alſo be added a vertuous and well-diſpoſed Temper of Soul, free from all vicious habits and inclinations. Thus the *Jews* had their Schools of the Prophets, for the fitting and preparing Young Scholars, which they call'd, *the Sons of the Prophets*, for that imployment. Now this ſufficiently ſhews, that ſomething more

more than mere Fancy was required to the Nature of Prophecy; Yet this is not ſo to be underſtood, as if Prophecy was the Natural reſult of any of theſe ſingly, or of all joyntly, unleſs God was pleas'd to Communicate himſelf to ſome, as he ſaw fit. For all thoſe who were brought up in the Schools of the Prophets, did not preſently propheſie: Thus neither the abſence of the uſual qualifications do incapacitate a Man for Prophecy; nor doth the concurrence of 'em all make one actually a Prophet: Prophecy, in the formal Notion and Nature of it, being no ways in the power of Man, but wholly depends upon the will of God. Hence we ſee, what little reaſon the foreſaid Author had to ſay, that tho' God did make uſe of the Fancy ſometimes in the conveyance of his Will to the Prophets; yet that Prophecy, *Non niſi ope imaginationis perficitur, & à ſolâ imaginatione pendet:* and this he proves no other ways, than becauſe they propheſied. But this is not to prove, but to beg the Queſtion.

He firſt makes an injuſt Compariſon betwixt Natural Knowledge and Divine Revelation, 1. In reſpect of the Name, and tells us that the one may be called Divine as well as the other, becauſe they are both deriv'd from

the ſame Fountain, *viz.* God. But thus by the ſame way of arguing he muſt, and indeed doth aſſert, That either there are no Miracles at all: or elſe that all the effects of Nature are ſuch; becauſe the power of Nature is the Divine Power, as well as that of Miracles. But in order to either of theſe, he ſhould firſt make good one or both of theſe Poſitions, either that God hath not an immediate Power of Acting by himſelf, diſtinct from the ordinary courſe of Nature; or elſe, that ſince the conſtitution of the Natural Frame of the Univerſe, he hath not reſerv'd to himſelf a liberty of Acting according to that Original Power: neither of which will he be ever able to prove.

2. Suppoſe Natural Knowledge may alſo be call'd Prophecy or Divine Revelation, in reſpect of it's Original; yet how can it be call'd *æquali jure*, as he ſays, Divine: becauſe in other reſpects, both as to the manner of their conveyance, and largeneſs of extent, there is a great deal of difference betwixt 'em: however why ſhould Natural Knowledge be call'd Divine Revelation, ſince Cuſtom and good Reaſon have juſtly affix'd them to ſeveral things? for he that goes about to unhinge the ſignification of Words, which Uſe and Cuſtom has truly appropriated

ated to 'em in Divinity, has probably no better deſign than he that removes the ancient Land-Marks in a common Field, *viz.* Injury, Diſorder, and Confuſion: Tho' this muſt be alſo granted, that Natural Knowledge doth bring us under an Obligation to thoſe reſpective Duties which it dictates, even antecedent to that of Divine Revelation. For we are firſt Men, and then Chriſtians; and by both theſe ways God hath made known his Will, and claims our Obedience.

He grants indeed that *Humanæ Naturæ Leges, in ſe conſideratæ, non poſſunt ejus, i. e. Divinæ Revelationis eſſe cauſa.* Why he ſhould thus mince the matter, as to inſert theſe Words, *in ſe conſideratæ*, I know not; whereas 'tis certain, That the Laws of Humane Nature can be no ways the cauſe of Divine Revelation. I know, his meaning here is ſuſpected by ſome to be this, that the Laws of Nature, *conſider'd in themſelves*, that is, without the ſuppoſal of a God, which is one integral part of the Univerſe; ſo indeed they cannot be the cauſe of Divine Revelation: but then ſuppoſing a God ſo interwoven with the Laws of Nature, as that he ſhall be either really the ſame with, or very little different from the Univerſe and the Laws thereof, under this conſideration, how

how far the Laws of Nature may be the cauſe of Divine Revelation, that is, of that which he calls ſuch, is the grand myſterious Queſtion.

The other thing wherein he compares Natural Knowledge with Prophecy, is in reſpect of certainty, wherein Natural Knowledge, he ſays, comes no ways ſhort of Prophetical.

If we conſider the certainty the Prophet himſelf had of thoſe things which were reveal'd to him, we are now at a loſs how certainly to determine this Queſtion; for he only could fully aſſure us of the truth of theſe things, they relating to himſelf: Yet it ſeems very reaſonable to believe, that the certainty of their Knowledge did not any way fall ſhort of, but rather exceed that of Natural Knowledge; ſeeing we may eaſily ſuppoſe, that God may, by the ſecret influences of his Spirit, & by the more immediate applications of himſelf to the minds of Men, as fully aſſure 'em of the truth of his Revelations, as they can be of any thing by any Natural Principles: and that it really and actually was ſo, may appear from hence, that thoſe to whom God convey'd theſe Revelations, have by vertue hereof undertaken the performance of ſuch things, which

arguments

arguments drawn from mere Senſe and Reaſon, in all probability, could not have perſwaded 'em to.

Cum itaq; mens noſtra ex hoc ſolo, quod Dei naturam objectivè in ſe continet, & de eadem participat, poteſtatem habeat ad formandas notiones, &c. Merito mentis naturam, quatenus talis concipitur, primam Divinæ Revelationis cauſam ſtatuere poſſumus. This ſeems very ſtrange myſtical Divinity: if by Divine Revelation, he mean Revelation truly ſo call'd; then it is altogether unconceiveable how any impreſſions of Natural and Moral Truths (and that is all that he ought to underſtand by thoſe expreſſions, *quod Dei Naturam objective in ſe continet, & de eâdem participat*) How theſe can any ways be the cauſe of Divine Revelation; if by Divine Revelation he mean nothing but Natural Knowledge, beſides the impropriety of the Expreſſion, I do not ſee how the Soul can ſo truly be call'd the firſt cauſe even of that neither, but rather the firſt and immediate ſubject of it. Upon the whole matter, one might almoſt be perſwaded from hence to think, *That by our Souls containing in it the Nature of God objectively, and partaking of the very ſame*, that hereby he deſign'd, as it were, to melt down God and the Soul of Man

Man into an equal conſtitution, and both into parts of a material Univerſe.

Then he tells us, that *Quicquid dici poteſt, ex Scripturâ ſolâ peti debet* : What ever is ſaid of things relating to Divine Revelation, ought to be fetch'd from Scripture alone. This in general is a very good Rule, yet it is to be underſtood with ſome certain limitations, as he himſelf acknowledges in the ſame Paragraph, unleſs we had rather ſay, that the latter part thereof contradicts the former: for he tells us, "That the *Jews* ne-
"ver took any notice of Second Cauſes,
"but did generally recur to God, as the
"cauſe of all great and excellent things they
"had occaſion to ſpeak of. And therefore
"we muſt only take that for Supernatural
"Revelation, which Scripture expreſsly ſays
"is ſuch, or what may be gathered to be ſo,
"from the circumſtances of the Relation.

Firſt, I grant, that God may declare that again, which a Man either by Natural Principles or ſome other way knew before.

Secondly, When God makes any Revelation to a Man, it is neceſſary, that he ſhould make ſuch a reduplicative Declaration as this, That this which I now ſpeak, is Pure, Simple, unmixt Divine Revelation, ſuch as exceeds the Power of Natural Cauſes to make

make known? if ſo, then it may be queſtioned, Whether God ever made any ſupernatural Revelation to Mankind or no; becauſe we no where meet with any ſuch Declaration. And as to the circumſtances of the Narration, we can never, according to his Principles, from thence gather any thing to be truly Divine; becauſe, as I intimated before, he makes the Power of God and the Power of Nature the ſame; or however aſſerts, that we are very much ignorant how far the Powers of Nature may extend. However we may make uſe of this aſſertion, againſt himſelf, that if we may argue from the circumſtances of the Relation; then it is not neceſſary, that whatever is ſaid concerning theſe things, ſhould be fetch'd from Scripture only. 'Tis eaſily obſervable how this Author, by unſetling the ſignifications of Words, and confounding the Notions of things, deſigns to bring all into confuſion: he argues much what at a rate with Mr. *Hobbs*, that is, weakly, and probably with the ſame deſign, that is, Wickedly. But Providence hath ſo ordered affairs, that a bad Cauſe ſhould always be a weak one.

He founds all Prophecy meerly in the imagination: hence, he ſays, it is that the Prophets conceiv'd all things parabolically, and

and expreſs'd ſpiritual things after a Corporeal manner; becauſe this agrees more with the Nature of Imagination. Hence it was, that thoſe that were with Chriſt, *ſaw the Spirit deſcending like a Dove*; and the Apoſtles, *as it were Tongues of Fire*; and S. *Paul*, when he was Converted, *ſaw a great light*: becauſe *all theſe things did ſuit with the nature of Imagination*: As if either there was no Foundation in Nature for any ſuch belief, but only the imagination of Men; or as if theſe appearances reach'd no further than the Fancy, without any Divine Influence, making any further impreſſions upon the minds of thoſe who were concern'd herein.

Si igitur ſacra volumina percurramus, videbimus quod omnia quæ Deus Prophetis revelavit, iis revelata fuerunt vel verbis, vel figuris, vel utroq; modo. That all the Prophecies we meet withal in Scripture, were convey'd to the Prophets by Words or Figures and ſenſible Repreſentations, or both. I ſhall here ſhow *Firſt*, That this aſſertion is falſe. *Secondly*, If it was true, yet it would not prove what he thereby deſigns.

1. It doth not appear that all the Divine Revelations in Scripture were convey'd one of theſe two ways: There are ſome inſtances where there is no mention made

made of either of theſe two; and to ſay, that one of theſe was made uſe of, tho' not expreſs'd, this is *gratis dictum*, and contrary to his own Rule, That whatever is ſaid of theſe things, muſt be drawn from Scripture.

The inſtances, I mean, are thoſe of *Joſeph*'s interpreting the Dreams of the *Butler* and the *Baker*, and of *Pharoah*'s Dream concerning the Seven Years of Dearth, *&c.* *Gen.* 40 and 41 *chap.* Now the Interpretation of Dreams, is as much Prophecy or Divine Revelation as the Dreams themſelves; and yet here we do not find either any Voice or ſenſible Repreſentation.

Nor are his Reaſons any whit more cogent than his Inſtances: for tho' he grants it poſſible for God immediately to communicate himſelf to Men, *Attamen ut homo aliquis ſolâ mente aliqua perciperet, quæ in primis noſtræ cognitionis fundamentis non continentur, nec ab iis deduci poſſunt, ejus mens præſtantior neceſſariò atq; humana longe excellentior eſſe deberet.* But I know no reaſon, why the Soul of Man is not of capacity enough to perceive and apprehend the Objects of Divine Revelation, when duly communicated to the perceptive Faculties, without the aſſiſtance of Fancy or Imagination: For this is certain, and both Reaſon and Religion obliges

us

us to believe, That God doth convey his gracious Aſſiſtances, by which he both enlightens the Underſtanding, and reforms the Will, without the mediation of the Phancy: and it is alſo very reaſonable to believe, That God did many times, under the Old Teſtament, convey the Intimations of his Will to Men, without either Voice or Viſion: however this is certainly done by the Communications of Divine Grace to Chriſtians, now under the Goſpel.

2. Suppoſe that God always made uſe of theſe imaginary Repreſentations, in the Conveyance of his Will to the Prophets; will it therefore follow, *ad prophetizandum non eſſe opus perfectiore mente, ſed vividiore imaginatione?* Will it therefore follow, that they did *tantùm per imaginationem percipere?* Will it therefore follow, that they did *non niſi ope imaginationis percipere?* Though God in the wiſe methods of his Providence, did make uſe of ſecond Cauſes, will it therefore follow that the whole Cauſality muſt be aſcribed to them? Could the Fancy alone, or the Fancy and Underſtanding together, rightly judge of the ſenſe and meaning of thoſe Repreſentations, without the further aſſiſtance of Divine Illumination? to aſſert either of theſe, would argue him either a bad

bad Philoſopher, or a worſe Divine: ſo that it would be hard to conceive, how theſe imaginary Repreſentations, without a more immediate interpretation of their ſenſe and meaning, would be any thing better than idle ſhows and inſignificant appearances.

CHAP. III.

Of natural Notions of Truth and Goodneſs.

THere is nothing that affords us more noble or more uſeful matter, whereon to exerciſe our Speculations, than a ſerious Enquiry into the reſpective natures of Truth & Goodneſs, which are things of ſo great Excellency in themſelves, and of ſuch near relation to us, that it doth not become a Man, a Philoſopher, or a Chriſtian, to be ignorant of either. 'Tis obſerv'd by ſome, that *Pilate* immediately upon his propounding that Queſtion to our Saviour, *What is Truth?* He went forth, not ſtaying for an Anſwer: yet Providence hath not left us in the dark in things of this nature; we have the certain Guides of Reaſon and Revelation, as much

much as God thought fit to impart to us, ſufficient to ſatisfy all ſober, though not over-curious Enquiries, ſufficient to all the ends and purpoſes of this humane State. Truth, indeed both natural and reveal'd, hath ever ſince its firſt appearance in the World, variouſly ſuffer'd by the Ignorance of ſome, and the Malice of others; by the contrary and eager pretences of oppoſite Parties, by the weakneſſes and follies of Men, and by the power and ſubtlety of the Devil; and eſpecially by that univerſal deluge of Sin and Wickedneſs, which both upon a natural and moral account, is very prejudicial to the concerns of Truth, both as Vice is naturally deſtructive of good Principles, and alſo as wicked Men are ready to believe (though never ſo falſe) what they think would be their Intereſt to be true.

Thus if we conſider the ſtate of the Gentile World in the firſt Ages, we ſhall there find a very bad face of things. For not to ſpeak of the groſsneſs of popular Errours, and the no leſs impious, than falſe apprehenſions of the generality of the common ſort; the moſt exact Enquiries of their Philoſophers were often falſe, but always mixt with a great deal of uncertainty in their Diſcourſes,

Diſcourſes, having commonly a contrary Sect and Company of Men, that whatever was aſſerted by one, was many times with as much vigour and equal probability of reaſon contradicted by another. So that a ſober and ſerious Enquirer after Truth, though he might have reaſon enough not to profeſs himſelf a Sceptick, but to believe that there was ſuch a thing, as truth; yet he might then ſee too much cauſe to deſpair of ever finding the certain way that led to it, among ſo many By-paths of errour and uncertainty.

And even now in the Chriſtian World, the many errours in Opinions, and the more fatal Hereſies, of wicked practices, do ſufficiently teſtify, that Truth doth not enjoy ſuch an undiſturb'd Empire, as might have been hop'd and wiſh'd, ſince Chriſt's appearance in the Fleſh. Now among all theſe diſadvantages, under which Truth always labour'd, and even ſtill labours, Providence hath more eſpecially provided theſe two ways for the preſervation of it. 1. By natural inſcription upon the minds of men. 2. By after revelation for the further illuſtration and confirmation of it. And theſe two are, as it were, the two Pillars, that have preſerved it, both from the deluge of

Sin, and the violence of all other oppoſition.

1. Natural Inſcription. I hope, I ſhall not need to deſire the Reader, not to impoſe any ſuch groſs ſenſe upon this word, as is inconſiſtent with the nature of an Immaterial Soul.

I ſhall here therefore firſt briefly explain, what I mean by truth of firſt Inſcription, or natural Notions: For the Defendant has always leave to ſtate his own Queſtion, and to declare in what ſence he undertakes the defence of it: this I the rather intimate, becauſe ſome Men will put ſuch a Senſe upon theſe words, *innate*, *imprinted* or *impreſs'd*, frequently made uſe of in this Queſtion, as none that I know of, go about to defend.

Firſt, I do not here aſſert the Opinion of the *Platoniſts*, concerning innate Ideas, in all its circumſtances: I do not here ſuppoſe the Soul to præxiſt; nor do I make all the knowledge we have in this ſtate, to be nothing but reminiſcence or recollection of what we knew in the other.

Secondly, Theſe natural Notions are not ſo imprinted upon the Soul, as that they naturally and neceſſarily exert themſelves (even in Children and Ideots) without any aſſiſtance from the outward Senſes, or without

without the help of ſome previous Cultivation. For thus reaſon it ſelf, which yet, we ſay, is natural to a Man, is not ſo born with him, but that it requires ſome ſupervenient aſſiſtances, before it arrive at the true exerciſe of it ſelf: and it is as much as I here contend for, if theſe notions be in the ſame ſenſe connatural to the Soul, as reaſon it ſelf is.

But *Thirdly*, The uſe of our Underſtandings being firſt ſuppos'd; that is, our faculties labouring of no natural defect, nor depriv'd of thoſe other advantages, that God and Nature have made neceſſary thereunto, then our Souls have a native power of finding or framing ſuch Principles or Propoſitions, the Truth or Knowledge whereof no ways depends upon the evidence of ſenſe or obſervation: thus knowing what is meant by a whole, and what by a part, hence naturally reſults the truth of this Propoſition, *totum eſt majus ſuâ parte*, without being any ways oblig'd to ſenſe for it. Of this nature are thoſe univerſal Propoſitions, the truth whereof doth not depend upon the actual Exiſtence of any thing; as *quicquid agit, eſt*, &c. Now, I ſuppoſe, we may eaſily diſcern a difference betwixt the Truth of ſuch Propoſitions, as theſe, and thoſe

others, which are brought by ſome to vie with thoſe natural Notions, *viz. White is not black, Tellowneſs is not ſweetneſs*, &c.

I ſhall here 1. enquire into the grounds and reaſons upon which Dr. *Parker*, late Biſhop of *Oxford*, in his account of the Platonick Philoſophy, aſſerts Experimental Obſervation to be the great Rule and Meaſure of Truth: And firſt he blames the Platonick Theology for reſolving Knowledge into its firſt and fundamental Principles. But Knowledge is of a larger extent than that which relates ſtrictly to natural Philoſophy, or what is the object of ſenſible Experiment. There is alſo a Metaphyſical Knowledge, a truth of Propoſitions, which no ways depends upon Obſervation; ſo that, I ſuppoſe, when the Platoniſts ſpoke of reſolving Science into its firſt Principles, they only meant ſuch Knowledge as was capable of ſuch Reſolutions: They did not ſuppoſe us born with innate notions of ſuch things, the Knowledge whereof depends upon Experience: and therefore we ought not to meaſure the Truth or Falſhood of many late Inventions, by ſearching for the reſpective Ideas of 'em in our Minds. Indeed as to matters of natural Philoſophy, it is a much more certain way of reſolving ſuch Knowledge,

ledge, ſo far as can be done, into the teſtimony of Senſe and Experience, than into any imaginary Principles of Speculation.

But he tells us, "That the Mind from "particular Obſervations doth make gene- "ral Rules, which after an exact Scrutiny, "and comparing of every Individual, are "juſtly admitted for proleptick and funda- "mental Verities, and that general Axioms "are only the reſults and abridgments of a "multitude of ſingle Experiments, and that "from the plain experience of ſeveral In- "ſtances, that we cannot look abroad, but "we ſee the parts always leſs than the "whole. Hence we gather this Maxime, *totum eſt majus ſuâ parte:* this indeed is plauſible popular Diſcourſe, but not ſeverely Philoſophical. For what if one ſhould come and tell us, that in a certain place in the *Eaſt-Indies*, he found the contrary to his obſervation to be true, *viz.* That the parts there were bigger than the whole: I know not what we could Anſwer, in this Caſe, upon the former Principles; for according to them, this Propoſition, *totum eſt*, &c. is true, only, with this his Proviſo, ſo far as hath been yet obſerv'd. But now we find in things of meer Obſervation, ſome particulars to contradict what has been before generally

receiv'd for true. Besides, I never heard of any general Council or Company of Men appointed to declare, when particular observations had undergone a sufficient tryal and probation, so that they then might be admitted into proleptick and fundamental verities; and I conceive, no Man's private authority is enough to do it. It is very difficult, if it all possible, to convince a *Sceptick*; yet are there more strong and probable ways of arguing with him, than this, which founds all truth upon experimental observation: for thus the truth and certainty of any proposition can arrive no higher than this, That so far as is yet observ'd, 'tis true. Now this seems only a more ingenuous and well-natur'd piece of *Scepticism*; for the more moderate of 'em will grant truth of appearance, and tell you, That Snow seems white, but whether it be so or no, they know not.

But to what purpose, says he, *should God imprint such obvious and evident Notions upon Mens minds?* To this I answer, 1. That it must be granted, that it is at least possible for God to imprint truths upon the minds of Men: and if so, then it cannot be done any other way, than by making 'em thus plain and self evident; for we cannot suppose any other way, than by making 'em such, as do

sua

ſuâ luce patere. So that ſuppoſing this poſſible, and ſuppoſing God to reduce this poſſibility into act, and really and actually imprint 'em; yet the objection would lye ſtill as ſtrong againſt 'em, as formerly: So that this is only ſuch an objection as would ly againſt an acknowledged truth, which we commonly ſay, upon that account, is none at all.

2. He muſt give us leave to ſuppoſe theſe natural Notions, till ſuch time as he has evinc'd the contrary. Now in ſtrictneſs of Argument, we ought not to urge the needleſsneſs of imprinting ſuch obvious and evident Notions, againſt thoſe, who ſay that theſe truths do in a great meaſure, owe their clearneſs and evidence to their being thus imprinted: they are indeed evident from the Nature of the Thing, and to us evident from the Nature and Conſtitution of our Faculties, that we cannot apprehend 'em otherwiſe.

And as for Obſervation, that only claims in the Third place--- *ſic à Jove tertius hæres.* So that the needleſsneſs of imprinting ſuch evident Notions cannot be argued from their preſent clearneſs; becauſe it is their being thus imprinted or thus connatural to our minds, that makes 'em ſo.

If it be here reply'd, That however they would be ſufficiently evident meerly by obſervation;

ſervation; It is not certain, that they would be thus ſufficiently ſo, as was before intimated. However we have no reaſon to find fault, if God has given us more and clearer evidences, than perhaps were abſolutely neceſſary.

" But ſuppoſe, ſays he, that we were born " with theſe innate Notions, how ſhall we " be aſſur'd, but that errour may be the " natural Reſult of our Faculties?

Here indeed is ſuch a doubt raiſed, as I ſee not, how he either gives, or can give a ſatisfactory Anſwer to, according to his Principles. For ſuppoſing that the ſeeds of errour may be the natural reſults of our Faculties; that is, Suppoſing our Faculties may be falſe, I do not ſee, how their truth can be evinc'd by the moſt wary and diſcreet experience: and this, he ſays, is the only way, by which to do it. For if errour may be the natural reſult of my Faculties, that is, If my ſuperiour Faculties be falſe, I may then juſtly ſuſpect my lower: If I may be deceiv'd in what, by the moſt clear and diſtinct methods of reaſoning, I conceive to be true; I have then little reaſon to truſt my Senſes.

Here I ſhall further do theſe two things, 1. Show that the Seeds of Errour are not the natural reſults of our Faculties. 2. If they

they were, the moſt wary and diſcreet experience would not at all help us, in our ſearches after truth and certainty.

1. It is not poſſible, that the ſeeds of errour ſhould, *&c.* in thoſe things, that we clearly and diſtinctly perceive to be true; and this will appear,

Firſt, From the nature of Man, as he is a rational Creature: now rationality includes in it one or both of theſe two things.

1. Some certain and undoubted Principles, which are to be the Foundations of Truth and Goodneſs.

2. However a natural power or faculty of making right conſequences, and drawing neceſſary Concluſions from true premiſes, which way ſoever we come by 'em. Now the poſſibility of our Faculties being falſe, is not conſiſtent with either of theſe.

Secondly, This further appears from the nature of the divine Attributes: for conſidering the excellency and goodneſs of the Divine Nature, he could not give us ſuch faculties, as ſhould deceive us *in clarè & diſtinctè perceptis*, as *D. Cartes* has well obſerv'd: for this would argue either weakneſs or malice in God; either that he ſtood in need of ſuch fallacious methods to bring about his deſigns, or that he did purpoſely impoſe

impoſe upon his Creatures. All that can be here pretended, is this, that indeed it would have reflected diſhonourably upon God to have created us ſo at firſt, as that errour ſhould be the natural reſult of our faculties. But then, what if by ſome offence, either of our own, or of ſome other in our ſtead, this be brought upon us as a juſt puniſhment, the contrary fate to *Caſſandra*, that as ſhe always ſpake true, yet never was believed: ſo on the contrary, we ſhould always believe our faculties, though they never ſpoke true. But thoſe that make this objection, do either believe the Scriptures, or they do not: If they do, then it muſt be the Sin of *Adam*, that had this malignant influence upon all Mankind. But then by the ſame Scriptures we are as fully aſſur'd, that the puniſhment hereof did not extend ſo far; as we are, that it did at all deſcend upon his Poſterity. That our faculties are weakned, and we hereby become more liable to errour by *Adam*'s Fall, is certainly true: but that our faculties are ſo corrupted, that we are become uncapable of perceiving natural truth, is that which the Scriptures deny, and what the aſſertors of Original Sin, in its greateſt latitude, do not affirm.

If

If they be ſuch as do not believe the Scriptures, yet the objection it ſelf doth ſuppoſe a God, that is, a being infinitely Wiſe, Juſt and Good. Now upon this ſuppoſal we may eaſily refute this unreaſonable ſurmiſe. For this would introduce ſuch diſorder and confuſion into the World, as would be inconſiſtent with the nature of God, who is a God of Order, to ſuffer it. According to this ſuppoſal, we could never come to the certain knowledge of our fault, for which this puniſhment was inflicted: for if our faculties ſhould any ways acquaint us with ſuch a thing, what reaſon had we to think, that they ſhould rightly inform us in this particular, and be falſe in all the reſt? Nor could we ever come to the certain knowledge of the means and methods of amendment; for according to this we ought to act contrary to our reaſon, in obedience to our Principles, as ſuppoſing the dictates of our faculties to be falſe: and ſeveral other ſuch like abſurdities would follow hence, which would be unworthy of a wiſe and good Man to ſuffer in the World, if it was in his power to help; much more unworthy of an infinitely wiſe and good God.

2. If we ſhould once ſuppoſe our faculties to be falſe; I am afraid we ſhould be condemn'd

condemn'd to Eternal Scepticiſm; however beyond the power of the moſt wary experience to relieve us. *Laſtly*, he tells us, "That the only way to be ſatisfy'd of the "truth of theſe notions, is to examine them "by a wary and diſcreet Experience: and "if ſo, to what purpoſe do they ſerve? for "before I have made tryal, I cannot uſe "them, becauſe I have no reaſon to truſt "'em; and Experience makes 'em uſeleſs, "becauſe Experimental Knowledge is of all "others the moſt certain and moſt indubi-"table.

To this I Anſwer, That ſuppoſe theſe natural Notions were not ſo certain in themſelves, but that they ſtood in need of ſome further confirmation by experience: yet would they not be altogether uſeleſs, both as they would encourage us in our Tryals with fair hopes of ſucceſs; and then afterwards when we found the experiment fully to anſwer to, and agree with our former Conceptions, the concurrent teſtimony of theſe two Witneſſes would more fully aſſure us in the belief of thoſe things thus variouſly atteſted: tho' indeed, it would be very hard to try the truth of ſome Propoſitions by Experiment, ſuch as this, *Nihili nullæ ſunt affectiones*, &c.

But

But here a little more poſitively to lay down my apprehenſions herein, I conceive that God, from all Eternity, did ſee and know the natures of things, and the ſeveral Relations they either did, or poſſibly could bear to one another: and this is that which ſome call Ideas in the Divine Intellect, or objects of the Divine Underſtanding. Thus what God underſtands to be either true or good, that is neceſſarily ſo; as a Learned Man expreſſes it, the *Divine Will and Omnipotence it ſelf has no Dominion over the Divine Underſtanding.* For if the nature of truth and goodneſs did wholly depend upon the meer poſitive Command of God, and the arbitrary determination of his Will, then could we not be ſo fully aſſur'd, but that the whole Scheme, both of Truth and Morality, might be changed, and that which is now Vertue, might afterwards become Vice; and ſo on the contrary: the very poſſibility whereof is very unworthy of God, and inconſiſtent with that notion, which we have of him. Thus, I conceive, things are in reſpect of God. Now in reſpect of us, he hath communicated ſomething of a Divine Ray, relating both to Intellectual and Moral Notices, into the very conſtitution of our humane Nature; ſomething that is both a light

light and a law unto us: and this the very Nature and end of ſuch Creatures (as God deſign'd to make us, that is, Rational and Religious) did require.

I know I muſt expect to meet with great oppoſition in the management of this Argument. I am very conſcious to my ſelf of my own inabilities: but I thank God, I am not conſcious of having ſaid any thing againſt, but, as far as in me lies, to promote the deſigns of truth and holineſs. ---*Veniam petimuſq; damuſq; viciſſim.*

D. Cartes, though he grant Eternal Truths, yet theſe he only derives from the Divine Will. "God, ſays he, is not only "the Author of the Exiſtences, but of the "Eſſences of things: and as it was in his "power whether any thing had exiſted or "no; ſo alſo their Eſſences depended upon "his free determination, *Ep.* 37. Part I. He "tells us, that it was equally free for God "at firſt to have made this true, that the "Lines drawn from the Center of a Circle "to the Circumference, ſhould not be equal. But doth not this weaken the force of his own Argument, drawn from clear and diſtinct perception: for we do as clearly and diſtinctly perceive that the lines in that caſe ſhould be equal; as we do the truth of this Propoſition,

Propoſition, *Cogito, ergo ſum.* If it be here reply'd, That ſuppoſing ſuch a Conſtitution of our Natures, as at preſent we have, then things cannot be otherwiſe than now we apprehend them; but if either the frame of our Natures had been otherwiſe at firſt, or ſhall afterwards be changed, then the things alſo had been, or may be otherwiſe. But now the only way to confute ſuch an extravagant Suppoſal, is to appeal to Men's more ſerious and impartial Thoughts: would not the very poſſibility of ſuch a thing be very diſhonourable to God? would it not introduce ſuch a Fate into the World, as would alſo introduce a neceſſity of aſſerting an immoral Deity? Or ſhould we be ever able to aſſert and defend the juſt Rights and Intereſts of Truth and Goodneſs upon this Suppoſal? So that as before I obſerved of Experimental Obſervation, That the higheſt degree of Certainty we can arrive at, by that Principle, is only this, That ſuch or ſuch a Thing, ſo far as has been yet obſerved, is true. So here, though ſuch or ſuch a Thing (I ſpeak now of ſuch as we call univerſal Truths) be at preſent clearly and diſtinctly perceiv'd to be true, yet at firſt it might have been otherwiſe, and may, for ought

we know, be ſo hereafter: And what he aſſerts of ſpeculative Truths, the ſame alſo he ſays of moral Notions of Good and Evil.

Reſp. 6. *There's nothing, neither matter of actual Exiſtence, nor reaſon of Truth and Goodneſs, but what depends upon God:* If by depending upon God, he means dependance upon his Will; ſo that it was free for God to have made theſe Reaſons juſt contrary to what they now are, which ſeems to be what he there means, then in this ſenſe they do not depend upon the Divine Will: If by dependance upon God he means this, That there is nothing either of actual exiſtence, or reaſons of Truth and Goodneſs, but what owes its being to ſome relation it bears to God. This I grant, for even theſe *Rationes veri & boni*, do owe their Eſſences to the relation they bear to the Rectitude and Sanctity of the Divine Nature; theſe were the proper and neceſſary Objects of Infinite Wiſdom from all Eternity, and do there only originally exiſt.

So that perhaps that which ſeem'd harſh to *Des Cartes*, was this, That there ſhould be any Thing that was abſolutely independent of God, which no one here aſſerts; only we ſay, thoſe *Rationes veri & boni* depend

pend upon, or conſiſt in that relation they bear to the Divine Underſtanding, as the exiſtence of other things of more indifferency, do upon his Will. Not but that theſe notions of Good and Evil have yet receiv'd a further impreſſion of their reſpective obligations (to perform the one, and avoid the other) from the Divine Will, that though they were not only therefore good, becauſe God will'd them; yet he hath made them now more abſolutely and indiſpenſibly ſo, by adding the ratification of the Divine Will to their antecedent Natures. Nor can that place of *Geneſis, That God ſaw that all things were good*, that is, ſays he, according to the determination of his Will; yet granting this, this place cannot with any juſt reaſon, be extended further than the material Creation: ſo that though that was therefore good, becauſe God will'd ſo to make it; yet it doth not therefore follow that thoſe *Rationes veri & boni* were only ſo upon the ſame account: or if it be extended further than the material Creation, then why may not things be good, becauſe God knew them to be ſo, before the determination of his will?

I do indeed here ſuppoſe ſome kind of di-

ſtinction betwixt the Divine Underſtanding and the Divine Will; and if it be here objected, that there is no ſuch diſtinction of theſe in God, yet I humbly conceive, that we may, in obedience to our own imperfect modes of conception, conceive of God according to our beſt and utmoſt Capacity; provided that we do not wilfully and maliciouſly derogate from the excellency of his Nature. Now it ſeems more honourable to God, and more agreeable to thoſe Revelations he hath made of himſelf in Scripture, to aſſert, that Good and Evil do not ſo depend upon his Will, as that he can altar the fundamental Grounds and Reaſons of them: though our higheſt conceptions cannot anſwer the excellency of the Divine Nature; yet certainly we may meditate upon God, without any danger of committing Idolatry, or diſhonouring him in our Thoughts, provided that we act according to the beſt of our poſſibilities.

Dr. *Cumberland* alſo, the preſent learned Biſhop of *Peterborough*, ſeems to be no great Favourer of theſe common or natural Notions; though I humbly conceive, that the deſign of that great Man, in his Book *De legibus Naturæ*, is not directly to oppoſe 'em: as may appear, 1. if we conſider the Perſons againſt

againſt whom he writ, that is, the *Epicureans*, as he himſelf aſſerts in his 5th Paragraph of his *Prolegomena*, againſt whom he thought that way and method would not be ſo Argumentative, ſeeing it was wholly rejected and deny'd by 'em. Or, 2dly, The times in which he writ: thus in the 4th Paragraph of his *Prolegomena*, he choſe rather that method there made uſe of, *Hiſce ſaltem temporibus*; that is, in an Age more Philoſophically curious and inquiſitive, in an Age that will not believe any thing, but what comes fairly atteſted and ſufficiently prov'd. And laſtly, If we conſider his own declaration of his Opinion, which he lays down with the greateſt Candour; thus, *Non impoſſibile eſt, ut & nobiſcum naſcantur hujuſmodi notitiæ, & ab extra denuò imprimantur*: So that we ſee, he doth not abſolutely oppoſe theſe natural Notions, only he thought it more convenient, in reſpect of the Perſons againſt whom, and the times and places in which he writ, rather to pitch upon another method. Thus his deſign in that Book, was to ſhew, That the univerſal practice of Vertue and Piety was not only our Duty, but our Intereſt, and ſo founded the Obligation of the Laws of Nature in that more univerſally acknow-

ledg'd and more generally prevailing principle of real advantage to our ſelves. Now this was a deſign ſuitable to the profoundneſs of his Meditations, very agreeable to the Genius of the preſent Age, and indeed every way ſo noble and generous, that none that are Friends to Vertue, can with any reaſon oppoſe his undertaking; eſpecially conſidering with what reſpect he treats that Opinion, which (though he doth not contradict, yet there) ſeems leſs to favour: Thus doth he ſtrengthen Vertue there, where it ſeems the weakeſt, and not in the mean time to deprive it of any of its former aſſiſtances, he fortifies it againſt the new Aſſaults of its modern Enemies, and refuſes not to joyn iſſue with them in a way, wherein they think they have the moſt advantage. But yet that firſt part of his own Aſſertion, *Non impoſſibile eſt, ut & nobiſcum naſcantur hujuſmodi notitiæ:*] This I look upon as ſo great a Truth, that I ſhall beg leave a little further to illuſtrate it. As for his Opinion, that theſe Notices are again imprinted from without, I ſhall not oppoſe it; only, I humbly conceive, there are ſuch good Reaſons for the former part, that of their being born with us, that it ought not to be excluded;

excluded: As 1. This ſeems more agreeable to the plain ſimplicity of former times, and to the leſs Philoſopical Genius of many of thoſe places, wherein notwithſtanding theſe Laws of Nature were generally receiv'd and acknowledg'd: and ſeeing they were ſo, and that by thoſe who had neither opportunity nor capacity to enquire more profoundly into the formal Reaſons and Cauſes of them any further, than as they were conſcious to themſelves both of their truth and obligation; hence it ſeems very probable, that there was ſome other way by which they might and did attain to the Knowledge of 'em, without ſuch Philoſophical Diſquiſitions. And indeed the very attempt to ſearch into the Cauſes and Reaſons of a Thing ſeems to ſuppoſe that we have at leaſt ſome knowledge of the Thing before-hand, as to matter of fact: for Men would ſcarce go about to enquire into the Reaſons and Cauſes of the Laws of Nature, if they had not ſome conſciouſneſs to themſelves, that there were ſuch Things in Nature; and we cannot, for the reaſon before-mention'd, ſay, that they then only firſt came to be known, when the Cauſes of 'em were thus ſearch'd into. And though 'tis true, that the whole Order of Nature

duly conſider'd, doth generally conſpire to the confirmation of this Truth, that the doing our duty is the beſt way to ſecure our Intereſt; yet ſuch is the intricacy many times of Divine Providence, and the viſible inequality in the diſtribution of Rewards and Puniſhments in this life, that without the Motives and Encouragements of ſome other Arguments, Men would hardly be perſwaded to the practice of that, of which they did not ſee the preſent Advantage. And though Vice and Wickedneſs, eſpecially in any high degree, do naturally tend to the prejudice of our Healths, and ruine of our Eſtates; yet if there were no other way to attain to the knowledge of our Duty, or of our obligation to it, we might perhaps ſometimes with too much reaſon plead ignorance thereof, and might pretend a liberty to be vicious, at leaſt ſo far, as might be without any conſiderable prejudice to our Healths or Fortunes: not but that Rewards and Puniſhments are naturally interwoven in the frame and order of the Univerſe without us, and the conſtitution of humane Nature within us; that ſo, though ſometimes there may be an unequal diſtribution of outward Rewards and Puniſhments, yet that Vertue might

always

always be ſure, at leaſt of a ſecret recompence, and Vice not altogether go unpuniſh'd, even here in this Life. But though our duty be always our real Intereſt, and Honeſty the beſt Policy; yet ſuch is the diſorder and confuſion which Sin has introduc'd into humane Nature, ſuch the general depravation of Mankind, that the truth of theſe Propoſitions is not readily many times acknowledg'd by us: but Men commonly, without any regard, either to the preſent nature of things, or their future conſequences, do make Luſt and Paſſion, and a miſtaken Self-Intereſt, the Rule of all their Actions.

2. I would here propound it to conſideration, whether our now being able to reſolve theſe Laws of Nature into their further Cauſes, as it is call'd, and to demonſtrate their Obligations from reaſons fetch'd from the Conſtitution of the Univerſe: whether, I ſay, this doth not depend upon that clearer Revelation, which God hath made of thoſe things in Scripture; for hereby we come to a clearer Knowledge of the Nature and End of the Creation, how that the whole Univerſe acts, in ſubſerviency to the glory of God, and to the promoting thoſe noble ends of Providence, of promoting

ting Vertue, and diſcouraging Vice in the World: hereby we are alſo more fully aſſur'd of a future ſtate of Rewards and Puniſhments. And theſe alſo muſt be comprehended in the full and adequate Sanction of the Laws of Nature; for without theſe, the other of temporal Rewards and Puniſhments, would be found many times deficient and ineffectual, for what they were there deſign'd. Now theſe things being more clearly reveal'd, and fully confirm'd to us by holy Scripture, and the belief hereof, made habitual to us, by the long ſucceſſion of many Ages, hence probably that method becomes now more evident to us, than otherwiſe it would have been; yet if this ſhould be granted, that, at leaſt, the evidence of that Propoſition (*ſtudium communis boni totius ſyſtematis agentium naturalium conducit ad bonum ſingularum partium, quo noſtra, velut partis unius, continetur fælicitas*) doth in ſome meaſure depend upon ſome further Revelations made known to us by the Chriſtian Religion; yet it would be no ſmall or inconſiderable advantage hereby gain'd to Vertue, if it be prov'd, that that Propoſition is of equal extent with the Chriſtian World, both as to its Truth and Evidence: and both theſe methods of probation

tion being join'd together, ſeem an undeniable Argument of the Divinity of theſe Laws; in that the God of Nature hath both made 'em natural to the minds of Men, which is that which I here mean by Impreſſion; and hath alſo further added the reſpective Sanctions of rewards and puniſhments thereunto in the natural frame of the Univerſe.

Not as if that other way of reſolving theſe Laws of Nature into thoſe natural Notions and Obligations reſulting therefrom, was deſtitute of its proper Sanctions of rewards and puniſhments; but then we ſay, according to this method, they are not reſolv'd only into theſe penal Sanctions, but that the will of the Law-giver, being publiſh'd with an intent to be obey'd, is the intrinſick form of a Law, though it did not come attended with outward force, not but that theſe penal Sanctions do alſo further declare and inforce the Law.

If it be here objected, that it is not eaſy to conceive the way and manner how theſe natural Notions are, or can be imprinted upon the minds of Men. I anſwer, there is no more difficulty in conceiving how theſe truths and obligations may be the natural reſults of our Minds rightly qualify'd at firſt;

firſt; than it is to conceive, how thoſe Joys and Torments, which ariſe from the ſenſe of our Innocence and Guilt, ſhould be the natural reſults of our Conſciences afterwards: which yet are acknowledg'd by thoſe who make the objection.

That a Vertuous and holy Life doth naturally tend to promote the honour of God, and the good of all Men in general, and of our ſelves in particular, is readily granted, eſpecially by thoſe, who believe the Chriſtian Religion: but then this Propoſition doth ſuppoſe; Firſt, That we know, what it is to be Vertuous. Secondly, That this Vertuous and holy Life is a duty incumbent on us; and both theſe, in order of nature, before we underſtand, that theſe tend to the glory of God, and the good of Men: otherwiſe the *Virtuoſo*'s of our Age, thoſe who pretend to be Philoſophically Religious, might perhaps plead this in excuſe of their preſent Wickedneſs, that they are only at preſent making an Experiment, whether Vice may not as well tend to the publick good, as Vertue: but as ſoon as they find the contrary by Experience, then they will become devout Proſelytes to Vertue.

But Mr. *Tyrrell*, *p.* 199. tells us, That though all Men do not ordinarily reduce the

Laws

Laws of Nature into that ſingle Propoſition of endeavouring the common good of all rational beings, or may not have an explicit Notion of it; yet if a Man be but thoroughly convinc'd, that he is not made for himſelf alone, that he doth truly obſerve the Laws of Nature towards himſelf, by a temperate and rational Life, towards his Neighbour, by obſerving the great Rule of doing as he would be done by; ſuch an one, tho' never ſo ignorant in other things, yet contributes his ſhare to the common good, *&c.* There is no doubt but he doth, but then may we not rather argue thus, that ſince Men do not ordinarily reduce the Laws of Nature into that one ſingle Propoſition, as indeed having no explicit notion of it, and yet do their Duties, both towards God, their Neighbours, and themſelves; that therefore they have ſome other way of coming to the Knowledge of their Duty, without reſolving the Laws of Nature into their proper Cauſes, as it is called.

Dr. *Lock*, the Ingenious Author of the *Eſſay of humane Underſtanding*, has ſpent the Firſt Part of his Book wholly againſt theſe innate Principles, relating either to Speculation or Practice. One great objection that he brings againſt 'em is this, that Children

Children and Ideots have no apprehension of 'em, and therefore they cannot be any original Impressions upon the minds of Men; because if they were, they would sooneſt appear in ſuch, theſe being ſuppos'd now to be in *puris naturalibus*, not tinctur'd with any adventitious prejudices of Art or Education: and upon this account alſo there cannot be pleaded that univerſal conſent, that is pretended to be given to theſe original Notions, or common Principles; ſeeing thus perhaps one third part of Mankind do not aſſent to 'em. In Anſwer hereto, 1. I obſerve that thoſe who make this objection, as I before intimated, will not give the Defendant leave to ſtate his own Queſtion, and explain his own ſenſe and meaning of it; but will put ſuch a ſenſe upon theſe words, *innate or natural*, as if a thing could not be thus natural or innate to the Soul, unleſs it did ſo immediately and neceſſarily ſtare Children and Fools in the Face; that they muſt neceſſarily aſſent thereto, even before, by the common courſe of nature, they are capable of aſſenting to any thing: whereas thoſe who defend this Queſtion, make theſe natural or innate notions more conditional things, depending upon the Concurrence of ſeveral other circumſtances, in order to the Souls

Souls exerting of 'em. Thus the Ingenious Mr. *Tyrrell* has well obſerv'd of Mr. *Hobs*, *that he only takes the meaſure of humane nature from thoſe Paſſions, which precede the uſe of reaſon, and as they firſt and chiefly ſhew themſelves in Children and Fools and Perſons unexperienc'd; whereas according to the Opinion of the beſt Philoſophers, we ſuppoſe the truer nature of man ought rather to be taken from his utmoſt perfection*, viz. *his reaſon*, &c. *p.* 256. So here 'tis thought that the truer judgment of theſe natural notions ought to be taken rather from the moſt perfect ſtate of Man, rather than as they either do, or do not ſhow themſelves in Children and Ideots. And whereas 'tis aſſerted, that theſe general Maxims are aſſented to as ſoon as propos'd, and the terms rightly underſtood: to this the Ingenious Author Dr. *Lock* replies, that then there muſt be an infinite number of innate notions, even thoſe which no one ever yet pretended to be ſuch, as, an Apple is not an Oyſter, black is not white, *&c.* Now theſe and ſuch as theſe, he ſays, are more readily aſſented to, than thoſe, *quicquid agit, eſt*, contradictories cannot be both true at once, *&c.* becauſe Children and Fools will readily aſſent to the former: but theſe latter require more attentive thought and

and conſideration for the underſtanding of 'em. I ſhall not here mention that diſtinction, which the Logicians perhaps would make uſe of in this Caſe, of ſome things being more known in themſelves, and yet not ſo to us; becauſe I know not what credit now a-days may be given to Men of that old-faſhion'd way of thinking. But the Ingenious Author himſelf doth aſſert theſe three ways of acquiring Knowledge. Firſt, By intuition, thus we have the knowledge of our being, *p.* 318. Man alſo knows *by intuitive certainty, that bare nothing cannot produce any real being*, p. 312. The ſecond way of Knowledge is by Reaſon. Thirdly, By Senſation. Now the Knowledge of theſe Univerſal Truths, or general Maxims, I conceive, is by the firſt way, rather by intuition than by reaſoning, or by the conſent or diſſent of the terms. For theſe Propoſitions, *Cogito, ergo ſum*, or that upon which this depends, *quicquid agit, eſt, bare nothing cannot produce a real being*: the truth of theſe Propoſitions doth not ſo much depend upon any conſideration of the terms; but ſeems rather the ſummary reſult of the whole, which that Author ſeems very well to expreſs by *intuition*, or *intuitive certainty*. But then as to thoſe other Propoſitions, wherein

wherein we deny one *Idea* of another, as, a Man is not an Horſe, blue is not yellow, *&c.* The truth of theſe depends upon the actual exiſtence of Things, and the *conſenſus & diſſenſus terminorum.*

But Mr. *Norris*, the ingenious *Author* of the Reflections upon the foreſaid *Eſſay*, of *Humane Underſtanding*, *pag.* 20. doth not allow any ſuch Things, as Mental Impreſſions or Characters upon the Mind, what way ſoever they may pretend to come there: So that though he agrees with Dr. *Lock* in denying all natural and innate Notions in the Mind of Man; yet it is for other Reaſons than thoſe which Dr. *Lock* goes upon, and upon a far different *Hypotheſis.* So that Mr. *Norris* his *Reflections* may be a ſufficient Anſwer to Dr. *Lock*'s Opinion, as it is defended by him, ſhewing the invalidity of the Grounds and Reaſons upon which he founds it: though in the mean time he agrees with him in the concluſion, in denying all Natural and Native Characters upon the Soul. Which thing, ſays he, in the place above cited, *Of Mental Impreſſions or Characters written upon the Mind, if it* pretend to any thing *more than Figure and Metaphor, I take to be meer Jargon and unintelligible Cant.*

But here, I humbly conceive, that when we ſpeak of Natural Notions, or Native Impreſſions of Truth and Goodneſs made upon the Minds of Men, though perhaps there may be ſomething of Metaphor in it; yet the ſenſe and meaning of it, is generally underſtood: nor is there any danger, leſt any one ſhould hence conclude the Soul to be made of White-paper, and the Knowledge we find there to be written with Pen and Ink, Heb. 10. 26. *I will put my laws in their hearts*, and *in* or *upon their minds will I write them*: That is, ſays Dr. *Taylor, Duct. Dubit. p.* 4. You ſhall be govern'd by the Law of natural and eſſential Equity and Reaſon, by that Law which is put into every Man's Nature; and beſides this, whatſoever elſe ſhall be ſuper-induc'd, ſhall be written in their Minds by the Spirit, who ſhall write all the Laws of Chriſtianity in the Tables of your Conſciences. Now I do not ſee any need of any ſuch curious Remark either upon the *Text* or *Comment*; that if this pretend to any thing more than *Figure or Metaphor, then it is meer Jargon and unintelligible Cant.* 2. Thoſe who aſſert theſe Natural Notions, do not ſuppoſe them ſuper-induc'd or imprinted upon the Soul, *In eſſe completo*; but ſuppoſe them

to

to be native Properties and Qualifications of the Soul, as it is ſuch as God firſt deſign'd to make it; that is, Rational and Religious. Now it can be no *meer Jargon* to aſcribe to a Subject its own natural and eſſential Properties, ſuch as are the very eſſential parts of its Conſtitution. They do alſo ſuppoſe, with Mr. *Norris*, the ideal World, or *Idea's* in the Divine Intellect, which are the Archetypal Forms or Patterns of all Truth; theſe they ſay, are communicated to the Soul in a way and proportion ſuitable to ſuch a being; that is, they are made either the natural Properties of its being, as ſuch, or the neceſſary and immediate reſult of its Faculties, in the right uſe and free exerciſe of 'em. But the *Author* in the forementioned place tells us, *That he accounts for the mode of Humane Underſtanding after a very different way*, viz. *by the preſentialneſs of the Divine λόγος, or ideal World to our Souls, wherein we ſee and perceive all things.* So that denying all mental Impreſſions, not only innate Notions, but alſo thoſe, which according to Dr. *Lock*, derive their Original from *Senſation* or *Reflection*; he aſſerts all ſenſible, moral, and intellectual Objects are only ſeen and underſtood in the *Divine λόγος*. Thus in his

Book of *Reaſon* and *Religion*, *p.* 85. This *ideal World, this Eſſence of God conſider'd, as variouſly exhibitive and repreſentative of things, is no other than the Divine λόγος, the ſecond Perſon in the ever bleſſed Trinity; this I think*, ſays he, *is highly agreeable to Reaſon: for I know no* Hypotheſis *that would ſo intelligibly make out the Eternal Generation of the Son of God.*

Againſt this Opinion, I ſhall briefly ſuggeſt theſe few Prejudices, which whether they be real or only imaginary, I ſhall leave to the Reader to judge. 1. I grant that every good Chriſtian, ſo far as in him lies, ought to defend againſt the *Socinians*, the Myſteries of the *Trinity* from all palpable and down-right Contradictions. But then it is queſtion'd by ſome, whether it be either modeſt, or indeed poſſible to invent *Hypotheſes*, which may, as the *Authour* ſpeaks, *Intelligibly make out* theſe Myſteries; or whether the Eternal Generation of the Son of God may not as well remain, as indeed it is, an Incomprehenſible Myſtery, as thus explain'd, by making the ideal World and the Divine λόγος, to be one and the ſame thing. 2ly, Though the natural parturiency of the *Authors own Mind*, *p.* 185. of his *Reaſon and Religion*, did early pitch upon

upon this Notion, of ſeeing and knowing all things in God, as eaſy and obvious, even before he had conſulted any Authors herein; yet other Mens Capacities may be ſo dull, as not eaſily to apprehend the manner of it, even now after ſuch an exact Elaboration.

3. According to his Hypotheſis, there ſeems not a ſufficient difference and diſtinction betwixt natural Knowledge and Divine Revelation, ſeeing God muſt immediately apply himſelf to the Souls of Men in both, and there is no natural ground or foundation in Man for one more than for the other.

4. It ſeems not ſo becoming that profound veneration we ought to have of the Majeſty of God, thus to make the Divine λόγος, as it were, the Glaſs of every trivial perception of ſenſible objects.

5. May not his Hypotheſis, of ſeeing and perceiving all things in God, ſeem to diſcourage or leſſen the diligent uſe of our Faculties in the ſearch of Truth? or may it not encourage Enthuſiaſm, by giving Men occaſion to think, that the only way to Knowledge is, fantaſtically to give themſelves up to the Impreſſions of the Ideal World? Theſe things I here propound to Conſideration, though withal, I think that

it is more eaſy to oppoſe the particular manner of any Mans explaining humane Underſtanding, than it is to lay down a true one of his own.

But laſtly, That which ſeems of the greateſt conſequence is, that the Author dangerouſly forces ſome places of Scripture only to make 'em favour the peculiarity of his notion. Thus *Jo.* 1. 3. *all things were made by him, or according to him,* δι' αὐτοῦ p. 89. *Reaſon and Religion,* and *p.* 90. *Heb.* 1. *By him God is ſaid to make the Worlds, that is, ſays he, according to the eternal exemplars or platforms in this ideal World.* Now if the *Arrians* were juſtly blam'd for putting that interpretation upon thoſe words, δι αὐτοῦ, thereby to ſignify an Inſtrumental Cauſe, as if the λόγος was only an Inſtrument in the hand of God, in creating the World, how much more then ought this interpretation to be rejected, which makes the ſecond Perſon in the Trinity only an Exemplar or Platform, according to which God made the World: *but* Διὰ *with a Genitive Caſe in Scripture, generally ſignifies the efficient Cauſe:* And however, I believe, he will no where in Scripture find it in that ſenſe, which he there puts upon it: So that this ingenious Author ſeems not ſo ſucceſsful in aſſigning his

his own particular way of humane Underſtanding, as he was in confuting that of Dr. *Lock*'s. And here I would further appeal to the conſiderate Reader, whether this way of ſeeing and perceiving all things in the ideal World, *if it pretend to any thing more than Figure and Metaphor, whether it be not as meer Jargon, and unintelligible Cant, as the other.*

Anima eſt abraſa tabula, nihil eſt in intellectu, quod non priùs erat in ſenſu. Theſe, and ſuch like Opinions, ſeem to owe that general reception they meet withal, rather to the Authority of their firſt Founder, than to any ſtrength of reaſon, that would be found in 'em, did they once undergo a ſeverer Examination: this Opinion ſeems to tye the Soul to its particular Seat, or at moſt, gives it leave only to go a begging to the Cinque-Ports of the Senſes, not only for all the Notices it receives from abroad, but alſo for all the knowledge it enjoys at home.

That the Soul, by the very Laws of Creation, was at firſt dependant upon the Body, and by the firſt tranſgreſſion of the Divine Law, is now more deeply immers'd in matter, and a greater Slave thereto than it was by nature, is certainly true: but then the Image of God, wherein Man was at firſt

Created, did first more especially respect the Soul. 2. It consisted in the respective Endowments and Perfections of the Understanding and Will, *viz.* in Knowledge and Righteousness. And therefore 3. Not in a mere capacity, or bare possibility of having this Pourtraicture drawn afterwards upon the Soul, by the assistance of the outward Senses, but in something at first actually existent in it self. And supposing this to be the true state of the Case before the Fall, it is proportionably the same since: for though the Fall did very much weaken our Faculties; yet it did not wholly alter or invert the method of acquiring, or retaining Knowledge. There are indeed some, who define an Idea to be nothing else, but the similitude or representation of a thing made in the Brain: which definition being so peculiarly appropriated to meer sense and fancy, they cannot conceive any Idea, or Conception to reside any where else; and that we talk mystically and unintelligibly, if we suppose any other Idea, to which that definition doth not, or cannot belong. But tho' it may be justly question'd, whether the mode of sensation be yet fully and clearly explicated, *viz.* how the phancy can represent outward objects in proportionable similitudes

litudes to the ſuperiour perceptive faculties, ſeeing perhaps it would be very difficult to demonſtrate, that any thing, beſides motion, can be communicated to the Seat of the Soul; yet I ſhall at preſent grant, that the Underſtanding doth make uſe of the Repreſentations of the Phancy for the apprehending thoſe things, which were there firſt impreſs'd: and thus I here ſuppoſe all material objects are apprehended by ſuch ſenſible repreſentations.

But now the Queſtion is, Whether the Underſtanding cannot frame right Notions or Appreheſions: of thoſe things, which according to our modes of conception, neither are, nor can be repreſented by the Fancy: Whether there be not ſome things knowable, both moral and intellectual Objects, relating both to Truth and Goodneſs, which are not, and cannot be the Objects of Senſe. So that whatever it is that terminates the Act of the Underſtanding, that may be properly call'd an *Idea*, *Notion*, or *Conception*.

Nihil eſt intellectu, quod non, &c. This cannot be univerſally true, in that latitude wherein ſome would take it: For *Ariſtotle* himſelf grants a Power of judging, of drawing Conſequences from particular Inſtances,

to

to the Underſtanding, which doth not belong to the Senſe; and this Power, I ſuppoſe, will be granted to be ſomething: and indeed it is moſt probable, that he did not extend that ſaying any further, than as it relates only to ſenſible and material Objects.

One Argument commonly made uſe of, to prove the Soul diſtinct from the Body, doth alſo prove the Operations of Senſe and Phancy, diſtinct from thoſe of the Underſtanding: That Faculty of the Mind, ſay they, by which we reaſon and judge of Objects, is ſo far from being a Body, that it muſt withdraw it ſelf from all bodily Repreſentations, when it ſets it ſelf to contemplate more ſpeculative and ſublime Truths: for if the Soul ſhould always frame its Notions according to the Notices of Senſe, this would only betray it into Errour; but now when it abſtracts from this, and with Reaſon corrects what may be there juſtly deem'd amiſs, this evidently ſhews the diſtinction of theſe two Faculties, and the ſuperiority of the one above the other.

So that that opinion wch makes the Soul ſo wholly to depend upon the repreſentations of ſenſe in all its operations, ſeems to have

have a bad influence upon the belief of its immateriality, or however, upon the excellency of its way of acting, by making it more ſubject to the Body, than God and Nature ever made it.

Thoſe therefore who either from the obſervation of the accidental bad uſe, that ſome Men make of the diſtinction of theſe two Faculties; or from the difficulty they themſelves find in aſſigning the differences betwixt 'em, are therefore enclin'd to believe, that there is no difference at all. Theſe Men like unskilful Artiſts, do rather cut then looſe the knot: and like thoſe inconſiderate Men, who from the difficulties and ſeeming irregularities of Providence; or from their own inabilities or unwillingneſs to take the pains to ſolve 'em, do take, as they think, this more compendious way to extricate themſelves, *viz.* to deny that there is any ſuch thing as Providence in the World.

But it is here objected, that the opinion, which I here aſſert, lays a Foundation for Fanaticiſm and Enthuſiaſm, as it gives occaſions for the Enthuſiaſts to think, that thoſe Men are too much immers'd in matter, and too great Slaves to ſenſe and fancy, who do not preſently apprehend their pretended

tended illuminations and myſterious nonſenſe. I ſhall here therefore briefly ſhow, wherein the nature of Enthuſiaſm doth properly conſiſt; and that this opinion, which I here aſſert, is no ways chargeable with giving any occaſion or encouragement to it.

But 1. we may obſerve, that God in the wiſe diſpoſals of his Providence has many times plac'd truth upon the Confines of Errour; nor is it any diſparagement to it, if ſometimes, by reaſon of this Vicinity, it may accidentally give occaſion to it. This ſhould rather teach us the true exerciſe of our Underſtandings, to diſtinguiſh betwixt the falſe gloſſes and plauſible appearances of Errour, and the realities of Truth.

2. I ſhall not here go about to recriminate, for to aſperſe other Men's Opinions is not to vindicate our own; for though they may be charg'd with as bad Conſequences, as thoſe they caſt upon ours, yet this will not make our own innocent, if they be in themſelves obnoxious. I might perhaps with as much or more reaſon charge *Ariſtotle*'s Opinion, *Nihil eſt in intellectu, quod non prius erat in ſenſu*, with giving countenance to *Atheiſm*, as the contrary

trary doth to *Enthuſiaſm*. Dr. *Cudworth*'s 5th *Chap. Intellectual Syſteme.*

This being briefly premis'd, I anſwer, That according to the moſt rational account of *Enthuſiaſm*, which founds it only in ſome irregular and turbulent Motions ariſing from the Body, and acted more eſpecially upon the Scene of Fancy: according to this, I do not ſee, how the aforeſaid Opinion hath any more influence upon *Enthuſiaſm*, than it has upon any other Errours and falſe Opinions whatever.

Thus the *Enthuſiaſt* together with moſt other erring perſons, do take their own miſtaken Fancy and falſe Apprehenſions for the Dictates of Reaſon and Underſtanding: So that *Euthuſiaſm* ſeems rather founded in the contrary Opinion, in not diſtinguiſhing betwixt theſe two; and the *Enthuſiaſt* of all others ſeems the leaſt chargeable with this Errour (if it be one) of diſtinguiſhing betwixt the Phantaſms of Senſe and Imagination, and the Ideas of the Underſtanding: for, as ſuch, he ſcarcely acknowledges any higher Faculty in the Soul, than that of Phancy. So that that Opinion of diſtinguiſhing betwixt the Repreſentations of Senſe and the Idea's of the Underſtanding, hath not any natural tendency to favour

vour *Enthuſiaſm*, unleſs we make it the πρῶτον ψεῦδος, the firſt grand Foundation of all Errours and miſtakes in general; for almoſt all erring perſons do tell thoſe that differ from 'em, that either they are not ſpeculative enough rightly to apprehend their Notions; or that they are too much prejudic'd with falſe Opinions, readily to entertain them.

As an *Appendix* to this *Chapter*, I ſhall add ſome ſhort Reflections upon the 10th *Chap.* 3. *lib.* of *P. Poiret's Cogitat. rationales de Deo*, and upon the 9th and 10th *Chap.* 2. *lib.* of *Cuperus* his *Arcana Atheiſmi*, *concerning Eternal Truths.*

Some

Some Reflections upon *P. Poiret*'s *Cogitationes rationales de Deo, lib. 3. Cap. 10. concerning Eternal Truths.*

The *Queſtion* he thus ſtates, *p.* 125. That God indeed doth neceſſarily conceive thoſe Truths which immediately relate to himſelf, his *Nature*, *Eſſence*, and *Attributes*: He was never indifferent as to theſe; but as for all other Truths, *Quæ ipſe Deus non ſunt*, which are not God himſelf; theſe wholly depend upon the moſt free and arbitrary Determination of his own Will, and are therefore only true becauſe he appointed them to be ſo: and that there might, if God had ſo pleas'd, either have been none of theſe at all, or elſe quite different from what they now are; and he extends his Aſſertion to all Propoſitions, whether Mathematical or Moral, relating either to Truth or Goodneſs; and this he mannages with as much ſubtlety both of Argument and Anſwers, as perhaps the thing is capable of.

But

But before I come more cloſely to examine his Opinion, I ſhall premiſe in general, 1. That it is very ſtrange, that God who created *Man* after his own *Image*, in *Knowledge* and *Righteouſneſs*, ſhould yet aſſign the Methods of *Knowledge* and *Underſtanding* in Men, quite different from thoſe of his own; we know the reſpect and relation that the Actions of the Underſtanding bear to thoſe of the Will in Men, *viz.* That the one, thoſe of the Underſtanding, always precede thoſe of the Will. But now according to his Way and Method, it is quite contrary in God; for according to him God doth not know or underſtand any thing, but what he firſt determines to be ſo. I know not whether I may urge this in ſtrictneſs of Argumentation, yet it ſeems at leaſt a great preſumption againſt the truth of his Opinion. 2. It is a plauſible pretence of Piety, a ſeemingly profound Veneration and Reſpect for the abſoluteneſs of the Divine Perfections, which ſeems either the chiefeſt Argument for, or the greateſt Motive and Perſwaſive to his Opinion. This tender care for the Honour of the Divine Nature, is indeed a thing very commendable in it ſelf, and very worthy of a *Philoſopher* and a *Chriſtian*; yet Men

Men ought to be very careful and conſiderate herein, leſt they leſſen and derogate as much from the excellency of the Divine Nature one way, as they ſeem to advance it another.

Now in order to a more particular Anſwer to his Opinion, I ſhall obſerve, 1. How in the Progreſs of his Diſcourſe he relinquiſhes his own Principle, and limits the general extent of the queſtion, as it was at firſt ſtated, ſo as that in effect he Anſwers himſelf; for he either doth himſelf tacitly, at leaſt, or from his own aſſertions will be forc'd to acknowledge, That there is ſome truth antecedent to the Divine *Placitum*, or appointment.

In his Anſwer to the firſt Objection, that God knows, what it is that he either will or will not appoint, ſo that his knowledge muſt precede his determination; to theſe Premiſes he returns no plain poſitive Anſwer, but only holds to the Concluſion, and ſays, that they who aſſert this, do pre-ſuppoſe, that there is ſomething different from God, *quod ante Dei arbitrium ſeu placitum habeat veritatem & poſſibilitatem à parte ſui*, which he ſays is πρῶτον ψεῦδος, the grand original miſtake: here he aſſerts, that God knows nothing to be true, nothing to be

poſſible before his own reſpective determination of both: As to the firſt, I ſhall only return what Dr. *Cudworth* ſays, *p.* 646. of *his Intellectual Syſteme. This is to deſtroy the Deity, by making one attribute thereof to devour and ſwallow up another, infinite will and power, infinite underſtanding and reaſon; for to ſuppoſe God to underſtand, and to be wiſe only by his will, is all one as to ſuppoſe him really to have no underſtanding at all.* As to the other, the poſſibility of things, I would only ask him, whether or no, there was not a poſſibility in God of Creating or doing more things, than ever he actually Created or did; now this poſſibility muſt be ſomething, and ſomething which God knew he had in his power, antecedent to his determination.

But notwithſtanding he confidently holds to the Concluſion, *non datur nec concipitur ullum quid ante Dei placitum*: and in the very next words he tells us (and he doth not here ſuppoſe any Divine *Placitum* to intervene) *Abſurdum eſt dicere*, &c. it is not much material to repeat what he there aſſerts. But how comes he to call any thing *abſurd* in this Caſe: the thing perhaps may be ſo in it ſelf, and may be counted ſo by others; but, according to his Principles, how can any

any thing be *abſurd*, antecedent to the Divine *Placitum*, or appointment? For an abſurdity doth ſuppoſe Truth and Falſhood, according to the agreeableneſs or diſagreeableneſs to which rules, a thing is ſaid to be abſurd, or not abſurd: but it is very hard for a man, who has undertaken ſuch a Province, not ſometimes to contradict himſelf. *Res ipſæ nolunt malè determinari.*

He further grants, that there is a neceſſary truth in this Propoſition, *that a thing cannot ſimul eſſe & non eſſe:* that it is impoſſible, that contradictories ſhould be true at the ſame time: as may be ſeen at large, *p.* 133. for this would make God to be *Statuens & non ſtatuens, volens & non volens, ponens & non ponens eandem operationem; abſurda hæc ſunt*, &c. I am of his Opinion too herein. But then doth not this one conceſſion deſtroy his former aſſertion; for why ſhould this truth only be exempted from the common fate of all the reſt. I think, *Des Cartes* acted, at leaſt, more conſiſtently with himſelf, when he went thorough with what he had undertaken, and tells us, that if God had pleas'd, contradictories might have been true at once: nor is it ſufficient for him to ſay, that this would be abſurd; both for the reaſon before mention'd, and

alſo becauſe ſeveral other of his aſſertions might be thus anſwer'd, That they are abſurd. But he tells us, *p.* 126. *That the contrary to his opinion deſtroys both the unity and abſolute perfection of God; for there would not be one, abſolutely perfect God, if he did conceive any thing neceſſarily true and immutable, habens ſimilem ſecum radicitùs & eſſentialiter proprietatem*, beſides himſelf. But then what will he ſay to his former priviledg'd Propoſition, *nihil poteſt eſſe, & non eſſe ſimul.* This will either be a ſufficient Anſwer to his Arguments of this Nature, or elſe he muſt make it an addition of another Perſon to the Trinity, and make it God himſelf. But why ſhould he be ſo ſollicitous, leſt, granting theſe moral and intellectual truths to be neceſſary and immutable, they ſhould thus derogate from the divine perfection; for it doth not thence follow that theſe truths have *ſimilem cum Deo radicitùs & eſſentialiter proprietatem*: for theſe truths are only things of an intellectual nature, ſuch as terminate the act of Divine Wiſdom and Underſtanding; but no body ſays, that they have any radical or eſſential propriety univocally equal, or like to God.

But further, What inconſiſtency, or what unbecomingneſs would there be in the Notion,

on, if we thus conceiv'd of God, *that he is an infinitely wiſe and Omnipotent Being, comprehending Himſelf, and the extent of his own Power, that is, the Idea's of all the poſſibilities of things, together with all their ſeveral, either neceſſary, or accidental relations one towards another.* So that according to this Scheme of things, theſe truths are but the neceſſary objects of Omniſcience, or infinite Wiſdom; ſo that it is impoſſible, that theſe neceſſary and immutable truths ſhould any ways derogate from the Divine Perfections, ſeeing we cannot ſuppoſe God to be Omniſcient, that is, infinitely perfect without 'em: neither would theſe truths be ſo abſolutely Independent of themſelves; for we can ſcarce ſuppoſe any moral good or evil, unleſs we firſt ſuppoſe a God, in Conformity, or Non-Conformity to whoſe pure and holy nature, and to his Will, acting always according thereunto, conſiſts the nature of both.

The ſecond thing I ſhall obſerve from his management of this Queſtion is this; that as to things which relate to moral goodneſs, ſuch is the awful power of truth, ſuch is the natural modeſty of Mankind, that inward ſenſe they have of, and profound veneration for theſe things, that many times they are aſham'd openly to aſſert that which yet may

be the natural conſequence of ſome falſe Principles they have entertain'd. And this ſeems the Caſe of this Author in this particular: for it is obſervable through his whole Diſcourſe, he no where plainly and expreſly aſſerts (which yet according to his Principles will neceſſarily follow) that God might, if he had ſo pleas'd, have appointed a quite *contrary* Scheme of Morality, or a Set or Syſteme of moral truths juſt *contrary* to what they now are. Indeed he does ſay, *p.* 126. that this Divine *Placitum* was of its own nature indifferent, *vel ad hæc ſtatuenda, vel plane omittenda, vel diverſa decernenda*, and that God might have repreſented himſelf to the minds of Men, *per alia, neſcio quæ, quàm per naturas rerum quales jam ſunt*, p. 136. Yet theſe ſeem to come ſhort of aſſerting the quite *contrary* way and method. But ſome perhaps will ſay, that this is too favourable an interpretation put upon his words; but ſuppoſe it be, yet I would rather err on this ſide, than on the other: yet if it be but thus far true, it will be notwithſtanding a ſufficient confutation of his Opinion. But give me leave only to ſuggeſt the reaſon of that my charitable interpretation, *viz.* becauſe he often mentions a certain decency, which he ſeems to make the Rule

Rule of Divine Actions, even antecedent to the Divine Will. Thus, *p.* 131. he ſays, that the juſtice of God did appoint things *modo ipſum decenti*, in a way becoming him, which would ſeem an impertinent expreſſion, if all the decency that things have ariſe only from God's appointing 'em to be ſo: and immediately after ſpeaking of God's liberty and freedom in making things thus or thus, he ſays, that he was indifferent, *vel ad nulla ſtatuenda vel ad alia ſtabilienda, quæ æquè Deum decuiſſent*: which words ſeem to imply, that there was ſomething truly θεοπρεπὲς, worthy of God, antecedent to his poſitive appointment.

But then let us ſee how he anſwers that Objection, that according to his Principles, the hatred of God might have been good, and the love of him evil, if he had ſo appointed. Now this might either have been ſo, or not; if it might, then why did he not plainly ſay ſo? if it could not, then his Principles are falſe, *viz.* that there is ſomething good or evil, antecedent to the divine poſitive appointment. But when Men either cannot, or will not return plain Anſwers to a plain Queſtion, it is a certain Argument, that they ly under either ſome natural, or ſome moral defect; that their no-

tions either do not ly ſmooth and clear in their Heads; or elſe, upon ſome worſe deſign, they thus purpoſely wrap themſelves in Clouds. But he tells us, *p.* 136. *amor præſupponit mentis naturam, hæc voluntatem ſive placitum Dei ſeſe hoc modo adumbrandi.* But we muſt abſtract, he ſays, from all theſe: but now to comply with him in his own way, I am willing to abſtract as far as is poſſible for us to abſtract; only he muſt not abſtract us into nothing, he muſt ſuffer us to remain ſubjects capable of abſtracting: and yet I believe after all theſe, he is not that hardy Man, as in plain words to ſay, That God might have made the love of himſelf a Sin, and the hatred of him a vertue. However it doth not ſeem any good Argument of the truth, or any great commendation of the goodneſs of an Opinion, that we muſt abſtract from every thing, that is, (at leaſt at preſent) either rational or religious, before we can poſſibly frame any conception of it. And yet this is the opinion, which he is ſo fond of, and ſeems to value himſelf ſo much upon, that in his Appendix, *p.* 304. where he makes ſome reflections upon his former work, he particularly commends this 10*th Ch. de Dei dominio, cujus excellentiam, ſine jactantiâ, ob ipſam*

ipſam rei veritatem & utilitatem, non ſatis poſſum commendare. And yet this ſeems a truer Character of it, that it is in it ſelf falſe, unworthy of God, and of dangerous conſequence to Men.

I ſhall only here clear one place of Scripture, relating hereunto, from a forc'd and falſe interpretation, which *Cuperus p.* 246. *Arcana Atheiſmi*, has put upon it, *Rom.* 2. 14. *the Gentiles having not the Law, do by Nature the things contain'd in the Law; theſe having not the Law, are a Law unto themſelves.* The Apoſtle here deſigns to aſſert that natural knowledge, which the Gentiles had of good and evil. But, ſays he, before this can be made appear, we muſt prove theſe two things. 1. That by the Gentiles are here to be underſtood the Pagan Gentiles, thoſe who had neither heard of the Law of Chriſt, nor the Law of *Moſes.* 2. That the words *by Nature*, are not to be join'd with thoſe going before, thus, *the Gentiles having not the Law by Nature, do the things contain'd in the Law.* But firſt he has no warrant from any Copy, or good Authority thus to place the *Comma*, and ſo to read it; now if Men may take that liberty to place *Comma*'s where they pleaſe, they may ſoon make the Scripture quite another thing.

But

But then further, it would not be worthy of the Apoſtles way of diſcourſing, to tell us, that the Gentiles had not the Law of *Moſes* by Nature: for who ever imagin'd they had? Now he does not grant here any other Law, not ſo much as any Law of Nature: but then he ſays, that it is falſe, that the Gentiles not believing in Chriſt, either did or could perfectly obſerve the Law; and who ever ſaid they could? The Text only ſays, *That the Gentiles not having the Law*, that is, not any reveal'd Law, *did by nature the things of the Law.* Now he will needs make doing the things of the Law, to be perfectly to obſerve the Law: and further, if by Gentiles be underſtood thoſe that believed in Chriſt, how can it be ſaid, that theſe are a Law unto themſelves, ſeeing they had both the Law of *Moſes*, and the Law of Chriſt to direct 'em? But from hence it will be obvious to obſerve, what hard ſhifts Men are commonly forc'd to make, when once they engage in the defence of a falſe Opinion.

Some

Some Reflections upon the Tenth Chapter of the Second Book of Cuperus *his* Arcana Atheiſmi.

THE Poſition he there endeavours to defend, is this, That by the mere light of Nature, without Divine Revelation, it cannot be made appear, that there is any difference betwixt Vice and Vertue, although we were already aſſur'd, that there was a God, *etiamſi nobis jam innotuiſſet eſſe Deum.* Vertue therefore and Vice, in reſpect of God, can be nothing elſe, *quàm religioſus numinis cultus.* Vertue indeed may, but how Vice can be a religious worſhip of the Deity is hard to underſtand. Some would think ſuch a ſtumble as this, in the very Threſhold, was very ominous. Others, perhaps more agreeably to his Principles, tell us, that Vice and Vertue, in reſpect of God, are the ſame as to this particular; and that God, if he had ſo pleas'd, might as well have been worſhip'd by the one, as by the other. Now worſhip, he ſays, neceſſarily requires the certain knowledge of theſe three things. 1. That he, to whom we

we pay it, requires any ſuch thing at our hands. 2. What it is that he does require. 3. Upon what conditions, *viz.* What Rewards he will give in caſe of obſervance, and what puniſhments he will inflict in caſe of neglect. Now he would ſeem to infer, that we have no natural knowledge of any of theſe three. I ſhall here, once for all, remind the Reader, that in the ſtating of the queſtion he ſuppoſes, not only that there is a God, but alſo, that we certainly know it: Now as to the firſt requiſite, he grants that there is a worſhip due to God, *when it doth appear that we are his Creatures, p.* 250. ſo that by his own confeſſion, it doth appear, that God requires this worſhip at our hands, unleſs we may know, that there is a God, and yet at the ſame time not know that we are his Creatures: which would be a ſtrange poſition for a Chriſtian Philoſopher to aſſert. And ſecondly, if we know that there is a God, then we know in general how and with what actions he will be worſhip'd. If God be a Spirit, then he is to be worſhip'd with a pure mind, was a natural and eaſy conſequence made by an honeſt Heathen. This I ſay will follow, unleſs we ſuppoſe an Immoral God. But this, though

it

it be both abſurd and impious to do, yet I am afraid it will not be counted either by him. As to his third Requiſite, we grant, that we owe it only to Divine Revelation, that God will reward our imperfect obedience with ſuch degrees of eternal happineſs: yet this even Nature teaches us, that holineſs doth either entitle us to happineſs, or at leaſt to a freedom from miſery. And as for what he ſays, That it cannot be known among Men, whether, or how they will be ſerved, unleſs they firſt openly declare it; the Argument is no ways concluſive, if it be apply'd to this caſe, becauſe Men have no other way to make known their Will, but by outward Declarations: but God has, *viz.* thoſe natural Notions, which he inwardly inſerted into the Minds of Men. But to this he anſwers, That ſince Men draw theſe things from natural reaſon, they muſt alſo by the ſame reaſon prove the exiſtence of a God: but ſince that cannot be done, neither can there be any natural knowledge of good and evil, of Vice and Vertue. But here though I do not grant, That the Being of God, cannot be prov'd by the light of Nature; yet I muſt remind him, that he flies here from the Queſtion, as it was by himſelf firſt ſtated, where he ſuppoſes the Being

ing of God to be now known to us. But then, as if he was himſelf conſcious of his Evaſion herein, he immediately adds, *Vel ſi aliqua inde petenda eſſet, ſcilicet vitii vel virtutis cognitio,* &c. if there was any knowledge of Vice and Vertue to be drawn from Nature, then it could be no other, than that that ſhould be counted vicious, from which any Man's Nature doth abhor; and that honeſt, to which Men are carryed by a natural Propenſion. But this is a ſtrange account of Morality, to make every Man's exorbitant Luſts and Paſſions the rule and meaſure of good and evil; nay, according to theſe Principles there can ſcarce be any thing evil, for *p.* 254. he tells us, *Nihil fere eſt, nec ullum flagitium, ad quod natura multorum,* &c. that there is ſcarce any wickedneſs, to which the Nature of many Men is not naturally inclin'd. I ſhall not here particularly examine his Opinion concerning Original Sin, only herein he ſhows himſelf neither a ſound Divine, nor good Philoſopher; ſeeing many of the Heathens themſelves did acknowledge the Subſtance, that is, the general depravation of humane Nature, tho' they were unacquainted with the Name and Nature of it. But he again reſumes his former Argument, That if the way how God

God is to be Worſhipped, may be known by the light of Nature, then the reward of eternal Life, might be known alſo by the ſame light. But this is no good conſequence, as I before ſhow'd. 'Tis true, neither the way and method of Divine Worſhip, nor eternal Life are ſo clearly known by the Light of Nature, as they are now made manifeſt to us by Divine Revelation: yet it doth not thence follow, but that Nature hath, in ſome meaſure, diſcover'd Both unto us, 2 Tim. 1. 10. *Chriſt hath indeed brought life and immortality to light, through the Goſpel*; that is, made clearer manifeſtations of it; but then this hinders not, but that both *Jews* and *Gentiles* might have ſome more obſcure and imperfect Notions of it before.

But he goes on and tells us, *p.* 252. *Virtutis & vitii Chriſtiani notitia*, &c. That the knowledge of Vice and Vertue, both among *Jews* and *Chriſtians*, is no otherwiſe convey'd to either of 'em, but by Divine Revelation. And here he urges Rom. 7. 7. *I had not known Sin but by the Law*; *and I had not known Luſt, if the Law had not ſaid, Thou ſhalt not covet.* But here firſt I would ask him, Whether thoſe People, who have no outward Law given 'em, either do or can commit

commit any ſin, provided they do but follow their own natural Inclinations? According to him, there is no ſin, but when a Man is guilty of ſuch a ſtrange piece of Self-denial, as not to comply with his own natural Appetites, when there is nothing, as in this caſe, that forbids him ſo to do. Thus *p.* 260. he tells us, That no actions, with reſpect to the Worſhip of God, by the mere Light of Nature, can be counted ſin, *Præter illas à quibus vel omnium hominum natura abhorret, vel in certis hominibus illas, quæ ipſorum naturæ ſunt contrariæ.* Where by *Nature* he means nothing but natural Affections, Appetites and Inclinations: But certainly a Man muſt have a new Nature, and a new Bible given him, before this will paſs either for Reaſon or Religion. But then for the better underſtanding of that place before cited; ſome ſay, That St. *Paul* there doth not ſpeak in his own Perſon, but in the Perſon of a *Jew*, brought up under ſuch Maſters, who did not underſtand coveting, as it includes the inward act only, to be a ſin. Others ſay, That ſin was known to be ſo by the Law of Nature, before the giving of *Moſes* his Law; thus *Theophylact*, πῶς ὁ κατακλυσμὸς γέγονε; &c. How was the Deluge brought upon the World? And why

why were the *Sodomites* deſtroy'd by fire, if Luſt was not known to be a ſin before the Law? So that the Law did not firſt make Luſt to be a ſin, but did more expreſly declare it to be ſo. He quotes indeed ſeveral other places of Scripture, but to as little purpoſe, *p.* 254. *Si pietatis officia ſpecialia*, &c. if the ſpecial Offices of Piety were known by the Light of Nature, then there muſt be ſome certain foundation from whence they might be drawn. Here he mentions three.

1. Natural Inſtinct.
2. The Sanctity of God.
3. Divine Power, or Dominion.

As for the firſt, Natural Inſtinct, this indeed, he ſays, is not the rule of humane Actions, to them who live under the Goſpel; but, according to his Principles, it muſt be to them who only enjoy the Light of Nature.

Nor, Secondly, ſays he, can the Sanctity of God be the rule of our Actions; but the reaſon he there gives, is a very ſtrange one, and very odly expreſs'd, *viz.* becauſe *God acts nothing but by inſtinct of his Nature*, nor is *there any thing holy in God, but what his Nature deſires.*

But to this I Anſwer: Firſt, That God ſometimes acts as an abſolute Soveraign of

the Univerſe, and Governour of the World; and in theſe caſes his Actions are not, in all particulars, to be the rule of ours.

Secondly, It ſeems an irreverend way of ſpeaking, to ſay, That God acts out of Inſtinct of Nature, which is commonly and properly attributed to meer Animals: yet granting the Expreſſion *in ſano ſenſu*, it cannot be ſuppos'd, that God doth daily alter the Determination of his Will concerning the ſame Object.

Thirdly, Yet this we may ſafely ſay, That the holineſs of God is the rule of our Actions, ſo far as, either by the Light of Nature, or Divine Revelation, it is made known to us to be ſo.

But in the Third place, He reſolves all into the abſolute Power and Dominion of God, That nothing is juſt and good, but that only which he commands, and for no other reaſon, but becauſe he does ſo: And yet in the very next Sentence, *p.* 255. (as if ſomething from within had whiſper'd better things to him) he tells us, That God indeed may command any thing, *Modò Dei naturæ non ſit contrarium, ut talia fiant*, &c. provided it be not contrary to his Nature, that it ſhould be done. This indeed is a very pious and prudent, a true and rational Aſſertion,

on, but then it contradicts the deſign of the whole Chapter. Some things indeed may be more evidently and directly contrary to the Nature of God, as not to love, or not to obey him; but then to forbid all due reſemblance of himſelf, all Vertue and Goodneſs, and to command all filthineſs both of Fleſh and Spirit in rational Creatures, this certainly is alſo contrary to the Divine Nature. He then proceeds, as he ſays, to examine the principal parts both of Natural and Chriſtian Religion, in order to ſee whether there lies any obligation upon us to 'em, but meerly by the Divine Command. And here I grant, That thoſe Truths, and thoſe Duties, *viz.* the belief of a Trinity and Faith in Chriſt, that depend meerly upon Divine Revelation, cannot be known to be ſuch, by the Light of Nature: But then the reaſon is not the ſame in thoſe other Moral Duties, which Chriſtianity did not firſt reveal, but only further illuſtrate and confirm to us. Nor ſhall I here follow him through all the parts of Natural Religion, which he there inſtances in: I ſhall only pitch upon one, which yet ſeems of the greateſt weight and moment, that of Juſtice. This, he ſays, cannot be recommended to us from the Nature of God, becauſe it doth not ap-

pear by Nature, *Deum neminem injuriâ affi-cere*, That God does no Body any wrong: For, he ſays, that if that be injury, when we hurt thoſe who have not deſerved any ſuch thing at our hands; *Quid infantes in Deum peccaverunt?* Wherein have Infants ſin'd againſt God, who yet many times are grievouſly afflicted by him? To this I An-ſwer,

1. That I before premiſed this, That God ſometimes acts, as a Soveraign, or Lord of the World; and in this caſe ſome actions may be injurious, or unjuſt in Men, which are not ſo in God.

2. The conſideration of original ſin, might give eaſie Solutions to what he there urges: But becauſe he doth not acknowledge any ſuch thing, I ſhall not therefore here in-ſiſt upon it.

3. It is no ways contrary to Divine Ju-ſtice to inflict very high degrees of Afflicti-ons on rational Creatures, provided that the Mercies they injoy be more than the Miſe-ries they undergo: And he will never prove, that God ever inflicted ſuch Miſeries upon Infants, but that, if they had the power of Election, they would rather chuſe to under-go 'em, than their own Annihilation. But he lays great ſtreſs upon that action of the

Iſraelites

Iſraelites robbing of the *Egyptians*, which was done by God's Command, or Allowance, and therefore was no ſin: Therefore nothing is juſt or unjuſt in it ſelf, but only as God commands, or forbids it.

In Anſwer to this ſome ſay, That God herein acted as the univerſal Creator and original Proprietor of all things, and here transfer'd the Property, as he juſtly might, from the *Egyptians* to the *Iſraelites*. Others ſay, That as Soveraign Legiſlator, he diſpens'd with the Law in this particular; yet it will not follow hence, that there is nothing good or evil, but with reſpect to God's poſitive Command: For I humbly conceive, there are ſome other *rationes boni & mali*, more ſacred and indiſpenſable, than thoſe of Property.

If the Reader here Object, That my Stile, eſpecially in the latter end of this Chapter, is more than ordinarily rough and uneven; I willingly acknowledge, that I am no Maſter of it, not in the moſt even way, where all lies plain before me: But then here in my Reflexions upon *P. Poiret*, and *Cuperus*, I had a mind to keep as near to their words, as I well could, leſt ſome perhaps might ſay, That I injur'd their ſence; and all Men know, how rough and broken the Stile

muſt needs be, when *Latin* is thus Tranſlated into *Engliſh*.

CHAP. IV.

Of the Being of God.

IT is the general method of the Atheiſts of the preſent Age, to skirmiſh, as it were, in their Arguings, rather than come to a cloſe Engagement; and think they have got matter enough of Triumph, if they can defeat ſome of thoſe Arguments, we bring for the Proof of a God, or by ſome ſubtle Evaſion, leſſen, or enervate the force of 'em. They do not much pretend, by poſitive Arguments to prove the reaſonableneſs of their own Opinions, or the impoſſibility of ours; both which they ought to do, if they would gain any Credit to their Cauſe.

The Heathen Philoſophers, and Orators of Old uſed to invoke the Deity to vouchſafe a Bleſſing upon their reſpective Undertakings, and taught it as a Duty incumbent upon all, with Prayers to Sanctifie their firſt Entrance

Entrance upon any work of Importance. But now to desire an Atheist to do thus, would seem a direct contradiction, and a begging of the Cause, to desire him to suppose that, which by the state of the Controversie, he is engaged to deny.

But yet an Atheist himself in this dispute, wherein the right knowledge of the Truth is of so much concernment to him, ought at least to bring with him a teachable temper, and disposition of Mind and Will, ready to receive what his understanding upon the fairest consideration of things that they are capable of, dictates to be, if not absolutely demonstrated, yet most rationally probable, and most prudentially credible. The Atheist therefore, seeing he cannot be absolutely sure, and positively certain, That there is no God, ought (and that without any Violation to his Principles as a Philosopher, however highly agreeable to his Prudence, as a Man) at least to make such Applications as these to that Supream Power, whose Existence he very much doubts, or perhaps rather denies; That if there be any such, then that he would vouchsafe to enlighten his Understanding with the true knowledge of the truth, and encline his Will to the Belief of it.

And here 'tis obſervable, That *Protagoras*, who was generally counted an Atheiſt, and was expelled out of *Athens* for being ſo; yet as *Diog. Laert.* reports of him, he makes *Precatio* to be the firſt part of an Oration.

What was the firſt occaſion of the *Platonick Triad*, whether the contrary falſe Opinions of the *Atomiſts* concerning the Materiality of the Univerſe, and the manner of its Formation, according to the way and method laid down by the Learned Biſhop of *Lincoln* in his Treatiſe of *Idol. p.* 407, 408. I ſhall not here diſpute: Yet as to the Belief of a God in general, that was never occaſioned by any falſe belief of others to the contrary, becauſe Truth, in order of Nature, is always antecedent to Errour. What is ſaid of Idols, *Wiſd.* 14. 13. That they were not from the beginning; the ſame may be ſaid of Vice, and Errour, that they were not ſo from the beginning, but that Truth and Vertue was ſtill antecedent to them. *Primus in Orbe Deos fecit timor*, is ſo far from being true, that the Belief of a God was the cauſe of Fear; and not Fear the cauſe of the Belief of a God.

The Opinion of the Exiſtence of a Deity has ſo much the advantage of the contrary, that of Atheiſm, that I believe, its very Oppoſers,

poſers, when at any time they give themſelves ſeriouſly to conſider, and examine the reaſons on both ſides, that their diſſent is not ſo much their Opinion that the thing is really ſo, as their ſecret deſire and Inclination, that it ſhould be ſo; for if we conſider either the weakneſs of their own Arguments, or the frivolous Anſwers they return to ours, one would think, that they had not ſufficient ground ſo much as to found an Opinion upon, ſo much violence do they offer in their Arguings, not only to Religion, but to Reaſon too. Though the Atheiſts of the former Ages ſeem more excuſable, than theſe of ours, for they wanting thoſe Supernatural Arguments drawn from Divine Revelation, and not knowing ſo well how rightly to manage thoſe natural ones (which yet if rightly uſed, would have proved a God) they thus argued themſelves into Atheiſm, or into Tenents very like it. Whereas ours, either out of Ignorance or inconſideration, either not willing, or not able impartially and throughly to examine the Arguments, which both Reaſon and Religion do afford them, they thus run headlong into fooliſh and falſe Opinions, ſatisfying themſelves with meer ſhadows of reaſoning inſtead of Subſtances.

Thus

Thus a Spirit must be baniſhed out of the World, only becauſe they ſay the Notion of it implies a Contradiction: And the World muſt be the reſult of the Fortuitous Concourſe of Atoms, only becauſe it implies no Logical Contradiction that it ſhould be ſo; thus boldly aſſerting impoſſibility, where indeed there is none, and reſting in bare Poſſibilities where there is no reaſon to do ſo. And this ſeems the very Sum and Subſtance of the Philoſophy of our Modern Atheiſts.

But 'tis here objected, That the Belief of a Deity was an Opinion at firſt invented, and afterwards continued in the World by thoſe whoſe Intereſt prompted them thereunto, *viz.* by Kings and Princes, and thoſe of the Eccleſiaſtical Order, the one to keep their People in awe, the other to maintain and bear up the reputation of their Function; as if the *Jewiſh* Religion at firſt was only the Politick Invention of *Moſes* and *Aaron*; and afterwards for the ſame reaſons carried on by their ſucceſſive orders: That the Thunderings and Lightnings of Mount *Sinai* were only the well-order'd Plots of ſomewhat like Drums and Gun-powder behind the Stage; and that the Miracles of our *SAVIOUR* were only the deluding and

and cheating of the outward Senſes of ſome, and the inward Imaginations of others; that his ſeeming reſtoring Eyes to the Blind, was only the deceiving the Eyes of the Beholders, and a perſwading the Blindman that he ſaw, what indeed he did not. But it would be too frivolous a deſign to go about to confute ſuch an extravagant and groundleſs Aſſertion; for perhaps it would require as much power to perſwade a Blind Man, that he ſaw, when he did not; as really to reſtore his Eyes.

But then as to the Principle, whereon the Objection is founded, I ſhall do theſe three things.

Firſt, Show the weakneſs and falſeneſs of it in it ſelf.

Secondly, The Accidentalneſs of its concluding.

Thirdly, The Unfitneſs and Improperneſs of it, as made by them, and how it may be with as much ſtrength retorted upon themſelves.

1. The Foundation of the Argument is this; That that is juſtly ſuſpected as falſe in Religion, the Belief or Practice whereof is joyned with either publick, or private Advantage to thoſe concern'd. Now nothing is more falſe than this, for this is one *main* Foun-

Foundation of our Natural Religion; and part even of the *Gentile*'s Creed, *viz.* A Belief that God is, and *that he is a rewarder of thoſe that diligently ſeek him*; That ſuch is the Goodneſs of God towards us, that he has joyned our Duty and our Intereſt together, not only as to the future, but alſo as to the preſent Life: And God, in ſo ordering the Frame of our Religion, has but ſeconded and confirmed the common ſenſe of Mankind, and acted according to the Principles of Humane Nature; for ſuch is the Conſtitution thereof, that Good and Convenience is the neceſſary Object of all our Deſires. Now if any thing of preſent or future Advantage be made an Argument of the falſeneſs of things in Matters of Religion, we may then upon the ſame grounds queſtion the Truth and Reaſonableneſs of all humane Actions; becauſe Men neceſſarily propound ſome kind of advantage to themſelves in 'em all. But this would lay a Foundation of Scepticiſm in Humane Nature, and cauſe us to reject or doubt of things for thoſe very reaſons, for which we ought to receive 'em.

2. This Objection taken from the Advantages that attend Religion is a very contingent and accidental one, ſuch as could be of

of no force in the firſt Ages of the Church, when Chriſtianity expoſed its Profeſſors to nothing but Perſecution, their Names to Sandal and Reproach, their Eſtates to Ruine, and their Bodies to Martyrdom.

3. I ſhall ſhow the unfitneſs of the Objection, as made by them that urge it; indeed if thoſe Men were ſo Heroical in their purſuits of Vertue and Holineſs, as to embrace 'em meerly upon the account of their Intrinſick Excellence; then might there ſomething more be pleaded for 'em: But ſince they are Men of Debauched Lives, and if poſſible to juſtifie their own Wickedneſs, would inſinuate into the Minds of others, a ſecret belief, That Religion is nothing but a meer Cheat: This is the greateſt inſtance not only of Profaneneſs, but of Folly too, becauſe the Argument may be retorted, with as much ſtrength upon themſelves, thus.

If the Belief of a God and Religion be therefore ſuſpected to be falſe, becauſe it is the Intereſt of thoſe that believe 'em, that there ſhould be both:

Then why may not the Denial of a God be rejected for the ſame reaſons; becauſe it is as much the Intereſt of wicked Men, that there ſhould be no God, as it is of good Men,

Men, that there ſhould be one. So that if there be any force in the Argument, it proves as much againſt themſelves, as it doth againſt us.

As for thoſe who tell us, That the Notion of God includes in it a Contradiction, and that it is and ever was impoſſible that there ſhould be one; theſe Men indeed take the moſt effectual way of defending their Cauſe, in caſe they could prove their Aſſertion: For whoever grants the poſſibility of the Being of God, muſt either grant that he really is, or elſe will be forced to contradict himſelf; for what is poſſible may be reduced into Act. But if God be not now, and actually was not exiſtent from all Eternity; it is impoſſible for ſuch a Being, as is included in his notion, ever to begin to be: And this ſeems to be *Bradwardine*'s Argument, *Cap.* 1. *p.* 3. So that an Atheiſt muſt prove not only that there is no God, but that it was from Eternity impoſſible, that there ſhould be one; neither of which, he will ever be able to prove.

The Being of God is not the leſs credible, becauſe it is not capable of ſuch proofs as ſome other things are; all things will not admit of Mathematical Demonſtrations, nor indeed is it expected, that they ſhould;

nor

nor are they on this account leſs true and certain than thoſe that do: For ſometimes the very poſſibility of Demonſtration argues ſome degree of uncertainty, or obſcurity in the thing to be demonſtrated; thus Indemonſtrables are always the moſt certain, therefore the Being of God is not therefore the leſs certain, becauſe it cannot be demonſtrated. Some indeed are ſo groſs in their Reaſonings, that they make the Inviſibility of Spirits an Argument againſt their Exiſtence; whereas indeed the very Reaſons, upon which we believe their Exiſtence, are inconſiſtent with their Viſibility.

That ſome Heathens did worſhip that one ſupream and true God, is certainly evident both from the Teſtimony of Profane and Sacred Hiſtory, Act. 17. 23. *Whom therefore ye ignorantly worſhip, him declare I unto you.* So that the *Athenians*, either worſhipped the true God, or St. *Paul* declar'd to 'em a falſe one; yet 'tis generally agreed, that ſuch Heathens might be, and were guilty of Idolatry. Nothing therefore hinders, but that the *Papiſts* may be guilty of Idolatry, though they do not only acknowledge the true God, but the Chriſtian Trinity; nor do I ſee, how their Idolatry,

latry, as ſuch, that is, ſuch as is conſiſtent with the Belief of the true God, is capable of any mitigation; becauſe no one charges them with any other, than what they are truly guilty of.

Some *Proteſtants* indeed ſay, That ſome of the Heathens are capable of the ſame defence, that the *Papiſts* make for themſelves, that is, That they only give an Inferiour Worſhip to Saints and other Inferiour Dæmons, but pay the Supream Worſhip to the Supream God only.

Now this Plea ſeems to hold as much for the one, as for the other, and muſt either acquit both or neither. Nor can the *Papiſts* their being more particularly inſtructed in the Knowledge of the Nature and Will of God, be any Mitigation of their Offence, but rather an Aggravation of it. Falſehood is neither in its own Nature fit, nor was it ever intended by God, as a proper means whereby to defend truth: For this neither ſtands in need of a Lye, nor can it really be defended by it; nor is it our Intereſt or Prudence to attempt the defence of a good Cauſe by weak Arguments; for this will only give occaſion to our Adverſaries, when they ſee that they can eaſily anſwer theſe, to think worſe of our cauſe, and

that

that all the reſt of our reaſonings are of the ſame nature. Yet granting that ſome Arguments ſometimes made uſe of to prove the Being of God, are not abſolutely cogent and concluſive, yet are they not preſently to be rejected, as uſeleſs; and that upon theſe two accounts.

Firſt, Becauſe they that urge them, do not make uſe of any ſingle Argument, as if the Cauſe did wholly depend upon it. Secondly, In things of a Moral Concernment, there may be ſuch a thing as an Accumulative Demonſtration, as Biſhop *Taylor* tells us in another Caſe. (*Pag.* 124. *Lib.* 1. *Caſes of Conſc.*) Therefore, ſuppoſing a Man in his attempt to prove the Being of God, ſhould either through the ſhortneſs of his Meditations, or the ſublimeneſs of the Theory, make uſe of an Argument not perfectly concluſive; yet ſeeing the ſucceſs of the Cauſe depends not upon it, and ſeeing the Man perhaps has effected as much, as he intended by it; that is, added his Mite to the former Treaſury; upon the whole matter, it ſeems hard if ſuch an one muſt be proſecuted, as an Atheiſt, or a Betrayer of the Cauſe of Religion. *Cicer. de Univerſ. Si fortè de Deorum Naturâ, ortuq; Mundi diſſerentes, minùs id, quod habemus Animo, con-*

ſequimur, &c. *haud ſanè erit mirum; contentiq; eſſe debebitis, ſi probabilia dicentur; æquum eſt enim, meminiſſe, & me, qui diſſeram, hominem eſſe, & vos qui judicetis; ut ſi probabilia dicentur, nè quid ultra requiratis.*

Among the many Arguments brought to prove the Being of God, theſe two ſeem the moſt conſiderable.

Firſt, That comprehenſive one which is drawn from the Being of the World; whereby I underſtand not only the Divine Power of creating or producing ſomething out of nothing, but that admirable Wiſdom alſo that appears in making it ſuch as it is; and in the proper ſubſerviencies of things therein to their reſpective Ends; That Argument further which is drawn not only from the Material, but the Intellectual Univerſe, not only from the ſtructure of the Body, but the Nature of the Soul.

Secondly, That which is drawn from the Conſent and univerſal Acknowledgment of all Nations.

As for that, which ſeems *Ariſtotle*'s Opinion, That the World was from Eternity, and yet that it was in Nature of an Effect, in reſpect of God, the Cauſe; it will be impoſſible to free this Aſſertion, either from a Contradiction, or from an unworthy reflection

flection upon the Excellency of the Divine Nature. For if God, as a Cauſe, was in time antecedent to the World, then it is a contradiction to ſay, it was from Eternity. If it did flow from God, as an Emanative Effect, as the Beams from the Sun; then this deſtroys the chiefeſt Perfection of the Divine Nature, *viz.* its Liberty.

And this ſeems one of the beſt Arguments to prove, That the World neither was, nor could be from Eternity, and it will be very hard, (if once we give our Adverſaries leave to ſuppoſe it to be Eternal) by any other Argument to force 'em out of their Opinion: For I do not ſee, that it would be any abſurdity to ſay, That ſuppoſing the World to be Eternal, there has been as many Years as Days; that is, an equal Infinite number of both, all Infinites being Equal; for Infinity can no more be exhauſted by Years than Days; if it could, then it would not be, what it is in its own nature, inexhauſtible: But the truth is, ſuch is the nature of Infinite with reſpect to our Finite Capacity, that the one is not a Competent Judge of the other: and when we enter into diſputes of this nature, we are often entangled with unanſwerable difficulties on both ſides.

But the Atheiſt tells us, That all this viſible

ſible Univerſe, the Heavens, the Earth, and all Mankind at firſt were the lucky hits of blind Chance, which after almoſt infinite ſucceſsleſs Tryals going before, did at laſt happen upon theſe admirable and excellent Structures, particularly thoſe of humane Bodies. But here we muſt know, that according to theſePrinciples, the ſame Chance, which firſt made us, muſt ſtill continue us. But then how comes it to paſs, that Chance is ſo regular and conſtant in its Productions ſince? That whereas it is above ten thouſand to one, according to theſe Principles, but that Mankind long ere this, muſt have wholly ceaſed to have been, or elſe nothing but Monſters have been produced; inſtead hereof we ſee a very regular and orderly courſe of Nature generally obſerved?

This is, as if a Man ſhould be a thouſand years in caſting all ſizes upon ſix Dice, and then for a thouſand years after to throw nothing elſe, if we could ſuppoſe a Mans Life to laſt ſo long. Whoever can believe ſuch ſtrange things as theſe, ought never to blame any one for being over credulous.

As for that other Argument, drawn from the conſent of Mankind, there are ſome who tell us, That thoſe natural Impreſſions of God upon the minds of Men, upon which this

this univerſal conſent is founded, are mere imaginary things, and that there is no need of 'em in our diſputes againſt Atheiſm. But theſe Men might do well to conſider whether they do not too much oblige the Atheiſts, and go too far towards the betraying the Cauſe of God, and Religion in the World, who willingly quit and give up that Argument which hath hitherto been managed with ſuch good ſucceſs by the beſt and wiſeſt of Men in all Ages: willingly, I ſay, to give it up *gratis*: for I verily believe, it can never be forc'd and wreſted out of the hand of a Chriſtian Philoſopher, who rightly underſtands it. And why ſhould we grant any thing to an Atheiſt, which may tend to the advantage of his, or the prejudice of our own Cauſe? unleſs he neceſſarily force it from us by dint of Argument; always provided, that we readily acknowledge evident Truth whereever we find it.

Firſt, I conceive, there neither is nor can be any Argument in a true and proper ſenſe, *à priore*, to prove the Being of God, that taken from the Idea is not ſuch; But it is an arguing from the effect to the Cauſe, only the effect ſeems a more immediate one, and ſuch as bears a more particular reſemblance to the Cauſe.

That ſomewhat was from Eternity, is evidently demonſtrable; for if once there was nothing, it was impoſſible for any thing ever to begin to be: Now this ſomething muſt be either Matter or Spirit, a thinking or unthinking Being; it cannot be an unthinking Being, for then it would be impoſſible, that there ſhould be any ſuch thing, as Knowledge or Cogitation in the World, which yet we are inwardly conſcious to our ſelves of. For as Dr. *Lock*, *Chap.* 10. *Book* 4. hath well obſerv'd; *It is as impoſſible to conceive, that ever bare incogitative matter ſhould produce a thinking intelligent Being, as that nothing of it ſelf ſhould produce matter.*

Now it muſt be either Man, that was the firſt Eternal Being, the Creator of all things, or ſome other Being. But though the Atheiſts are not the greateſt Wits in the World, yet we muſt not think 'em ſuch very Atheiſts neither, as to make mere Man to ſet up for a Sovereign Creator. Thus we have an Idea, or Conception of a Being infinitely more perfect than our ſelves, and therefore we were not the Cauſe of our own Exiſtence: for if we had, we ſhould then have given our ſelves thoſe Perfections, which we find wanting in us, and conceive in another.

Therefore

Therefore we owe our Exiſtence to, and dependance upon that Being without us, which enjoys all Perfections.

But now the Queſtion is, Whether the Idea be the Cauſe, or occaſion of this Ratiocination, or the Ratiocination the Cauſe of the Idea. Some think, that theſe two, Reaſoning and the Idea, ought not to be ſeparated, or contradiſtinguiſh'd in this diſpute: For the Idea is not ſuch an Engine, as of it ſelf will prove the Being of God, without the Uſe and Exerciſe of reaſoning thereupon. So that the Idea doth not exclude, but include the uſe of our Faculties; nor is it any receding from the Argument ſo to do: Yet it ſeems more probable, that there is ſomething in Man, Co-eval with and connatural to his very Being, that dictates ſuch a thing, and directs our thoughts and reaſonings that way; for it is not probable, that Men ſhould, as it were, accidentally, and yet ſo generally agree in one and the ſame thing, without ſome inward ſuggeſtions, and intimations at leaſt to employ their Faculties upon ſuch an object, *viz.* a Supreme Being.

So that though this Idea be not ſo full and perfect, but that it may receive further Additions of ſtrength and clearneſs from Ratiocination; yet this is no more a diſparage-

ment to the Works of Nature, that they are ſometimes further perfected by Study and Induſtry, than it is to a Man, that he was not born with all thoſe accompliſhments, which he hath afterwards acquired.

Secondly, Next to a Sceptick, who grants no Principles at all, it is the greateſt difficulty to convince an Atheiſt, who aſſerts ſuch abſurd and unreaſonable ones, that he can ſcarce be urged with any greater, ſo that he will more eaſily evade the force of any Argument, if what we urge upon him, as an abſurdity, if he make it, as it were the very Foundation of his Diſcourſe. Only 'tis obſervable, that ſuch Men are more uſually prevail'd upon by the Convictions of Conſcience, which is done, I conceive, by awakening thoſe natural impreſſions of God, and their obligations to him in their minds) than merely by convincing their Underſtandings.

Thirdly, In the managing our thoughts upon this ſubject, we ought to conſider, not only what is in it ſelf poſſible, and perhaps may imply no contradiction, but what upon a full conſideration of things, and all their circumſtances, may be counted moſt reaſonable, what is worthy of our rational Faculties

ties to aſſert, and a prudent Perſon to believe.

So that after theſe inward impreſſions made upon the minds of Men, and thoſe outward manifeſtations of himſelf by the Works of Creation and Providence, it perhaps would be difficult, even for the moſt Sceptical Perſon to aſſign, what further Rational Evidence he could deſire for the Belief of a Deity. Nor does that variety of Opinions concerning the Nature of God in different Nations and among different Perſons, any whit leſſen the credibility of his Being, but rather confirms and ſtrengthens it. For this ſhows, that it was not the Invention or Contrivance of any ſingle Nation at firſt, nor of more jointly afterwards; for if they had thus combin'd together, or borrow'd one from another, in all probability they would have agreed better in their Notions and Opinions concerning him: Nor was Religion any humane Invention to reſtrain the Exorbitances of Mankind, becauſe there was Religion before any ſuch Offences, as a Learned Prelate of our own has well obſerved; *That Oppreſſion, though by Accident, grew rather from Religion, than Religion from Oppreſſion*; for before the two Brothers, *Cain* and *Abel*, had offer'd up their

their Sacrifice, there was no ſuch thing as Oppreſſion.

There are ſome, who tell us, that the Being of God cannot be proved by any Internal Arguments, from any natural impreſſions made upon the minds of Men, dictating any ſuch thing; others, that it cannot be proved by any external ones, drawn from the nature of the Univerſe, or any thing elſe without us. Now the Atheiſts make this advantage of theſe our unſeaſonable differences herein, That they bid us firſt Anſwer our own Arguments, which we bring againſt our ſelves: and if the Being of God cannot be proved either way, which ſome among our ſelves do with too much eagerneſs ſeverally aſſert; then they think they have gain'd their point. For as for Divine Revelation, they do not much value that, as thinking it not ſo proper to be urged againſt them, becauſe they believe nothing of the whole matter. What *Cuperus* in his *Arcana Atheiſmi*, ſayes of Divine Revelation, that we are firſt convinc'd by it, That there is a God, and afterwards thereby enabled to prove it by reaſon, I think, may be better apply'd, in ſome proportion, to theſe two ways of probation here made uſe of, thus; That from theſe natural impreſ-

ſions

ſions made upon the minds of Men, we have the firſt grounds of our belief of a God: and then this is further confirmed by thoſe External Arguments drawn from Nature.

--- *Quæ non proſunt ſingula, juncta juvant.*

I ſhall here make ſome ſhort remarks upon *Cuperus* his Opinion in this particular; In the beginning of his Proem he tells us, with ſome kind of Formality and Oſtentation, That the only prejudice, that can be done to a good cauſe, is to endeavour to defend it by weak Arguments. That he had frequent opportunities of hearing Atheiſts (being bred up amongſt 'em) diſcovering the weakneſs of thoſe Arguments, which the Theiſts brought againſt 'em. Hereupon he was forced to think upon ſome more effectual way of proving the Being of a God, than hitherto had been made uſe of, which is this, to deny all natural knowledge of God, and utterly to reject, at leaſt at firſt, all thoſe Arguments drawn from the light of nature, and to prove his Being by Divine Revelation. This indeed is a very firm and ſure way of doing it, but I am afraid it will not be altogether ſo cogent, as to convince an Atheiſt: for ſuch an one will not believe

Moſes

Moſes his Hiſtory, neither the Creation, nor any Tradition relating to it.

Now the whole force of his Argument will depend upon this ſlender hinge, *viz.* The faithful and uninterrupted conveyance of this Tradition to all ſucceeding Ages: But *the preſent Learned Archbiſhop of* Canterbury, *in that excellent Sermon of his againſt* Atheiſm, *Page* 51. tells us, *That it is much more likely, that the Belief of God, is a Notion, which was bred in the mind of Man, and born with him, than a Tradition, tranſmitted from hand to hand, through all Generations; eſpecially if we conſider, how many rude and barbarous Nations there are, which conſent in the Opinion of a God, and yet have ſcarce any certain Tradition of any thing that was done amongſt 'em, but two or three Ages before.* If the Knowledge of God, ſays *Cuperus*, *(Proem.p.penult.)* was drawn from the Light of Nature, then it needed not to be proved, That there was a God; becauſe thus we ſuppoſe it, and already believe it: But may not his own way of arguing be retorted more juſtly upon himſelf? When he tells us, *p.* 246. That, *Poſtquam per Dei Revelationem edocti ſumus eſſe Deum, tum intelligi poſſe*, &c. When by Divine Revelation we are taught there is a God, then we can find out

out natural Arguments to prove it. But when we are firſt taught and convinc'd by Divine Revelation, That there is a God, How do Arguments drawn from natural reaſon, afterwards prove it? So that indeed theſe Arguments will be little more than Illuſtrations, or further Confirmations of a thing already believed, becauſe revealed. But then he ſays in the ſame place, *Principia oſtendi deberent, ex quibus is, qui nullam unquam Numinis mentionem, vel ſuſpicionem hauſiſſet, ſponte in Numinis, Naturæ Conditoris, agnitionem paulatim deduceretur.* Some Principles muſt be ſhown, from whence he that never heard the leaſt mention, nor had the leaſt ſuſpicion of a Deity, might be drawn to the knowledge of him. To this, I Anſwer,

Firſt, That according to the Principles of thoſe Men, whom he now oppoſes, he cannot ordinarily ſuppoſe a Man, without ſome ſuſpicion at leaſt of a Deity; for this, ſay they, is born with him, and he muſt not ſuppoſe his Adverſaries Aſſertion to be falſe, but prove it ſo.

Secondly, Why may not that conviction of mind, which is the reſult of our Faculties rightly reaſoning hereupon, inferring the Exiſtence of a Supream Being, together with

with that inward conſciouſneſs of our Obligations to him? Why may not theſe be Principles ſufficient to prove, ſo far as is requiſite for Nature to do it, That there is a God, and that to one who had not heard any other way that there was one? But he ſeems to lay a great ſtreſs upon that of a Man's having, or not having heard the leaſt mention of a God before. But if he ſuppoſe a Man ſo to have heard of a God, by Divine Revelation, as thereupon really to believe his Exiſtence, then thoſe natural Arguments brought to prove the ſame, may further confirm him in his belief; but tho' he have heard mention made of a God, and yet not believe that there is any ſuch thing, I do not underſtand, how his bare hearing of him before, will any ways make thoſe reaſons, drawn from Nature, the more effectual to convince him.

If Men of late have too frequently run into Atheiſm, it was not any weakneſs they found in that Argument drawn from the Light of Nature to prove the Exiſtence of a God, (ſo far as can in reaſon be expected from it) that was the cauſe thereof; but he ſeems to lay the fault there, where indeed he ought not, and aſcribes it to the weak defence that ſome Men have made of a good Cauſe,

Cauſe, only thereby to magnifie and uſher in his own new Notion with more pomp, *p.* 247. He there grants, that Men generally have ſome Notion, or Idea of God: but then, *Nullus alius modus inveniri poteſt, quo mentes hominum occupavit, quàm quòd ab ipſo Deo per Revelationem, vel Creationem ſit inſertus.* If by Creation he means that natural conſtitution of Soul, whereby, by the very Laws or Creation, natural to ſuch a Being, this Notion of God was imprinted on it: then his Aſſertion would be true, but then he would herein contradict himſelf. By Creation therefore he muſt mean only that Tradition of the Being of God, derived down to all Mankind from the Creation: and then we can eaſily aſſign another way how this Idea might poſſeſs the Minds of Men, *viz.* that before mention'd natural Inſcription. In *Chap.* 9. *Lib.* 2. there his chief deſign is to prove, that the Being of God is not knowable by the Light of Nature. Now I humbly conceive, that in that Dialogue, which he fram'd betwixt *Philalethes* and *Miſalethes*, he did not equal juſtice to Truth in ſtating the Queſtion ſo, as to make *Philalethes*, (whoſe Province it ought to have been rather to defend than prove the *Being of God*) the Opponent; whereas

whereas he ſhould in ſtrictneſs, rather have been Reſpondent: for this advantage accrued to *Miſalethes*, by being on the Defenſive part, that meer Evaſions might ſerve inſtead of ſolid Anſwers. For it ſeems a more eaſie thing to defend an Errour, than to oppoſe a Truth.

Though I ſpeak not this as if Truth was not able, not only to defend it ſelf, but to convince its Adverſaries, provided that reaſon would do it. But I do not ſee, why we ſhould give that advantage to the Atheiſts, as to give 'em leave to *ſuppoſe* us at once, both out of our Reaſon and Religion too. *p.* 264. *Cùm verò omnes ex naturâ petitas rationes, quæ pro utrâque ſententiâ proferri poſſunt, invalidas eſſe*, &c. Seeing, he ſays, he has proved all the natural Reaſons brought either for, or againſt the *Being of God*, to be invalid, and the Atheiſt, he ſays, has nothing elſe to relie on: then the moſt natural conſequence hereof will be, That the Atheiſts muſt now hang in *æquilibrio*, and profeſs themſelves Scepticks; and this is the utmoſt that he can pretend to have effected upon 'em, *p.* 265. He tells us, That that Notion of a God, which ſo generally prevails in the World, muſt be derived from God himſelf; for *ſi conficta eſſet*, &c. if it were feigned,

ed, then it would be neceſſary, that in every Nation there ſhould be ſome who firſt invented it, and perſwaded it upon others; *Quod*, (p. 266.) *ſanè impoſſibile eſt, niſi homines qui de Deo nihil unquam audiverunt, naturali diſpoſitione ad illam opinionem maximè eſſent proclives*; where he grants, That if there be ſuch a natural Proclivity in the Minds of Men to believe a God, then his Argument fails: he therefore ſhould have bent his utmoſt force to diſprove this Natural Diſpoſition, or Proclivity to believe a God; but the Argument he there brings, will not do it. 'Tis only this, that *Rochfortius* and ſome others relate, That there are ſome Nations in *America*, who cannot be perſwaded that there is a God. To this I Anſwer,

Firſt, That it will proportionably prove againſt himſelf, and deſtroy the Univerſality of his own Tradition, for it will follow hence, either that God had not taken care to make known this Original Tradition to all Nations, or that they which were the firſt Founders of theſe Nations, had neglected to teach it to their Poſterity; or that in proceſs of time both Parents and Children were grown ſo rude and barbarous, as to forget it: and indeed, according to this Hy-

 potheſis,

potheſis, it is a wonder that half of the *Gentile* World long e're this, is not become mere *Soldanians*, without any knowledge of God, or any Principles of Morality; nor can there be any good account given of thoſe Moral Principles of Honeſty, according to this Traditionary way, which were as generally believed among the *Gentiles*, as the Being of a God, and perhaps with a greater Uniformity.

Secondly, We do not ſay, that this Notion of God is ſo implanted in the Minds of Men, or ſo connatural to our Faculties, but that by careleſneſs and Inadvertency, by Vice and Luxury, by habitual Wickedneſs and Debauchery it may be in a great meaſure obliterated.

Others tell us, That the Being of God is not to be proved either by any Original Tradition, or by any Natural Impreſſions made upon Men's Minds, but only by external Arguments drawn from the Nature of things, and from the Nature of Man; that is, from the conſideration of his Soul and Body, not ſuppoſing, or including any ſuch Natural Notices: I do not here go about to oppoſe any Arguments brought to ſupport and defend the Cauſe of God and Religion in the World. *Valeant quantùm valere poſſunt:*

ſunt: Only when their Authors would monopolize all the force of Argument to their own way of arguing, and abſolutely reject all the reſt; this, I think, is to give our Adverſaries *advantage over us.* Thus that *Ingenious Gentleman,* Mr. *Tyrrell,* in his late Book, *p.* 197. tells us, *That the knowledge of the Being of God is clearly, and without difficulty, to be read, from the great Book of the Creation, without any aſſiſtance from natural Impreſſions*; and he cites Rom. 1. 19, 20. *Becauſe that which is known of God, is manifeſt in them, for God hath ſhewed it unto them; for the inviſible things of him from the Creation of the World are clearly ſeen, being underſtood by the things, that are made, even his Eternal Power and Godhead.* Where he ſays, The Apoſtle appeals to the common reaſon of Mankind, guided by things without us, for the proof of a Deity: But it doth not appear from hence, that he draws his Argument meerly from things without us; for the 19th Verſe ſeems as clearly to relate to thoſe inward Impreſſions made upon our Minds, as the 20th doth to the outward Creation. φανερὸν ἐν αὐτοῖς, is manifeſt in them; I know that Prepoſition ἐν, is ſometimes render'd *inter*; but when the proper and natural ſignification of words may be kept,

why ſhould we look for another? *For the inviſible things of him from the Creation.*] By Creation here is neither meant the things created, nor the Act of Creation, but only it relates to the time thereof. *From the Creation*] that is, ever ſince the Creation; by which, ſays Dr. *Hammond*, it appears, That there is no neceſſity of interpreting God's ποιήματα, his Doings, or Actions here, of the Works of Creation, (that is, *ſolely*) but of all things, that from time to time, to this incluſively, have been done in the World by him; and ſo it will be extended to all the Doctrines, and Miracles, and Actions of Chriſt, the whole buſineſs of the Goſpel. Nay, I may add, that even thoſe natural Impreſſions upon the Minds of Men, may be meant by God's ποιήματα here mention'd. *Even his Eternal Power and Godhead*;] δυναμις & θειότης. The firſt may refer to his Omnipotence in Creating the Material World. The other, θειότης, to the more Divine Conſtitution of Spiritual and Intellectual Beings.

CHAP.

CHAP. V.

Of the State of Nature, that it is neither a State of Equality, nor a State of War.

I Shall here by way of Introduction to this Chapter, briefly take notice of what Mr. *Hobbs* tells us in *Chap.* 4. of his *Leviathan*, concerning Speech, and the particular uſes of it, *viz.* that it is for the acquiring of Arts, and the improvement of Knowledge, to convey to others that skill which we have attain'd to our ſelves, and to communicate to them our Counſels and Reſolutions, that ſo we may have the mutual help and advice of one another: but now how can theſe Uſes be applyed to that croſs-grain'd ſtate of Nature, which he has deſcrib'd to be nothing but a State of Fraud and Violence? What place is there for Arts and Sciences? What room for friendly counſel, and kind advice in a ſtate where all are Enemies to one another, where what counſel we give to others, ought rather in reaſon to be ſuſpected, ſeeing therein we deſign nothing but our own

advantage? Why ſhould we deſire, or hope for the aſſiſtance of others, ſeeing there we deſign nothing, but by force or fraud to ſupplant all we deal with, and by degrees to draw 'em into their own ruine? Now Speech muſt be ſuppos'd in the State of Nature; for without it, he tells us, there could be no entering into Societies, no Compacts, no transferring of Rights *per verba in præſenti.*

In the ſame Chapter alſo he tells us how neceſſary it is for thoſe, who aſpire to knowledge, to be ſtrict in fixing the true ſenſe of Words, and framing true Definitions, in examining thoſe of former Authors, and either to correct 'em when deficient, or to make new ones themſelves. Therefore, he ſays, in Geometry, which is the moſt accurate Science, Men begin with ſetling the ſignifications of their words; which ſetling of Significations, they call Definitions, and place 'em at the beginning of their work.

Now it had been well, if Mr. *Hobbs* had practis'd his own rule, and that, in one of the moſt conſiderable Inſtances of his Moral Philoſophy; that is, if he had at firſt given us a perfect definition of that word ſo oft made uſe of in his Writings, *Nature*, and had fix'd the Significations of thoſe Expreſſions,

ſions, *Naturally, and by Nature:* Which he could not well have done without diſtinguiſhing it into pure and primitive, and into corrupt and depraved *Nature*: Which he having no where done, it has occaſion'd a great deal of obſcurity and uncertainty in all his Diſcourſes relating thereunto; which if he had done, in all probability it would have put an end to many of thoſe Controverſies, which were perhaps at firſt begun, and afterwards continued by the want of it.

'Tis true, he has given us ſeveral Senſes and Acceptations of theſe words, but yet has been ſo far from ſetling and fixing their Significations, as he calls it, that he has rather left them ſtill in greater uncertainty, eſpecially in thoſe other places, where they are mentioned ſingly, without any intimation at all, in what ſenſe they are to be taken. In his Preface to his Book *de Cive*, where 'tis objected, that from his Principles it would follow, that Men are wicked by *Nature*. This, he ſays, does not follow, for though Men by *Nature*, that is, *from their firſt Birth, as they are meer ſenſible Creatures*, &c. Here Nature muſt ſignifie Man, as he comes firſt into the World, with reſpect meerly to his Animal Qualifications, which

he has in common with other Creatures. In the ſame Preface, foraſmuch as God overrules all Rulers *by Nature*; that is, by the dictates of Natural Reaſon: here Nature ſeems to refer rather to the higher, than the lower Faculties of the Soul, *Chap.* 1. *Paragraph* 2. if by *Nature* one Man ſhould love another; that is,as Man; here *Nature* ſeems to refer to Man in his largeſt extent. The Law of *Nature* he thus defines, that it is the dictate of *Natural Reaſon* converſant about thoſe things which are either to be done or omitted for the conſtant preſervation of our Life and Members, as much as in us lies. Here he makes *Natural Reaſon* to truckle under that mean deſign of ſelf-preſervation in the narroweſt ſenſe, as if right reaſon had no other or higher end and deſign, than that of a Man's private ſecurity here in this World. It would be tedious to reckon up all thoſe ſeveral Senſes, which in ſeveral places he gives to thoſe words, accordingly as may beſt ſerve the purpoſe he is then about. Now in the midſt of theſe various Significations, how muſt we interpret thoſe places, where he tells us, That the Diſpoſitions of Men are *naturally* ſuch, that unleſs they be reſtrained through fear, every Man will diſtruſt and dread each other:

ther: that Men *by Nature* are in ſuch a ſtate, wherein their Wills are their ſupreameſt Law, with reſpect to their Self-preſervation: How ſhall we know, whether *by Nature* here be meant the Dictates of right reaſon, truly ſo call'd, or only the irregular motions of Paſſion and ſenſitive Appetite. But I ſhall here leave Mr. *Hobbs* to the juſt ſeverity of his own cenſure, and a little examine *Chap.* 13. of his *Leviathan*, wherein he makes the State of Nature a State of Equality, and a State of War: Theſe are the two imaginary Poles, upon which his State of Nature moves.

Firſt, He tells us, That Men are by Nature equal.

1. As for ſtrength of Body, the weakeſt has ſtrength enough to kill the ſtrongeſt; and to kill is the greateſt thing, and they that can do the greateſt thing, are equal: *quod erat demonſtrandum.* The Confutation of ſome kind of errors may give occaſion to ſomething worth the Writer's Thoughts, or the Reader's Pains; but the confuting of ſuch inſipid ſtuff, as this, cannot but be tedious to both. By this way of arguing he might prove, that the meaneſt Creature in Nature is, or may be equal to Man: For did not a Fly once kill a Pope? And may not a Spider poyſon an Emperor? But then how this

this ſhould become a Principle of Policy, any other way than as by conſidering this caſual Power, which the weakeſt Man, or meaneſt Creature may have over us, thereby to incite our utmoſt care and circumſpection, and to beget in us an inoffenſive behaviour towards all Men: how, I ſay, this ſhould be an Argument to prove the natural equality of all Men, as the Phraſe is us'd in Politicks, is hard to underſtand.

Then as to the Faculties of the Mind, he ſays, he finds a greater equality among Men, than that of ſtrength of Body: for *Prudence is nothing but Experience, which equal time gives equally to all*: but ſuppoſe that Men were equal, as to Prudence, which yet is evidently falſe; yet there are other faculties or habits of the Mind, wherein one Man may excel another. Here it is not material to enquire, whether the Souls of Men were equal, as to their firſt Creation; we are now to conſider 'em in a more complex'd capacity, as join'd with ſuch and ſuch Bodies, wherein we find as much variety in their ſeveral abilities and inclinations now, as if they were really created unequal: but certainly Prudence muſt be ſomething more than mere Experience: for Prudence is a further habit ſuper-induc'd upon the Faculty, whereby

whereby we are enabled to manage our affairs, according to the Rules of Reaſon and Equity; thus Experience to Prudence is but as undigeſted meat to the nouriſhment of the Body. Experience indeed may collect general Rules for the mannagement of the affairs of Life: but then it is Prudence, which by conſidering matters of fact in all their Circumſtances, by comparing them with the preſent ſtate of things, and the poſſibilities of future contingencies, doth as it were digeſt experience into laudable nouriſhment: but if we did ſuppoſe Men equal in their natural, yet it will not thence follow, that they are ſo in their Political capacity too. For ſince Men did not at firſt ſpring out of the Earth like Muſhrooms, but came into the World, by the ordinary methods of Generation, by way of Father and Son; therefore there muſt needs be a ſubordination and inferiority among 'em, a dependance upon one another in reſpect of Cauſality, and an Obligation in reſpect of Duty and Obedience.

Nor, ſecondly, is the ſtate of Nature a ſtate of War; *if any two men,* ſays Mr. *Hobbs, deſire the ſame thing, which nevertheleſs they cannot both enjoy, they become Enemies, and in their way to their end endeavour to deſtroy or ſubdue*

ſubdue each other. If he ſpeak this in reference to Dominion or Empire, that common Miſtreſs courted by all, as he ſays, in the ſtate of Nature; it may be juſtly queſtion'd, whether all do thus inordinately affect ſuperiority, and whether all find themſelves thus naturally enclin'd to deſtroy thoſe that ſeem to ſtand betwixt them and the Throne: or are there not ſome more modeſtly vertuous, who out of conſciouſneſs of their own inabilities, and out of due reſpect to other Mens Merits above their own, who would quit their pretences to Empire, and willingly live in obedience to others? Is it not inordinate Pride and Ambition, rather than the dictates of nature and right reaſon in thoſe, who thus unreaſonably aim at nothing leſs than a Crown.

Secondly, Theſe natural Uſurpers do not make uſe of the moſt proper means, in order to their own ſelf-preſervation. Here I would only apply Mr. *H.* his own way and method of reaſoning againſt the attempt of obtaining Soveraignty by Rebellion to the preſent Caſe, *Pa.* 73. *Lev.* *'Tis manifeſt, ſays he, that though the event ſhould follow, yet becauſe it cannot reaſonably be expected, but rather the contrary, and becauſe by gaining it ſo, others are taught to gain the ſame in like manner,*

ner, the attempt thereof is againſt reaſon. Now doth not this equally hold good againſt the attempt, which theſe natural Uſurpers do propound to themſelves of an Univerſal Empire? would not the great hazard of any ones particular deſign ſucceeding make the action, in Mr. *Hobbs* his own account, very unreaſonable? So that there is but little reaſon for Men to betake themſelves to that way of anticipation in this ſtate of nature, that is, for a Man to endeavour to Maſter all before him, ſo long, till he ſee no other Power great enough to endanger him: ſeeing, that very equality, which he ſuppoſes, ſhould more effectually perſwade 'em to Peace, or ſome more Friendly way of compoſing differences, rather than urge 'em to War; ſeeing no ſingle Perſon can in reaſon ever hope to attain to Empire, ſince he muſt always have ten thouſand as ſtrong and as cunning as himſelf, to oppoſe all his deſigns. Thus that equality which ſeems to give him right, doth at the ſame time hinder him from the actual procurement of it. He grants indeed, *That this condition of War was never generally over all the World; yet he ſays, in many places they live ſo now: for the Savage people in many places of* America *(except the Government of ſmall Families, the*

Concord

Concord whereof depends upon natural Luſt) *have no Government at all*, &c.

But how is Government (though of ſmall Families) conſiſtent with that ſtate of abſolute independency, before deſcrib'd, where every one hath a right to every thing, and every Man an Enemy each to other? So that this exception of particular Families doth indeed deſtroy his general Rule: but then he interpoſes theſe two things.

1. That theſe Families are ſmall.

2. Their Concord depends upon natural Luſt.

But firſt he grants, *Lev. Pag.* 105. *that a great Family, if it be not part of a Commonwealth, as to rights of Soveraignty, is a little Monarchy*; but he will not grant the ſame priviledge to a little Family, *viz. unleſs it be of that power, as not to be ſubdued without the hazard of War*: but the rights of governing is that, wherein the nature and eſſence of any Government doth conſiſt, and not in ſtrength and greatneſs; now theſe proportionally are as much in a little Family, as in a great one; and we may with the ſame reaſon ſay, that the Eſſence of a natural, as well as of a Political Body, doth conſiſt in ſuch a proportion of ſtrength and greatneſs, below which a Man cannot truly be call'd a Man.

2. He

2. He ſays, that the Concord of theſe Families depends upon natural Luſt, *Solâ cupiditatum ſimilitudine*, Lat. Tranſlation. But let the Concord depend upon what it will, 'tis not material, the Government and Conſtitution of Families is not conſiſtent with ſuch a ſtate of nature as Mr *Hobbs* deſcribes; and here he might as well ſay, That Baſtards are not Men; becauſe they are gotten for the gratification of unlawful Luſt; for the different grounds, or reaſons, or ends, Men may have in making a thing, do not alter the nature and eſſence of it, when once made. The Queſtion here is not, whether the Families be ſmall or great, or upon what their Concord doth depend; but whether the notion and being of a Family, doth not deſtroy his ſuppos'd ſtate of Nature. But how doth he prove, that the Concord of thoſe Families depends only on natural Luſt, as his Engliſh; for War ſeems the more genuine reſult of Luſt, than Concord: or on ſimilitude of deſires, as his Latin Tranſlation renders it? for this he makes the great Cauſe of competition and conteſt, when ſeveral deſire, and are not able to enjoy the ſame thing. Thus ſimilitude of deſires muſt be ſometimes the cauſe of War, ſometimes of Peace; thus doth he at once, out of the ſame

ſame Mouth, blow both hot and cold. What the meaning of the Author of the device was, when he made two Pitchers floating upon the Waters, with this Inſcription, *Si collidimur, frangimur*, I know not; but it ſeems very applicable to Mr. *Hobbs* his methods of reaſoning, if they be conſider'd ſingly, they may perhaps bear ſome plauſible ſhew of Argument: but if they be compar'd with each other, they will often be found as inconſiſtent with themſelves, as they are ſingly inconſiſtent with the truth. But he tells us, that *in all times Kings and Princes, becauſe of their Independency, are in continual Jealouſies, in a State and poſture of Gladiators.* Here 'tis obſervable, how cunningly he joins thoſe two words, *State and Poſture*, ſeeming thereby to inſinuate, that Men could not be in a poſture of Defence, unleſs they were in a ſtate of War: for Kings to put themſelves into a condition to repel injuries, when violently offer'd, is no more, than what reaſon and Prudence dictates; but this doth not infer Mr. *Hobb*'s his State of War, but rather the contrary, when we ſee ſome Kingdoms able, and yet not willing to oppreſs their Neighbours. That Men may awfully do ſomething in the time of War, which is not lawful to do in the time of Peace,

Peace, is certainly true: but then we muſt not think, that the ſame blaſt of the Trumpet that Proclaim'd the War, did at the ſame time blow away all thoſe airy Notions of juſt and unjuſt, which according to him, have no other being in Nature, but what they receiv'd from humane Compacts. Juſtice and Injuſtice, are none of the *faculties, either of the Body or Soul, they are qualities that relate to Man in Society, not in Solitude. Further in this ſtate of Nature, nothing can be unjuſt, here Force and Fraud are two Cardinal Vertues:* that the practice and external exerciſe of Juſtice, and many other moral Duties, doth ſuppoſe a Society, or at leaſt a ſtate of Friendſhip, that ſo Men may have proper objects of thoſe reſpective Vertues, is certainly true; yet the reaſons of their obligation are founded in the nature of each ſingle Man, and ſo may belong to a Man in Solitude, for the reaſons of Juſtice and other Moral Vertues, are not ultimately to be reſolv'd into that natural ſupport and advantage they bring to a Society and Commonwealth, and that they cannot, without great diſadvantage, be baniſhed out of it, but into that Conformity they bear to the Divine Nature, and to the participation thereof in our ſelves: God indeed in the wiſe and be-

nign diſpoſals of his Providence, has twiſted our duty and our intereſt together: Goodneſs and Vertue have a natural tendency to make us as perfectly happy, as 'tis poſſible, even in our civil and political Capacities; but then they are not therefore only Vertues, becauſe profitable to the publick, but upon ſome other higher grounds and reaſons being Vertues, they thus alſo, as parts of Godlineſs, *become profitable to all things; having the promiſe of the Life that now is, and of that which is to come.*

But why are Juſtice and Injuſtice qualities that relate to Men only in Society, and not in Solitude? ſeeing theſe may as well be in a Man alone in the World, as ſome of his Paſſions, which alſo neceſſarily relate to their proper objects.

Mr. *Hobbs* ſome where approves of that definition, which the Schools give of Juſtice, *conſtans & perpetua voluntas jus ſuum cuiq; tribuendi*, ſo that according to this, a Man may be juſt, if he have a real and ſincere deſire to give every one his own, though he have not where withal to do it. Thus alſo why may not a Man be juſt and charitable, though he want fit objects to exerciſe theſe Vertues upon; for why ſhould the want of the object more deſtroy the nature of

of the Vertue, than the want of the ſubject matter, or material part, as in the former Caſe of the neceſſitous juſt Man.

There were ſome fatal Philoſophers of old, and ſome ſuch there are ſtill, who make good and evil, juſt and unjuſt, mere factitious things, θέσει not φύσει; ſuch as depend only upon the free and arbitrary determination of the Divine Will, but then to make 'em to depend merely upon the pleaſure of the Civil Magiſtrate, this ſeems to be a peculiar flight, proper only to Mr. *Hobbs*, thus to make a God of his *Leviathan*: This Opinion of his doth either ſuppoſe no God at all, or ſuch an one, as doth not much concern himſelf in the Government of the World, but, leaves all to his Vicegerent here below; obey the King, and you can ſcarce, according to him, diſobey God.

Some will ſcarce allow, that granting Mr. *Hobbs* his Principles, that his Concluſions do ever neceſſarily (or but ſeldom) follow, that is, that there is but little ſtrict and ſevere ratiocination in all his Writings: yet this, I think, we muſt grant, that his dangerous Errours in Government and Religion, are but neceſſary deductions from his falſe Principles firſt laid in humane Nature.

That Man is naturally a ſociable Creature, fit for Society, is granted by moſt, and not deny'd by Mr. *Hobbs* himſelf, but then he tells us, *that Man is not born fit for it*, this he is fitted for, *not by Nature*, *but by Education:* and the reaſon hereof is, becauſe he is not born at Years of diſcretion, not at Age to Seal a Bond, and without this there is no entring into Compacts, or Civil Society. But he tells us, *Pa.* 21. *Lev. that Children are called reaſonable Creatures for the poſſibility apparent of having the uſe of reaſon in time to come*; and I know not, why we may not by the ſame reaſon, grant Men to be *born* ſociable Creatures, or fit for Society, for the like apparent poſſibility, though they were not actually enter'd into Covenants, for they are born with all thoſe diſpoſitions and aptitudes to Society, which they have for reaſon it ſelf: now that Man is thus really a SociableCreature, will appear both from the nature and neceſſities of Mankind. 1. From the nature of Man, for the very fundamental Laws of Nature ſuppoſe either a Society, or ſomething anſwerable to it, *Quod tibi non vis fieri, alteri ne feceris*; *Do to others, as we deſire others ſhould do to us*, and we are generally as much oblig'd to the duties of Juſtice and Honeſty

to

to others, as of Prudence and Caution to our ſelves; and this neceſſarily ſuppoſes a Society, or ſomething like it, a ſtate of Friendſhip. 2. The neceſſities of Mankind ſeem to argue us to be ſociable Creatures, ſuch whoſe very ſubſiſtence neceſſarily requires the aid and aſſiſtance of others, otherwiſe the very Birth of a Child would be the certain expoſing of it to deſtruction.

Mr. *Hobbs* will not grant any Laws of Nature truly ſo call'd, in the ſtate of *Nature*; *they are only certain Theorems, or Maxims, tending to Peace, rather than Laws, that bring us under any obligation.* But why do not theſe Laws of Nature, which he grants to be dictates of reaſon, lay as great an obligation upon us for Obedience, as thoſe inordinate Paſſions of Nature? Eſpecially if we conſider, that obedience to theſe dictates of reaſon are more fit and proper means in order to ſelf-preſervation, than the proſecution of thoſe mere rights of nature, as he calls them, violence and anticipation. And if we reflect upon matters of fact, and the ſeveral inſtances that Hiſtory furniſhes us withal, we ſhall find Examples of Mercy and Compaſſion to others, of a generous condeſcention and ſelf-denyal of our ſelves, and of an univerſal love and good will to

Mankind, ſufficient to confute the ſcandals caſt upon humane nature upon this account. Though it muſt alſo be granted, that there has been too many barbarous and inhumane actions committed, both by Heathens and Chriſtians too, but then thoſe actions were not approved by the more wiſe and ſober Perſons of thoſe very Nations that committed 'em. 2. They were univerſally Condemn'd by the more civiliz'd part of the World. 3. They were ſo far from tending to their advantage, that they have many times prov'd the cauſe or occaſion of many and grievous Calamities brought upon themſelves and Nation by the juſt Providence of God.

Now Mr. *Hobbs* his Principles in general ſeem to be the ſuiting or fitting the vicious practiſes of Mankind to an Hypotheſis, thereby endeavouring to enact wickedneſs by a Law, and to prove the lawfulneſs of all poſſible violence and injuſtice, by the *Magna Charta* of Self-preſervation. This bad uſe has he made of the general viciouſneſs of Mens Lives, from thence to gather Principles, which might, if poſſible, legitimate their actions, like *Machiavel*, who from the ſmall reſpect that Princes generally bore to Leagues and Oaths, taught his Prince, that there

there was no obligation lay upon him from 'em, but only to conſult his own intereſt and advantage by 'em; and whereas his Compurgator admires the bad fortune of *Machiavel*, to ſee one Man inherit in particular the Maſs of reproaches due to all Princes and Stateſmen in general, he might have ceas'd his wonder, if he had conſider'd, that it was one thing to act wickedly, and another to teach Men that they might do ſo. Perſonal bad actions are but the failures of particular Men, ſuch as they themſelves perhaps may go about ſome ways to excuſe or extenuate, but not to juſtify: but now *Machiavel* his thus becoming an Advocate for Vice, is of more pernicious conſequence; it emboldens Sin, and endeavours to confound the notions of good and evil, for *he that ſhall break one of the leaſt Commandments, and teach men ſo, he ſhall be called the leaſt in the Kingdom of Heaven.* It is further pleaded for *Machiavel*, that all his Documents he gives only to a Prince, for had he recommended this practice to a Son, or any elſe circumſcrib'd in a narrower compaſs, than a Kingdom, he might have been more juſtly Condemn'd. Now this Apology, however weak and inſufficient it is for *Machiavel* himſelf, yet is Mr. *Hobbs* utterly uncapable of

any ſuch excuſe, becauſe his bad Principles are of a more univerſal influence, and reach not only to Prince, but People too.

I call'd Mr. *Hobbs* his Principles an Hypotheſis, now if any be offended at the word, as a term of diminution, I ſhall here further do theſe two things. 1. Show, that it is only ſo, and no more, being ſomething that is rather ſuppos'd than ſufficiently prov'd. 2. That it is not a good Hypotheſis, as wanting thoſe conditions and qualifications, which are requiſite to any Hypotheſis in general, much more to ſuch an one, as the nature of the ſubject requir'd his to be. 1. It is an Hypotheſis and no more, and I have very good Authority ſo to call it from Mr. *Hobbs* his own words, 8 *Ch. de Cive. Let us return again, ſayes he, to the ſtate of nature, and conſider Man as even now ſprung out of the Earth, and ſuddenly, like Muſhromes come to full maturity, without all kind of Government to each other.* Now this, I conceive, the moſt proper and genuine interpretation that can be put upon the place, to call it an Hypotheſis. For I would not willingly think, that Mr. *Hobbs* did really believe, that once upon a time Men ſtarted out of the Earth, like Mole-hills, eſpecially if we conſider, that he himſelf doth Satyri-

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cally reflect upon such a supposal, where he compares some kind of *ignorant persons to Children, that having no thoughts of Generation, are made believe by the Women, that their Brothers and Sisters are not born, but found in the Garden:* here we may observe how little right reason there is in all Mr. *Hobbs* his Discourses, that depend hereupon, for he himself tells us in his *De Cive*, 2 *Ch. That right reason is that which concludes from true Principles.* Now these true Principles in matters of Morality and Policy, must be more than supposedly true: indeed a certain kind of truth may be in favour granted to an Hypothesis of natural Philosophy, if it exactly answer all the *Phænomena* of Nature, though it self do not answer the real truth; but this Indulgence cannot be granted to things of a moral or political concern.

Neither Secondly is it a good Hypothesis, as wanting those qualifications which are requir'd to any Hypothesis in general, which are these three. 1. An Hypothesis must be possible, this is the least that it can pretend to, but it must not be only so according to the utmost extent of possibility, but also fairly possible according to the most easy

ſy methods of our Conceptions, that is, probable, ſo contriv'd, that we might be thence perſwaded, that that was the way, that God and Nature made uſe of in that particular: that as the *Epicureans* ſay of the Univerſe, that though it was the reſult of blind chance, yet all things therein have happen'd as well, as if they had been the reſult of the greateſt wiſdom and contrivance: thus an Hypotheſis, though perhaps it be not the real truth, yet it ſhould give as full and natural Solutions of things, as if indeed it were. 2. It muſt be ſelf-conſiſtent, and not contain Principles of Self-diſſolution within it ſelf, for it is impoſſible, that that ſhould be agreeable to the wiſe and regular methods of Nature, and Providence, which is not agreeable with it ſelf. 3. An Hypotheſis ought to employ our Faculties in the ſearch of true and uſeful Knowledge, and alſo to promote real Piety in the World, therefore we ought not to fancy to our ſelves ſuch an Hypotheſis in Philoſophy, as excludes God out of the World, and ſuch an one as aſſerts a mere material Univerſe. Now here I might eaſily ſhow, that this of Mr. *Hobb*'s, is neither 1. Poſſible, much leſs probable. 2. Not conſiſtent with it ſelf. 3. So far from promoting

moting ſound Knowledge and true Piety, that it is really deſtructive of both.

Whether ſuch a ſtate of Nature, as Mr. *Hobbs* deſcribes, be a proper and effectual means, in order to a Mans ſelf-preſervation, may be juſtly queſtion'd, and indeed he himſelf ſeems not to be of that Opinion, ſeeing he makes his natural Stateſmen to get out of it as ſoon as they can, in order to the bettering of their condition; yet this is certain, that he makes private intereſt the great and ultimate end of all humane actions in general, and of his *Levia.* in particular, as being that, wherein he thinks he has laid the beſt and ſureſt foundations of all humane happineſs: I ſhall therefore here, by way of Appendix to this Chapter, ſpeak ſomething in general concerning this great Principle of Self-Preſervation.

It is the natural folly of Mankind to run out of one extream of Vice and Errour into another; thus perhaps the ignorant Zeal and blind Devotion of ſome who attributed too little, might firſt give occaſion to others to aſcribe too much to Self-preſervation; however we muſt not deny it its due regard, ſo far as Reaſon and Religion admit, becauſe others have extended it further, than in either it ought. I ſhall therefore

fore freely grant, what the greateſt Patrons of Self-preſervation can with any juſt ground or reaſon demand, and hereby I ſhall gain this double advantage. 1. It will hence appear, that it is not out of any prejudice or heat of oppoſition, that I contradict any thing, even in that Opinion I do oppoſe.

2. Hereby I ſhall come to a truer ſtateing of the Queſtion, and ſo ſhall be better able to defend it: for this diſadvantage there is even to Truth it ſelf, in the falſe ſtating of a Queſtion, that we either undertake to oppoſe that in an adverſary which is really true, and ſo irrefragable; or elſe to defend ſomething that is falſe, and ſo not capable of being defended.

To deny that which is true, is altogether needleſs, for we need not fear any prejudice to a good Cauſe from truth elſewhere, becauſe all truths of this nature are conſiſtent with themſelves, and no ways contrary to each other, whereas the denyal of any thing that is true, tho' in an adverſary, may break that continuity of truth, and ſome way or other weaken our own cauſe, I ſhall ad two or three general conſiderations relating hereunto.

1. That God has imprinted in Man a principle of ſelf preſervation is not only true,

true, but very agreeable to the goodneſs of God, and very ſubſervient for the carrying on the deſigns of Prudence and Piety in the world, for it would have reflected diſhonourably either upon the goodneſs or wiſdome of God, to have made ſuch an excellent creature as Man, and taken no care for his preſervation, ſo far as it ſhould not be in the power of any one upon every ſlight occaſion to throw away himſelf, and ſo deſtroy Gods peculiar Image; or to have expos'd him to all the dangers, that either his own inadvertency or the malice of others might have brought upon him, without ſome innate inclinations of ſelf preſervation, and ſuitable principles of prudence to inable him thereunto. Thus Religion it ſelf doth not only permit, but command us to act with a due reſpect to thoſe two grand Principles of a Chriſtian Life, Prudence and Innocence, to be *wiſe as Serpents, and innocent as Doves.*

Further, without this we had wanted that moſt exact and eaſy rule of Charity to others, *Whatſoever you would that Men ſhould do unto you, even ſo do you unto them*, where our love to our ſelves is made the rule and meaſure of our Charity to others.

But, Mr. *Hobbs* makes ſelf preſervation without

without any reſpect to the lawfulneſs of the means, to be the firſt and great dictate of Reaſon and Nature, and charges Chriſtianity with folly, in that in ſome caſes it ſo little regards its own ſafety, but expoſes its profeſſors to Martyrdome for Religion's ſake.

If, ſays he, *Chap.* 42. we be commanded by our lawful Prince, to ſay that we do not believe in Chriſt, we muſt obey him, for words are but external things, and do no more expreſs the aſſent of the Speaker, than any other external action: and therefore a Chriſtian in ſuch things hath the ſame liberty, that the Prophet gave to *Naaman* the *Syrian:* 2 Kings 5. 18. *In this thing the Lord pardon thy Servant, that when my Maſter goeth into the Houſe of Rimmon, to worſhip there, and he leaneth on my hand, and I bow my ſelf in the houſe of Rimmon, the Lord pardon thy ſervant in this thing, and he ſaid unto him, go in peace.* Here Mr. *Hobbs* ſaith, that *Naaman* believed the true God in his Heart, but by worſhiping would ſeem not to believe, leaſt he ſhould offend his King. But here he ſuppoſes, but proves not, that *Naaman* here asks Pardon for what he deſign'd to do for the time to come, whereas the words may be as well render'd ſo, as to ſignify

ſignify his asking Pardon for the time paſt: but ſuppoſing, that he here refers to the time to come, yet this is not ſo much a denying of the true God, as if he had deny'd him with his Lips, as Mr. *Hobbs* would have it, for here he did not deny the true God at all, becauſe he declar'd before, that by this incurvation he did not deſign any adoration of the Idol, and this Declaration was as publick as his action, *viz.* that henceforth he would worſhip no other, but the God of *Iſrael*. Now Mr. *Hobbs* could not well imagine a Man to deny the true God with his Lips before a perſecuting Magiſtrate, and withal ſuppoſe him at the ſame time to declare, as it was in *Naamans* Caſe, that he intended no ſuch thing, as he ſpoke by his words, for this in all probability would rather incenſe the Prince, than any ways tend to his own preſervation. 2. Though the love of God, and the love of our ſelves, rightly underſtood, are no ways oppoſite to one another, in as much as God requires nothing of us, that is inconſiſtent with our real intereſt, yet we may truly and properly aſſert, that God is to be lov'd for himſelf, for the Excellency and Amiableneſs of his own Nature, not bu: that we may, and generally do, love God too with reſpect to his

his relative goodneſs towards us: thus Religion is ſuited, both to the moſt generous tempers of ſome, and provides objects for the moſt heroick acts of vertue, and takes away all occaſion from thoſe, who would, upon this occaſion, fix upon it the name of mercenary, and alſo on the other hand it condeſcends to the more common and ordinary inclinations of Mankind, in ſuffering and encouraging them to act with reſpect to the recompenſe of reward.

But though the conſtitution of humane nature be ſuch, that the conſiderations of Gods relative goodneſs to us do generally mingle themſelves with all our thoughts of God, and exerciſes of our love towards him; I doubt not but we may, without any fantaſtical abſtraction, ſo far diſtinguiſh betwixt the mercies received, and the excellency of the Divine Nature, that we may even therein found a reaſon of our love of him. So that the loving of God for his own ſake, though, I believe, it ſeldom occurs in practiſe, yet it ought not to be ſpoke againſt in Diſcourſe, provided firſt, that it be not made uſe of to lead men into unwarrantable extravagancies, either in opinion or practiſe, Secondly, Provided, as Biſhop *Tayler* ſays, that what is a great perfection in ſome,

ſome be not impos'd as a Law upon all.

3. In extreme neceſſity, it is lawful for a Man to do, what otherwiſe he ought not to do: here, I ſuppoſe, a Man brought to that exigency, that without timely and ſuitable ſupplies, he certainly periſheth; by what means he is here brought into theſe circumſtances, I do not here conſider; only I except this, That he be not a Malefactor condemn'd, and now about to undergo the juſt and due Puniſhment of his Offence: but then this neceſſity muſt be for the neceſſary ſuſtentation of Life, not for the gratification of Humour or ſenſual Appetite; we muſt not think with Mr. *Hobbs*, That we may, not only for Preſervation but Delectation alſo, endeavour to deſtroy others. He alſo tells us, That in the State of Nature there is nothing further required to make a thing lawful, but its being neceſſary to our Preſervation; and nothing required to make it neceſſary, but a ſtrong opinion that it is ſo; ſo that, according to him, confidence of Belief, and ſtrength of Fancy may alter the nature of things, and make 'em lawful or unlawful accordingly; ſo that, according to him, we then principally, if not only offend

againſt the Laws of Nature, when we pretend ſomething neceſſarily to tend to our Preſervation, which indeed either doth not, or what we do not confidently enough believe to do ſo. Further,

This neceſſity muſt be real, not imaginary; urgent and inevitable, not ſuch as may be ſupply'd or prevented by our own Endeavours. We muſt not pretend Neceſſity, when indeed we only indulge our own Lazineſs, and neglect the uſe of thoſe means, whereby we might poſſibly remove, what we now ſuppoſe: in theſe circumſtances a Man may lawfully make uſe of thoſe means, which neceſſarily tend to his Preſervation, and no further. Thus in caſe of extreme Hunger, he may take ſo much of other Mens Goods, as are neceſſary to preſerve his Life, without incurring the Guilt of Theft; and the Reaſon hereof is, not merely becauſe the Owner, in ſuch a caſe, is bound to give as much as is ſufficient for that purpoſe; for in many caſes others may be bound to do, what we have no power to force in caſe of denyal. Nor, *ſecondly*, becauſe at the firſt Diviſion of things, the Dividers excepted this caſe of extreme Neceſſity; wherein they did not deſign the Right of Dominion and Property

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to be ſo ſtrict and ſevere, but that, in this caſe, the *Jus primævum* ſhould return.

But, *firſt*, it ſeems not ſo reaſonable to believe, that there ever was that *Uſus communis* of all things, as *Grotius* aſſerts, and conſequently no ſuch Diviſion, wherein he ſuppoſes all Property to be founded.

Secondly, Suppoſe the Dividers, either thrô careleſſneſs or inadvertency had left this as a *Caſus omiſſus*, without making any Proviſion about it, and it doth not any ways evidently appear, that they ever made any ſuch; or if thro' perverſeneſs and ill nature they had determin'd it otherwiſe, yet the thing would ſtill have been, as now we apprehend it: ſo that it is more than probable, that both Property and that lawful Power that a Man hath, to relieve himſelf in extreme neceſſity, doth depend upon ſome antecedent Reaſon, and ſome higher Principle, than that barely ſuppos'd Agreement of the firſt Dividers.

3. The Reaſonableneſs of laying down our Lives for the ſake of Religion, will appear from the unreaſonableneſs of the contrary Aſſertion, which muſt ſuppoſe one of theſe three things; either that God has not Authority to command his Creatures ſuch inſtances of Obedience; or not Goodneſs

enough to reward 'em, for what he thus enjoyns; or that we have not ſufficient evidence, that his Will and Pleaſure is, that in ſome caſes he requires it: to deny the two former, is to deny the Dictates of natural Reaſon; to aſſert the third, is to deny the plain Words and Commands of God in Scripture.

And further, if we conſider what it is, that we are commanded to part with, only the ſhort and tranſitory ſatisfactions of a frail Life, which at beſt we cannot enjoy long, and which may be otherwiſe ſo loaded with Miſeries, that the very continuance of it may be the greateſt Puniſhment. Beſides, 'tis probable, the Martyrs, notwithſtanding the greatneſs of their Torments, being as great as either the Wit or Malice of their Enemies could invent, yet that they did not feel ſo much pain, as mere ſenſual Men might imagine, if we conſider the intenſeneſs of their Thoughts, then ſet on the Joys above, and alſo the more plentiful effuſions of the Divine Grace, ſtrengthening and aſſiſting them; ſo that they ſeemed rather pleaſantly to enjoy, than painfully to undergo the flames.

CHAP.

CHAP. VI.

Religion the beſt Foundation of Civil Government. With an Examination of ſome of Machiavel's *Opinions relating hereunto.*

IF we conſider the Nature of Religion in general: how that it is that Order and Conſtitution of things in the World, whereby all rational Agents, either do, or at leaſt are bound to act in obſervation of thoſe mutual Reſpects they bear to God, themſelves and others; how that it is that great inſtrument of Providence in the World, for the management of the moſt conſiderable Affairs thereof. And what ſome Philoſophers have aſſerted of the Soul of the Univerſe, may be very well applyed to Religion in reſpect of the rational World, that it ties each part to it ſelf and to one another, and diſpoſes of every thing for the Good and Advantage of the whole, and of every part. This conſider'd, it is impoſſible, but that Religion ſhould have a very

good and benign influence upon all publick Societies, theſe being the moſt conſiderable Bodies of the Univerſe.

And this the very Enemies of Religion acknowledge in their moſt malicious ſcandals and reproaches, that are caſt upon it, *viz.* when they tell us, That Religion is nothing but a meer politick Device and Contrivance of Princes, by which they might better govern their Subjects, and awe them into obedience: but this, as moſt Errours are, is founded in a certain Truth; and though it be a falſe ſcandal caſt upon Religion, yet it ſuppoſes this undeniable Verity, That Religion is not only conſiſtent with, but alſo highly promotive of the Ends of Government. Now the conſiſtency of Religion with Government in general will appear, from theſe following Conſiderations.

1. Religion in the true and ſincere Exerciſe of it, is the only Means appointed by God for the attaining of eternal Happineſs; now one great end of God's inſtituting a Government in the World, was to put Men into a better capacity of performing their Duty towards God, themſelves and others.

Theſe things being firſt granted (which I think alſo are ſufficiently plain and evi-

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dent in themſelves) it is impoſſible, that Religion ſhould be inconſiſtent with, or deſtructive of Government; ſeeing theſe two are made joint means in order to one common end of humane Happineſs. Thus God ſent us into the World, that by Holineſs we ſhould arrive at Happineſs; and he has appointed a Government over us, that under it we ſhould lead quiet and peaceable Lives in all Godlineſs and Honeſty: therefore theſe two, Religion and Government, are certainly conſiſtent with each other; otherwiſe it would charge God with Folly and Imprudence, by deſigning to bring about an end by inconſiſtent means.

2. Though Government in general, be ſubordinate to Religion, in reference to the ultimate End, eternal Happineſs; yet the Church (and the Affairs of Religion) in reference to its private Power and Authority, is ſubordinate, in a great meaſure, to the State. Thus we ſay, that the Church is in the State, and not the State in the Church. But now this is not an eſſential, but only an accidental Subordination; that is, ſuch an one, as depends upon Divine, poſitive Inſtitution: for if God had ſo pleaſed, he might have made the State inferiour to the Church in all things, as he hath made

the Church ſubject to the State in moſt. Now if we may venture to give a Reaſon of the Divine Inſtitution, it may ſeem to be this; That God ſeeing how much it was for the Intereſt of the State, to provide for and ſecure the Affairs of Religion, hath therefore ſubjected the Church in moſt things (always excepting thoſe ſpiritual Priviledges and Peculiarities belonging to the Church, which I always ſuppoſe ſacred and inviolable) to the Power of the civil Government; for it is not probable, that God would thus have committed his Church (to which he always bore ſuch a tender regard) to the care and charge of the State, if it were as our Adverſaries ſuppoſe, ſo much for the Intereſt of the State, to violate the Laws of the Church and of Religion.

But now particularly, Religion lays the beſt foundation of Government, theſe four ways.

1. By aſſerting the Original of Civil Power to be truly Divine.

2. By ſhewing the Religious Obligation of an Oath, and founding Obedience neither in Fear, nor Intereſt, but in Conſcience.

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3. By correcting and confuting all thoſe falſe Opinions and Principles, which are ſo deſtructive of all humane Societies and civil Obedience.

4. By removing all thoſe Luſts and Paſſions out of the Minds of Men, which are the great Incendiaries of the World, and Fomenters of War and Diſcord.

1. Religion does the beſt ſecure Government, by aſſerting the Original of civil Power to be truly Divine. Here I ſhall not reſtrain my Aſſertion to Monarchy only, but extend it alſo to all regular and well-ſettled Governments. Though I think, that Monarchy has a great advantage in its Plea, for a more particular Divine Inſtitution, ſo far as Example and primitive Practice can give any right thereto; nor do I here aſſert, That all Monarchies, in their original Conſtitution, were abſolute; or however there was no neceſſity that they ſhould be ſo. Some indeed ſay, That whatever Reſtrictions or Limitations have been ſince introduced into ſome Governments, yet from the beginning it was not ſo; theſe were the Encroachments of after Ages, and the Peoples uſurping upon the Prerogative; or elſe the Grants and Conceſſions of good-natur'd Princes.

Princes. But this, I think, is rather barely aſſerted, than poſitively proved: yet will it not follow hence, that the People are the original Proprietors of all civil Power. What our Saviour ſaid to *Pilate*, *Joh.*19.11. *Thou could'ſt have no power over me, except it were given thee from above*; the ſame we may ſay of the People, that ſuppoſe (but not granting) that they had ſuch a Power, as ſome imagine, yet they could not have it of themſelves; they muſt either mediately or immediately derive it from God: ſo that, they giving this Power to the King, the Power will be ſtill truly Divine, though it be convey'd through the People, as thro' a Conduit. But then to what purpoſe ſhould we ſuppoſe ſuch a needleſs circuit in the proceedings of Divine Providence: Why might not God give it more immediately himſelf, ſeeing this is, as eaſily conceivable, attended with fewer Inconveniencies, and more promotive of the Ends of Government than the other? Thus Mr. *Hobbs* no leſs falſly, than impiouſly tells us, *That God created Man in ſuch an ill-condition'd State of Nature; not that he deſign'd him to continue in it, but that he might mend himſelf by his own Prudence, by getting out of it, as ſoon as he could.* And *Grotius* ſeems to be much what

what of the ſame Opinion, in his Book *de jure belli & pacis*, where, among his many perplex'd methods of arguing upon this ſubject; yet this he ſeems poſitively to aſſert, That civil Power had its Original from the Conſent of the People, not taking the leaſt notice of any higher principle: but yet he directly contradicts himſelf herein, in his Epiſtle Dedicatory, to *Lewis* the *XIII*th. King of *France*, (whether only in Compliment or no, I know not) where he tells him, *Quàm glorioſum hoc*, &c. *ut ſi quando te Deus ad ſuum Regnum vocaverit, audacter poſſis dicere, hunc ego à te gladium pro juſtitiæ tutelâ accepi, hunc ego tibi nullius temerè fuſi ſanguinis reum, purum inſontémq; reddo.* Here he ſays that *Lewis* the *XIII*th. received the ſword of Juſtice from God, which if he did, it was more than ever any other King, according to his Principles, did before, *p.* 80. *de jure belli*; *Notandum eſt primò homines non Dei præcepto ſed ſponte adductos, experimento infirmitatis familiarum ſegregum, adverſus violentiam in ſocietatem civilem coiiſſe, unde ortum habet civilis poteſtas quam ideo humanam ordinationem Petrus vocat, quanquam & alibi divina Ordinatio vocatur, quia hominum ſalubre inſtitutum Deus probavit, Deus autem humanam legem probans cenſetur probare*

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ut humanam & humano more: where we ſee, that God was no farther concern'd in the conſtituting this civil Power, but only by way of approbation of what Man had done before: But here firſt, he ſuppoſes, it would be hard for him to prove, That Men liv'd at firſt in ſeparate Families, without any common Power over them.

But, 2. ſuppoſe they did; the ſenſe and experience of the Inconveniences that attended this way of living might be a motive or occaſion of Mens looking out for help: but I do not ſee, how they are thus any more the radical Cauſe of Civil Power, than the Patient is the Cauſe of his own Cure, or of the Phyſician's Skill, only becauſe he apply'd himſelf to him.

Nor is it here deny'd, but that the People may, in ſome caſes determine the Perſon, as in Elective Kingdoms. And further, ſuppoſe a mixt company of Men, ſuch as are neither Parents of Children, nor Maſters of Families; ſuch as have no relation or dependance upon one another; ſuppoſe theſe by chance caſt upon an uninhabited Coaſt, they may frame themſelves into any particular Form of Government; ſuch as they may reaſonably believe to be moſt agreeable to their Circumſtances, and moſt ſubſer-

ſubſervient to the great Ends of all Government, *viz.* Peace and Piety.

But yet notwithſtanding the Power, in this caſe, is not originally from the People, but, as the Learned and Judicious Dr. *Donne* has determined the Caſe, *God by a ſecret Compact made with Mankind, in Nature doth infuſe the Power, as the Soul, into the Body Politick (as well as Natural) thus duly prepar'd, and as it were preſented to God for that purpoſe, by a prudent and regular Election and Determination:* they who would ſee this further explain'd and confirm'd, may conſult Dr. *Donne*'s *Pſeudo-Martyrs*, Cap. 6.

That which ſeems moſt liable to Exception in this Account is, that ſecret Compact which God is here ſuppos'd to make with Mankind, *&c.* ſo that Learned Man is pleaſed to call it; but I am not very ſollicitous either about the name, or the particular way and mode of conveying this Power, only to make the thing appear the more reaſonable. We may conſider, that it would be very hard, if at all poſſible, for thoſe, who derive this Power merely from the conſent of the People, either to ſecure the Government at preſent, or the Succeſſion afterwards upon theſe Principles. For ſince, according

according to them, Men are by Nature born free, and conſequently it may be queſtioned, how far the Act of the Father, in this caſe, will oblige his Poſterity: Why may not the Children plead, that they have as good right to vote and conſent for themſelves now, as their Fathers had before; and this would ſoon prove the utter Ruine of all Government.

But now ſince the Obligation that lies upon us, is from an higher Principle; this, if any thing, will keep Men in their due Obedience; and this, I conceive, is very agreeable to the Doctrine laid down in Biſhop *Overall*'s Convocation-Book.

Here 'tis further obſervable, That the Patrons of that Opinion, which founds Power originally in the People, are like thoſe of the Church of *Rome*, in their Diſputes about Infallibility. Thoſe we have here to deal with, are ſure, that the Original of Power is in the People, only they know not where to fix and where to find it; whether in the Body of the People, collectively taken, or only in the Heads and Maſters of Families; or in the Men only, in contradiction to Women and Children, or in each particular Man ſingly, as Mr. *Hobbs* aſſerts: for he doth not ſuppoſe, that when the People

People make a Migiſtrate, that they confer any Power upon him, which he had not before in his private Capacity; only they covenant, that they will not uſe their Power in oppoſition to his, but let him alone to rule without a Rival. Now the great incertainty theſe Men are in, both in reſpect of Infallibility, and the firſt and immediate Subject of this Power, is a great preſumption at leaſt, that there is no ſuch as either, in that way and manner wherein they aſſert them: thus, I conceive, this way of ſtating the Queſtion gives both to God, the King, and the People, what is of right their due; and if the People ſhould challenge more than what is here given them, I think it would be to their diſadvantage. As for thoſe other three Particulars beforementioned, I ſhall refer the Reader to thoſe reſpective Authors who treat of 'em. But though civil Power be originally from God, yet is it not founded in Grace, which Opinion, as it is now commonly ſtated, is but the novel Invention of ſome brain-ſick People of latter days, founded upon the miſtaken ſence of ſome Prophecies of the old Teſtament, and upon ſome forc'd Interpretatious of ſome Texts of the New; and it has been further promoted by the fantaſtick

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Pride nnd Folly of thoſe that entertain it; firſt, by fanſying themſelves Saints, and then falſly applying all thoſe Honours and Priviledges to themſelves, which they think are any where applyed to Saints in Scripture, 1 *Cor.* 6. 2. *Know ye not that the Saints ſhall judge the world*; hence they falſly conclude, That thoſe Kings who have not a juſt right or title to a Crown in Heaven, ought to lay no claim to one on Earth, and therefore thoſe wicked of the World are to be rooted out, only to make room for their Saintſhips. But for the better underſtanding of that place, we muſt know, That Saints in Scripture frequently ſignifie no more, than the *called and faithful*; ſuch as from Judaiſm or Heatheniſm were converted to the Chriſtian Religion. Thus *know ye not that the Saints ſhall judge the world*? that is, Know ye not, that the World ſhall become Chriſtian, and that it ſhall be governed by Chriſtian Magiſtrates: and why ſhould you deem your ſelves unfit to exerciſe that Judgment now in a more private manner among your ſelves, without going to Heathen Tribunals, which Chriſtians ſhall 'ere long do, in a more publick and ſolemn manner upon all.

If Dominion was ſo founded in Grace, that all *Chriſtian* Kings were truly Pious and Religious, then would there be no publick Wrongs, or Injuries committed in the *Chriſtian* World; but this is a thing rather to be wiſhed, than ever rationally hoped for: Beſides, God in the Juſt and Wiſe Methods of his Providence ſometimes makes uſe of wicked Princes, as Inſtruments of his Juſtice, to puniſh the ſins of others; which could not be done, if all Kings were truly Religious: Neither doth God make 'em wicked, that ſo he may thus make uſe of 'em, as Inſtruments of his Providence, but finds 'em ſo; neither doth this any ways leſſen the ſin in them, becauſe God makes uſe of it for other Purpoſes, than they ever intended, their wicked and malicious deſigns of Injury and Oppreſſion being hereby nothing abated: And indeed that Opinion is ſo deſtructive of all publick and private Properties, that it would ſoon diſſolve all civil Societies, which our Saviour, both by his Precept and Example made his conſtant buſineſs to uphold: And if any in the World could ever lay claim to Dominion upon this account, certainly he might have done it, and yet we find he always

declin'd the taking of any ſuch thing upon him.

I ſhall here now briefly examine that Opinion of *Machiavil*, which tells us, That a Prince ought indeed to appear Religious, but that there is no neceſſity of his being ſo in truth and reality. Here the Queſtion is not, Whether a Prince that doth not act out of true *Chriſtian* Principles, for the Glory of God, and the Good of Men, but is indeed an inward Hypocrite, whether ſuch an one may not yet rule well, and derive all the Bleſſings of a pious Government upon his People, provided that his Actions, though they be deficient as to the principal, yet that they be good and lawful as to the matter. But *Machiavil* means not thus much by his ſeeming Piety, but only a meer pretence of Religion, till a fair opportunity offer it ſelf, and then thereupon to violate all that before he counted ſacred, *viz.* to break Oaths, and all the Laws of Juſtice and Honour, where his private Intereſt, or publick reaſon of State prompts him thereunto: But here we may conſider, that the Advantages that attend real Piety, and unfeigned Religion, what they are, they are conſtant and perpetual, but thoſe that are

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the reſult of Hypocriſie and Perfidiouſneſs, they are but for one turn; we can hardly again deceive thoſe whom we have once impos'd upon; ſo that this Counterfeit of Religion will not conſiſt long with his Reputation of Piety, his own People at home, and other Princes abroad, are uſually quick-ſighted enough to eſpie the faults of their Governours, and of thoſe they have to deal withal; and Hypocriſie, when 'tis once diſcover'd, is the moſt contemptible thing in the World.

But indeed it is neither the Honour nor Intereſt of a Prince to be Irreligious.

Firſt, It is not the Honour of any Man to be Wicked.

And Princes do not ceaſe to be Men when they take upon 'em the Soveraign, but ſtill remain under all theſe Obligations that God and Nature had before laid upon 'em. Now that Wickedneſs is in it ſelf diſhonourable, will appear upon theſe ſeveral Accounts.

1. Though ſome Men may arrive at that height of Wickedneſs as to glory in their ſhame; yet, thanks be to God, they are but few in reſpect of that greater and better number of Men, which both pity the Perſons, and deteſt the Follies of ſuch poor

deluded People: For we never yet heard of a Kingdom, a Commonwealth of *Atheiſts*, Providence having ſo order'd the affairs of the World, that the open and general Profeſſion of Wickedneſs ſhould be inconſiſtent with all Humane Conſtitutions.

And here we might further appeal to the experience of Wicked Men themſelves, whether their ſins were not always the moſt pleaſant, when they were moſt private: For there is ſomething of a ſecret ſhame in ſin, and ſomething of an awful Veneration owing to Vertuous and Religious Men; ſo that if Wicked Men at any time boaſt of their Wickedneſs, it is commonly before ſuch who are as bad and extravagant as themſelves.

2. Wicked Men may ſometimes glory in their ſins, not that they take any ſuch real pleaſure therein, but that they may thus invite others to mention their Enormities, and ſo are glad to hear that they have Companions in their Vicious Follies, and others as bad as themſelves.

3. Wicked Men themſelves do not ſeem be in earneſt, when they pride themſelves in their Wickedneſs, for when they would effectually reproach a Man, they then upbraid

braid him, not with his Vertues, but with ſome real or feigned Wickedneſs, which they falſly attribute to him.

'Tis true, ſuch may be the Circumſtances of time and place (but more frequently in Commonwealths than Kingdoms) that Men ſhall ſuffer for their very Vertues and Excellencies, as it happened among the *Athenians*, who could not endure a Man of extraordinary Vertue and Excellence; hence was made that Law of *Oſtraciſme* to baniſh ſuch, whoſe great Endowments had made terrible, and ſuſpected by the State: But then the execution of this Law upon any one was ſo far from being a Diſreputation to him, that the Baniſhment it ſelf was counted honourable. Nor

2. Is it the Intereſt of Princes to be wicked, for nothing doth more weaken the Nerves of Government at home, nor loſe the Reputation of a Prince abroad, than Sin and Wickedneſs; and Princes as well as Merchants, do in ſome ſenſe live upon their Credits. And further, Wickedneſs in a Prince has a Malignant Influence upon his Subjects, and a natural tendency to make them ſo too, ſo that there is ſcarce any Vice in him purely perſonal, but it commonly

extends its influence as far as his Dominions. Now 'tis eaſily conceivable, how the Viciouſneſs of the Subject tends to the prejudice of the Prince; for by this means they are neither well diſpos'd to keep peace at home, nor ſo well able to manage a War abroad. Thus *Machiavil* tells us, That Vanquiſh'd Provinces do fully revenge themſelves of their Conquerours, by receiving them delicately, and corrupting them by looſe manners: For thus the ſoftneſs of Pleaſures and Delights will cauſe 'em gradually to degenerate from their former Valour. And whereas *Machiavil* tells us, That a Prince may as well be hated for his Vertues, as for his Vices, and inſtances in *Pertinax* and *Alex. Severus*, Wiſe and Vertuous Princes, and therefore hated by their Men of War: Hence he concludes, That if a Prince will preſerve himſelf in his Eſtate, he muſt comply with the humours of ſuch as may hurt him, and even imitate their Vices and Corruptions.

In Anſwer hereto, I ſhall not here mention ſome ſmall Paſſages of thoſe two Emperours, which ſome Hiſtorians take notice of, as poſſible occaſions of thoſe Diſguſts that grew among their Men of War, but

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ſhall ſuppoſe that theſe Soldiers did really hate the Vertues of theſe Emperours, yet it will not follow from hence, that Vertue is equally liable to the hatred of Men. Thus Thieves hate the Magiſtrates, becauſe they execute Juſtice upon 'em, yet hereby do they get more Love from the publick, than they contract hatred from the Offenders: Thus, though thoſe two Emperours were hated by ſome few diſſolute and diſorderly Bands of Soldiers, yet never did any Emperours fall more lamented by the generality of the Empire, than they.

And though ſometimes a private Perſon, as I before intimated, may be the cauſe of ſome inconveniences to himſelf by his Natural Ability, or Moral Vertues; yet this cannot take place in a Prince, becauſe he is already in that Supream Authority, which others perhaps only aim at: nay, thus by being eminently Vertuous he will prevent all growing Popularity in the moſt Ambitious of his Subjects, and eclipſe their luſtre even in the Opinion of thoſe, who would otherwiſe be their great Admirers. I ſhall here only add the Apology that the *Florentines* themſelves, make for their Country-man *Machiavil*, viz. That he himſelf

did not really believe his own Aſſertions in his wicked Maximes of Policy and Religion, only deſigning hereby, if poſſible, to ruine the Houſe of the *Medices*, who had oppreſs'd the Common-wealth of *Florence*, he broach'd theſe Peſtilent Doctrines, in hopes they would embrace 'em, and ſo ruine themſelves by the practice of them. As for that Opinion of *Machiavil*, That the *Chriſtian* Religion has ſo effeminated the Spirits of its Profeſſors, that *Chriſtendom* is now become an eaſie prey to all Invaders; this is ſo falſe and fooliſh, ſo contrary both to Reaſon and Experience, that it ſcarce deſerves a Confutation. Chriſtianity forbids indeed all private Revenge, and teaches us Meekneſs and Humility towards all Men, but this is no way deſtructive of true Valour and Generoſity: For a firm belief of God, and the Immortality of the Soul, and a due care of engaging in a juſt Cauſe, are certainly the beſt foundations of true Courage: There is nothing that a *Chriſtian* fears more, than to commit ſin; now if the fear of offending God, and violating his Laws, be counted Cowardiſe, then who would be aſham'd of ſuch an Honorary Accuſation; but there is no neceſſity to pur-

purchaſe one Vertue at the expence of another, or to forfeit our Magnanimity, to maintain true Chriſtian Meekneſs: For the moſt Stout are always the moſt Generous, Meek and Merciful; and Cruelty is commonly a certain ſign of a Puſillanimous Spirit; and as for Experience, both Ancient and Modern Hiſtories teſtifie, that neither *Turks* nor any other Infidels have any advantage over *Chriſtian* Kingdoms upon this Account.

CHAP.

CHAP. VII.

Of Moral Vertue.

MOral Vertue is a thing ſo natural, and only proper to Mankind, that a Diſcourſe of Humane Nature without this, would ſeem defective in one of its moſt principal parts; the retaining of this Vertuous Innocence, was the Duty of *Adam* in *Paradiſe*; and the regaining of it, as far as this preſent ſtate of Imperfection will admit, is ſtill ours now. So that this univerſal rectitude of our Natures, was the firſt and moſt abſolute Duty incumbent on Man, for Faith and Repentance, thoſe two great Evangelical Duties, though they be abſolutely neceſſary in this laps'd State of Mankind; yet their neceſſity did only commence with Man's Fall: for in Innocence there had been no need of either, but Vertue and Holineſs, Piety towards God, and Honeſty and Charity to Men; theſe were Duties at firſt, and will be ſo to all Eternity hereafter, when Faith ſhall be ſwallowed up in Viſion, and when all ſin ſhall be done away, and ſo no need

need of Repentance. Thus Vertue was part of that Divine Image, wherein we were firſt created, and whoever, in this ſenſe, ſpeaks againſt it, Blaſphemes God. Moral Vertue therefore, as diſtinguiſh'd from original Righteouſneſs, and Evangelical Holineſs, may be thus deſcrib'd: *It is an habit of the Mind, founded indeed in Nature, but perfected by frequent uſe and exerciſe, whereby the Man is enabled by the mere ſtrength of Natural Principles, to do that which is moſt agreeable to the Duty and Dignity of his Nature, in thoſe three Relations he bears to himſelf, to others, and to God.* I ſhall give a ſhort Paraphraſe upon the Definition.

Firſt, It is an Habit, and ſo diſtinguiſhed from original Righteouſneſs, which was not an Adventitious Quality, or ſuper-induc'd upon Man *in eſſe completo*; but it was as eſſential to Man in Innocence, as roundneſs is to a Globe: Here I call it an Habit, rather than a Power or Energy, becauſe though External Cauſes, and ſuch is frequent Exerciſe, by which Vertue is gotten, be not of the Eſſence of a thing, and ſo according to the exact Rules of Defining, ought not to enter into the Definition; yet it is very difficult to come to the knowledge of the Eſſences of things of this Nature, and

and they are uſually defin'd by their Cauſes and Effects, by their Ends and Objects, and the manner of their Operations.

Secondly, Though a Man ſhould be born with this Quality of Vertue, yet notwithſtanding he would be truly Vertuous, yet here we ſpeak of things, as they are, not as it is poſſible for us to ſuppoſe and imagine them, becauſe none naturally are born ſo.

Thirdly, Habit is not a meer dull in-active thing, but Action is included in the Notion of it, eſpecially in theſe Habits of Vertue, wherein, beſides the general relation they bear to Action; they alſo include a neceſſary obligation thereunto in the very Nature and Notion of 'em. Indeed ſome tell us, That original Righteouſneſs, or that firſt Grace, by which *Adam* was enabled to rule his lower Faculties, was only given as a Bridle into his Hand, whereby he was to govern his Unruly Appetites; which, like a Wild Horſe, would otherwiſe eaſily have caſt off their Rider, and that this was only ſuper-added to Man already perfect. But this Opinion ſeems not ſo well to vindicate the Goodneſs of the Divine Providence herein; for though Man had a ſuper-added power of governing his Paſſions, yet if they

they were naturally headſtrong and exorbitant, he was in much greater probability of falling than ſtanding.

Founded in Nature, and ſo neither by Inſpiration from God, nor by the Influence, or Influx of the Stars.

1. Not by Inſpiration from God, which either was, or, at leaſt was more generally ſuppos'd to be the Opinion of *Plato*, that Vertue could not be taught, but was more immediately inſpir'd by God: But the later *Platoniſts* do either not make this his Opinion, or if they do, they do not then ſeem much to favour it. Alcinous. *Cum igitur virtus res divina ſit*, &c. upon which the Commentator's words are, *Omnis rei, cujuſcunque ſit, ſumma excellentia, quæ à Deo eſſe putatur, divina appellatur, quo modo rudiore quâdam Minervâ intelligi poteſt, quod hoc loco dicitur, virtutem, quæ hominis eſt perfectio, rem quandam eſſe divinam:* Not but that every good and perfect Gift comes from God, either immediately or mediately; but perhaps this was a way of Expreſſion common to *Plato* with the *Jews*, of calling any thing that was great and excellent in its kind by the Name of Divine; ſo that all that was probably meant by this Phraſe, was only to expreſs the excellency of the thing, and the great

great Opinion he had of it; or elſe that Divine Providence had ſome more particular concern in the diſpoſing and inclining Men to it, either by giving them a more happy Conſtitution of Body, or a more Ingenuous Temper of Mind, or by affording more advantagious Circumſtances of time and place, yet ſo as that the moſt happy Occurrences do not neceſſitate Men to be Vertuous without their own Induſtry and Inclination, nor the moſt Unhappy force 'em to be wicked without their own fault.

However if this be *Plato*'s Opinion, That Vertue is ſo from God, that it cannot be gotten by Humane Induſtry, in conjunction with the ordinary Influences of Divine Providence, this Opinion is neither reaſonable in it ſelf, nor is it ſufficiently prov'd by that Argument made uſe of by *Socrates* for that purpoſe: *If* (ſays he) *Vertue was poſſible to be taught, then would Good Men more eſpecially teach their Sons, that ſo they might inherit their Father's Vertues as well as Fortunes*; but the contrary frequently appears. To this I Anſwer,

Firſt, That nothing can be prov'd from particular Inſtances, ſeeing as many may be brought to the contrary, where Vertue has been, as it were, propagated with the Family,

Family, and we may furniſh our ſelves, even from our own Obſervation, with Examples of the happy ſucceſs of a Vertuous Education.

Secondly, Vertuous Parents, tho they may deſire their Children may be ſuch too, yet many times ſuch is their Tenderneſs and Indulgence to 'em, that they do not make uſe of thoſe Methods which are moſt proper thereunto, which are commonly joyn'd with ſome degrees of Severity.

Thirdly, Vertue, though it may be taught, and is capable of being learn'd, yet is it a very conditional thing, and depends upon the concurrence of many Circumſtances together, for the producing the effect, and that which often defeats all the reſt, is the liberty of the Will, which many Men uſe in oppoſition to all thoſe Moral means, which are otherwiſe ſufficient in themſelves and deſign'd by others to moderate their Paſſions, and reduce 'em to Vertue. Nor

2. Doth Vertue proceed from any Natural Influx of the Stars, for if we conſider the Nature of the Heavens, and natural Cauſes, and compare 'em with the Nature of the Soul and the Native Liberty of the Will, it will be impoſſible to conceive how any Sydereal Influences can any ways certainly

tainly or neceſſarily determine the Minds of Men. And the ſame Arguments that prove the Vanity of Judicial Aſtrology in other reſpects, do much more evince the folly of their pretences, who go into Heaven to fetch down Vertue from thence, when indeed it is nearer us, even in our Mouths, imprinted upon our very Hearts and Natures: I ſhall here give you *Savanorola*'s Argument in a caſe much what to this purpoſe: *If* (ſays he) *the* Chriſtian *Faith and Life proceed from the Stars, then their Faith is either true or falſe; if it be true, then it cannot proceed from thence, becauſe it condemns that Opinion, and aſſerts the Vanity of Judicial Aſtrology; if it be falſe, and proceed from the Stars, then it follows, that the Stars incline Men to falſhood, and the falſhood of the Effect will be no good reaſon why we ſhould believe the truth of the Cauſe. Whereby Men by the mere ſtrength of Nature*, &c. And thus Vertue is diſtinguiſhed from Grace; thus the *Heathen Moraliſts* have diſcours'd very well of Vertue in their Writings, and given great Inſtances thereof in their Practices, who yet were very Strangers to all Supernatural Revelation: And this Notion of it ſeems fitly to aſſign the juſt Limits betwixt the *Gentile* and the *Chriſtian* Religion,

on, it deprives not the one of what it may juſtly challenge, as its right; it allows to men in the ſtate of Nature, ſome inclinations and abilities too to Vertue, but yet that without ſupernatural aſſiſtance, he can never arrive at Evangelical Perfection: it doth not ſo far depreſs humane nature, as to make it perfectly ſtupid; nor on the other hand doth it raiſe it to a pitch of Pelagianiſm; it grants Heathens to be Men, and reminds Chriſtians of their Original Sin, and the preſent depravation of their Natures. And though the Heathen Moraliſts do ſometimes mention ſuch a thing, as *afflatus divinus* yet it cannot be in reaſon extended ſo far, as to ſignify that which Chriſtian Writers commonly underſtand by that expreſſion.

To perform that which is moſt agreeable to the duty and dignity of his nature. Thus though vertue in the proper acceptation of it be diſtinguiſh'd from Grace, as to the Principle from whence it flows, the one proceeding from nature, the other from a more divine original; yet do they agree in their end, and Friendly conſpire together to carry on the ſame deſigns of Providence in the World, *viz.* the glory of God and the good of Men. Now the dignities or excellencies of humane nature are of two ſorts. 1. Na-

tural and original. 2. Such as are the reſults of the divine benignity afterwards.

1. Natural and Original, and under this head I ſhall only conſider the excellencies of the Soul in particular. 1. As to the excellency of its nature and eſſence, that it is a ſpiritual being, and ray of Divinity; now conſidering this natural preheminence of the Soul above the Body, we act unworthy of the dignity and excellence of the Soul, when we make it only a Slave to the Body, and only as it were the Bodies Purveyor to make proviſion for the fleſh to fulfil the Luſts thereof. 2. As to its intellectual Endowments, Man only, of all this lower Creation, is endowed with a power of reaſoning: now certainly God never gave us ſuch excellent faculties only to employ 'em upon mean objects, and debaſe 'em by unworthy Employments, *Phil.* 4. 8. *Whatſoever things are true, whatſoever things are juſt*, &c. ταῦτα λογίζεσθε, *think on theſe things.* 3. As to its moral Endowments, that is, all thoſe natural Inclinations and Capacities the Soul has to Vertue and Goodneſs, that inward ſenſe of Honeſty, that *tactus quidam divinitatis*, as *Jamblicus* calls it: now this alſo obliges us to be true to that inward ſenſe of obligation that lies upon us.

2. Such

2. Such dignities as are the reſult of divine benignity afterwards, and theſe I ſhall conſider as belonging to humane nature in general: 1. The honour that Chriſt has put upon humane nature, by taking it upon himſelf. 2. As Man now is made the Temple of the Holy Ghoſt, 1 *Cor.* 3. 16. 1 *Cor.* 6. 19. 3. As humane Nature, by being join'd to the Divine, is made capable of enjoying Eternal Happineſs in the higheſt Heavens: but theſe are things rather of a Divine than Moral Conſideration.

Thus have I more fully explain'd the definition of Moral Vertue, wherein whilſt I endeavour'd to do right to Nature, I hope I have not any ways injur'd Divine Grace: for I count him not worthy to partake of the benefits thereof, who ſpeaks the leaſt word to derogate from the excellency and neceſſity of Divine Aſſiſtance.

How far Vertue, Reaſon, or Philoſophy (for they meant much what the ſame thing by them all) was or is available to the Heathens in order to their future Happineſs, I ſhall not here particularly enquire, or poſitively determine, this being a Queſtion wherein Scripture is much what ſilent; and Modeſty here teaches us not to be wiſe above what is written, nor curiouſly inqui-

ſitive in things wherein we have no certain Rule to guide us.

Only here give me leave barely to relate their Reaſons, who are willing to entertain as favourable thoughts, as they can, concerning the poſſibility of the Salvation of ſome Heathens: and here firſt to prevent miſtakes, they lay down this as an undoubted Principle, and a certain Truth, that there is no *name given under Heaven, by which any can be ſaved, but only the name of Jeſus.* So that none was ever ſaved, but with a reſpect to Chriſt's Death, and by the benefits they receive thereby: nor do they here hold an indifferency of Religions, as if it was equally poſſible and eaſy to be ſaved in any: for tho' ſome Heathens may be ſaved, yet the advantage on the Chriſtians part above them is much every way, both in reſpect of the means in order thereunto, and alſo in reſpect of the certainty, that God will certainly accept of ſuch conditions as he has requir'd in the Goſpel. So that a Chriſtian, if he be not wanting to himſelf, is not only ſafe, but certain, free not only from danger, but from doubt, which an Heathen cannot be: nor do they frame ſuch notions of God, as if he was compos'd wholly of Mercy, and that Juſtice was only an empty

Title,

Title; for they assert, that as mercy appears in the Salvation of a Christian, so likewise the Salvation of Heathens, if any such thing be, will not be in a way or method inconsistent with the Divine Justice: they do not here go about to describe the particular way how it is to be done, only they charitably conceive, that it is not any thing contrary to the Divine Nature, nor to any Declaration that he has made in Scripture.

CHAP. VIII.

Some short Observations upon Mr Hobs *his first Chapter of his Kingdom of Darkness.*

HE begins this Part of his *Leviathan* with a pleasant description of the Kingdom of Satan, which he makes altogether as phantastick as that of *Oberon*, or the Fairy Land, making the notion of Spirits and Immaterial Substances to be as groundless, as the Dreams of Madmen, and indeed the mere results of the timorous apprehensions of Children or Fools. There is mention made *in Scripture of the Principality of*

Belzebub *over Demons, that is to ſay, over Phantaſms, that appear in the air; and ſince* Belzebub *is the King of theſe Phantaſms, the Sons of Darkneſs, Phantaſms and the Spirits of illuſion ſignify the ſame thing:* the bare repeating hereof ſeems a ſufficient Anſwer, it being too fanciful to require a ſerious confutation.

And yet he makes this one great inſtance of the Churches being not yet fully emerg'd out of the Territories of Darkneſs, or not yet inſerted into the glorious light and liberty of the Sons of God, becauſe it believes Spirits to be Immaterial Beings, ſubſiſting by themſelves, and not mere Phantaſms; as if the Church could never arrive at a perfect purity of Doctrine, till it became a Company of Men openly profeſſing that, which either immediately borders upon, or naturally tends to Atheiſm.

But then in the beginning of his next Chapter, he tells us the manner how Phantaſms are produc'd, which in ſhort is this, by the impreſſion which viſible objects make upon the Senſes: which motion being continued to the place of perception, doth there beget in the Mind or Soul the Conception or Phantaſm of the object thus communicated to the mind. So that a Phantaſm according

ing to this way of explaining it, is not, and cannot be any where exiſtent, but in the mind of the Perceiver. But then how will this agree with what he had ſaid before concerning *Belzebub*'s being the Prince of *Phantaſms, that inhabit the air.* But perhaps it would ſometimes be as hard a matter to reconcile Mr. *Hobs* to himſelf, as it would be to reconcile his Opinions to Truth. How is Satan Prince of thoſe Phantaſms which every Man frames to himſelf? May not every one rather create his own Subjects, and become himſelf Prince of his own Phantaſms? but when he calls Satan or *Belzebub* Prince of theſe Phantaſms, he ſeems to grant a greater reality of Exiſtence to him, than to them: Now I do not ſee, according to his Principles, but that *Belzebub* himſelf is as great a Phantaſm, as any of the other. Now the firſt way he aſſigns, by which this Kingdom of Darkneſs is promoted among Men, is by extinguiſhing the light of Scripture by falſe Interpretations; and I could wiſh Mr. *Hobs* was not thus guilty himſelf of promoting this Spiritual Darkneſs.

The firſt inſtance he gives of this falſe interpretation of Scripture, is of thoſe, who make the Church, now in the World, the Kingdom of God, ſo often mention'd in

Scripture; whereas, ſays he, 'tis manifeſt to the contrary, that the Kingdom of God was inſtituted by God by the Miniſtry of *Moſes* over the Jews only, who for that reaſon are call'd *The peculiar People of God:* which Kingdom ceas'd at the Election of *Saul*, and that there never was any Kingdom of God properly ſo call'd, ſince that, on Earth.

Two things there are generally requir'd to the founding of an Hypotheſis. 1. To ſhow the reaſonableneſs of it in it ſelf. 2. The agreeableneſs of it to all other Obſervations, relating to ſuch a matter. Accordingly Mr. *Hobs*, in his former part of his *Leviathan*, had been laying down the reaſons and foundations of his Political Hypotheſis: and now becauſe he doth not altogether deny the truth of Scripture, but that ſome reſpect is owing to it; therefore he thought himſelf concern'd, to ſute it, as near as poſſible, to the Scripture alſo: hence he endeavours, if he cannot bring his Principles to it, he will, by forc'd Interpretations, bring the Scripture to them.

This premis'd in general, it is eaſily diſcernable why Mr. *Hobs* would not grant now God any Kingdom upon Earth, truly ſo call'd; becauſe if he had, it would contradict

tradict that notion which he hath fram'd of a Kingdom, as to its firſt Conſtitution, which muſt be by conferring Rights, by mutual Compacts, and Covenants, being an acquiſition of power over their Subjects by their own conſent. Now he fancies, though without any good grounds, that the People of the Jews, under *Abraham* and *Moſes*, were ſuch a Kingdom, wherein the People did transfer their Rights, and did mutually Covenant with God for the Conſtitution of a Kingdom, according to his own Notion; whereas indeed there was no more drawing of Articles, whereby God did acquire any more new right over them then, than there is now under the New Teſtament. 2. Suppoſing that this formal transferring of rights was neceſſary to the conſtituting of a Kingdom amongſt Men; yet it will not follow hence, that God too muſt acquire his right of Government the ſame way: for certainly God's right of Commanding doth not depend upon the Peoples Choice and willingneſs to obey. 3. Though Chriſtians do not go about to chuſe God their Soveraign, as they do a King in Elective Kingdoms, by majority of Votes; yet their very taking upon them the profeſſion of Chriſtianity, and expecting Salvation upon

upon its own terms, doth imply a tacit Compact. Thus the New Teſtament is διαθήκη, a Covenant too. So that the Church on Earth may as properly be call'd the Kingdom of Chriſt now, as the People of the Jews the Kingdom of God then: and Mr. *Hobs* himſelf tells us, *Ch.* 31. *Levi.* that to reign *in the proper acceptation of the word, is to rule by commanding, threatning and promiſing.* Now why may not Chriſt be now ſaid properly to rule by his word and laws? that is, by commanding, threatning and promiſing. But let us examine the reaſons why the Church upon Earth cannot be call'd the Kingdom of Chriſt: All that is there offer'd is, *Errori huic, quod Eccleſia, quæ nunc eſt in terris*, &c. Here he calls it an errour, ſuppoſing that he had prov'd it ſo in his 35 *Ch.* Where he purpoſely inſiſts upon this Argument: There he tells us, that the Kingdom of God by Divines is ſometimes taken for that Eternal Happineſs which the Bleſſed ſhall enjoy in the Kingdom of Glory. Sometimes it is taken for the Kingdom of Grace here on Earth. But here he doth not prove, which he ought to have done, that theſe are falſe and improper Interpretations of the word, or inconſiſtent with the true ſenſe of thoſe places, where

where the Divines ſo interpret them: only he ſays, *contra in Scripturis Sacris invenio regnum Dei ubiq; fere ſignificare regnum propriè dictum*, &c. Now this one word *fere*, *almoſt*, doth quite invalidate the force of all his Argument: for granting that the Kingdom of God is ſometimes taken in that ſenſe of his before-mention'd (which yet will be very hard for him to prove) yet if there be other places, wherein that word occurs, which cannot ſo be interpreted; then that is not the neceſſary and conſtant ſenſe and meaning of it.

I ſhall here briefly examine thoſe places of Scripture, which he draws, rather than leads to the confirming his own Notion, *Gen.* 17.7. *And I will eſtabliſh my Covenant between me and thee, and thy Seed after thee, in their Generations for an Everlaſting Covenant, to be a God unto thee, and to thy Seed after thee.* Here, he ſays, *Abraham* promis'd to obey God, for himſelf and his Poſterity; but indeed he doth not mention one word to any ſuch purpoſe: ſo that there was no tranſferring of rights, no inducing obligations *per verba in præſenti*: but all the reaſon that Mr. *Hobbs* had to cite this place in favour of his Opinion, ſeems only this, becauſe there is mention made of a Covenant, and

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he ſuppoſes all Covenants muſt be made according to his own Model: but I might as well cite *Jer.* 31. 31. where God promiſes to make a new Covenant with the Houſe of *Iſrael*, after thoſe days, *&c.* Which is to be underſtood of the coming of the *Meſſias* in the Fleſh, to prove a Kingdom of God, properly ſo call'd, now under the Goſpel, as this of *Gen.* is cited to prove it then. Another place is *Exod.* 19. 5. *If ye will hear my Voice, and keep my Covenant, ye ſhall be to me a peculiar people*, &c. *theſe are the words, that thou ſhalt ſpeak to the People. And* Moſes *call'd the Elders of the People, and laid before their Faces all theſe words which the Lord commanded him: and all the People anſwered together and ſaid, All that the Lord hath ſpoken, we will do.* Here God ſeems to require the conſent of the People, for the ratifying of his Covenant. To this I Anſwer, 1. That theſe and ſuch like Covenants, though they have ſo much of the nature of a Compact, as that the Bleſſings therein promis'd are conditional, and to be obtain'd only by the performance of the Conditions; yet upon the whole, they ſeem rather conferring of benefits, than ſevere ſtipulations: ſo that the conditions being propos'd, no one, that hath the uſe of reaſon, will refuſe to comply with 'em. 2. Though

2. Though God commanded *Moſes* to declare his Covenant to his People, yet it cannot be ſuppos'd that the obligation did depend merely upon their acceptance: for God had right to command what he there requir'd, though he had not join'd to the obſervance of his Laws ſuch particular Rewards.

3. God might have particular Reaſons to deal in this more ſenſible manner with the Jews, in complyance with their imperfections, out of tenderneſs of affection to 'em, to let 'em ſee that he requir'd their own conſent to what he enjoin'd 'em, hereby to lay a great ſenſe of obligation upon 'em; becauſe if they now rebell'd, they would not only break their natural Laws of duty to him, as God, but alſo violate their own Promiſes.

" Conſequent upon this errour, that the " Church now on Earth is the Kingdom of " Chriſt, and that there ought to be one " Man, or a Company of Men, by whom " our Saviour, now in Heaven, ſpeaks to " Men on Earth; conſequent to this it is, " that the Pope challenges an Univerſal " Power, *&c.* That which I here firſt obſerve is, his artificial ſliding of theſe two Propoſitions together, *viz.* That the Church on

on Earth is the Kingdom of Chriſt, and that there ought to be one Man, or one Company of Men, which ſhould rule the ſame, as univerſal head under him, hereby to impoſe upon the unwary Reader, as if they were Propoſitions altogether of the ſame import: whereas the one is only a falſe conſequence drawn from the other; but it is no unuſual Artifice with Mr *Hobbs*, to charge falſe Inferences upon true Principles, thus, if poſſible, to diſparage what he is not able otherwiſe ſolidly to diſprove: but by the ſame way of arguing, he may prove that there is no God, from thoſe Superſtitious and Idolatrous Practices, which are accidentally conſequent upon, and occaſion'd by the belief of a Deity; for if there were no Opinion of a God, there would be no Idolatry nor Superſtition. But this Argument, as it is deficient in other reſpects, ſo alſo is it in reſpect of time: for the Church on Earth might have been the Kingdom of Chriſt for the firſt four or five hundred Years after his Appearance in the World, notwithſtanding the force of this Argument. For it then only began to be an Argument when the Pope began to arrogate ſo much Power to himſelf. And indeed Mr. *Hobs* had great reaſon to thank the Church of *Rome*,

Rome, for affording him ſo much Sophiſtical matter to ſtuff his Kingdom of Darkneſs withal. Another Artifice, by which Mr. *Hobs* would diſparage a truth, that he has a mind to oppoſe, is, with a Philoſophical Gravity, to feign an idle and ridiculous original, to which judiciouſly to aſcribe it: thus he fancies, that *Ariſtotle*, from the conſideration of this or ſuch like Propoſitions, *Homo eſt animal*; from the *Copula* in this Propoſition he took occaſion firſt to aſſert ſeparate Eſſences, Celeſtial Intelligences, and humane Souls. *Leviat. Latin* p. 320.

Another inſtance he gives of the falſe interpretation of Scripture, is the aſſerting the immortality of the Soul, and its being really diſtinct from the Body; but now one would ſcarce deſire a better Argument for the proof thereof, than the very Anſwers he gives to thoſe places of Scripture, which are commonly alledg'd for it, ſo weak and frivolous many times are they: Eccleſ. 12. 7. *The Spirit returns to God that gave it*; which words, ſays he, *may ſuffer this interpretation*, but then they muſt undergo a great deal of pain, and have a great deal of Patience, if they ſuffer it: One great defect, which ſeems to run through all Mr. *Hobs* his Interpretations

terpretations of Scripture, is this, that he ſuppoſes himſelf on the defenſive part, and that all that he had to do, was only to invent ſome frivolous Evaſion, or put ſome forc'd Interpretation upon the place, and then all was done: whereas he ought poſitively to prove, that that of his was the only true and genuine ſenſe and meaning of the place, both from the generally approv'd concurrent Teſtimonies of the beſt and pureſt Ages, from the juſt and proper acceptation of the words, by the beſt and moſt approved Authors; from the general ſcope and deſign of the Context, and from the natural tendency that his Senſe and Interpretation has, to promote thoſe noble ends of Vertue and Piety in the World, which God and Chriſt deſign'd to carry on by the Scriptures. None of which things Mr. *Hobs* hath as much as attempted to do: *The Spirit returns to God that gave it*; that is, ſays he, *God only knows whence it comes, and whither it goes*: And I could wiſh that he had been true to his own Interpretation. But then how comes he ſo poſitively to aſſert its Mortality at preſent, and at what Periods it muſt return again to Life, *&c.*

Another place, he ſays, which ſeems to make for the immortality of the Soul, is

Matt.

Matt. 22. 32. where our Saviour affirms *Abraham*, *Iſaac* and *Jacob* to be alive; to which he anſwers, That they were indeed alive, but not actually, but as by the promiſe of God they were ſure of Eternal Life: but he alſo tells us, That the wicked are ſure of eternal Death; and thus, why may not the wicked be as properly ſaid to be dead, even whiles they are alive, by vertue of the threatning; as the Righteous can be ſaid to be alive, by vertue of the promiſe, even then, when they are ſuppos'd not to be at all.

The ſum of Mr. *Hobbs* his Opinion herein, is this; he ſuppoſes the Soul not to be any thing really diſtinct from the Body, but that it is compos'd of the purer parts of the Spirits, and by conſequence it dies with the Body; not that it is annihilated, for matter in this ſenſe is immortal; that is, not naturally capable of annihilation, but that upon ſuch grand indiſpoſitions of Body, which is called Death, the Soul is render'd uncapable of ſuch agitations, and ſuch reactions, in which the nature of a living Creature doth conſiſt: So that according to this Opinion, a Man can no more properly be ſaid either to be alive or dead, than Quickſilver may; for though it be not ſo Organized, as Mans

Body is, though it hath neither heart nor brain to tranſmit Spirits to each other, and though it has not the uſe of Speech, yet may it have a Soul as really intelligent as that of ours. The greateſt part of the reſt of this Chapter is employ'd in confuting or expoſing ſome Opinions of the Church of *Rome*; yet we may obſerve, that notwithſtanding his ſevere handling that Church in ſome reſpects, yet her Authority is then valued by him, when ſhe ſeems any ways to favour his Opinions: thus he cites her Authority to confirm his aſſertion, That Spirits are mere Phantaſms, becauſe ſhe in her Exorciſms calls 'em ſo. I ſhall here only further obſerve, how he hath transform'd all the Subjects of Satan into Phantaſms, in the beginning of his Kingdom of Darkneſs, and in the latter end thereof has allegoriz'd all the Officers and Miniſters of the Pope into mere Hobgoblins.

That which gave the firſt occaſion of employing my thoughts this way, was thoſe falſe Opinions concerning God, thoſe various modes of Theiſm, which now prevail in the World, which ſeem to be nothing but Epicuriſm and Hobbianiſm tranſform'd into other (I know not whether I may ſay into better) ſhapes. Now if what

what I here write, may but give occaſion to ſome abler Pen more fully to examine and confute thoſe fatal Principles (and I hope it will; rather than a good Cauſe ſhould ſuffer by my ill management.) If theſe Papers, I ſay, have this good effect, I ſhall not then need to make any other Apology, but think my Pains very well beſtow'd.

FINIS.

AN APPENDIX TO THE Seventh Chapter.

I Would not there be thought in the leaſt to favour that falſe and fooliſh, that dangerous and deſtructive opinion of Theiſm, an Opinion, which grants indeed the Being of God and natural Religion, but denies all Divine Revelation made to Mankind afterward: and thus it ſeems a compoſition of the worſt ingredients incident to humane Nature, Pride, Ignorance, and Ingratitude; of Pride, as not duly acknowledging the frailties of humane nature; of Ignorance, as not fully underſtanding the true ſtate and condition of laps'd Mankind; of Ingratitude, as not thankfully acknowledging the benefits of Divine Grace. But Secondly, beſides theſe, there are others, who granting a Divine Revelation made to Man, do yet ſo melt it down, as it were,

below it ſelf, till it come to an equal temper with, or very little exceed mere natural Religion. 3. Others, who in words acknowledge a God, but denying the common Principles of all Religion, the immortality of the Soul, and a future State, ſeem perfectly to entertain the Doctrine of *Epicurus*. ---- As for the light of Nature, which theſe Men ſo much Idolize, I ſhall grant to it as much, as in reaſon it can deſire, and ſo ſatisfy its own juſt demands. 1. The Law of Nature is a Divine Law, and brings us under the obligation of its Commands, ſo that whatever is directly contrary hereunto, cannot be made part of any future Revelation, becauſe one Divine Light is not contrary to another. 2. The rational exerciſe of their Faculties might be, and probably was made uſe of by the Prophets and Apoſtles in their revealing the Will of God to Man, yet ſtill under the Influence and Superintendence of the Holy Spirit, guideing and directing them in ſuch a meaſure, as was neceſſary in order to ſuch an end. 3. This light of natural Reaſon, together with the concurrence of thoſe other means, deſign'd by God in order thereunto, may be made uſe of for the better underſtanding of God's reveal'd will in Scripture: now

after

after ſuch fair Conceſſions made to it, it ought not to exalt it ſelf above, or make it ſelf equal to that of Divine Revelation.

Theiſm in a Chriſtian ſtate, where Men have not only all the Opportunities of knowing and underſtanding the Chriſtian Religion, but alſo live in the outward profeſſion of it, this of all things is the moſt unreaſonable, for even the beſt and wiſeſt Aſſerters of the Light of Nature and Human Reaſon, do grant, that in thoſe places where Chriſtianity is known, Reaſon it ſelf *will find more, and much ſtronger, Arguments for the Chriſtian, than for any other Belief whatſoever.* ——These Theiſts muſt alſo prove one of theſe two things; either, 1*ſt*, That there never were any ſuch perſons as the Prophets, our Bleſſed Saviour, and his Apoſtles, in the World; which is contrary to the univerſal Conſent and Confeſſion of all, both Friends and Enemies: Or elſe, 2*ly*, That they never made any new revelation of God's Will to Mankind; which they can never be able to do. As for the practical Duties of Religion, we grant they are founded in Nature, and agreeable to Reaſon; but then withal we ſay, That Revelation hath both added to the clearneſs of the Truth, and to the neceſſity of the Obligation of thoſe Duties.

But here they tell us, That Natural Reaſon has diſcover'd enough; and that there is no need of any farther Revelation to be made to Man; but it is a very weak and illogical way of arguing againſt a Matter of Fact, from a ſuppoſed needleſneſs, that there ſhould be any ſuch thing; we ought rather in this caſe to argue thus: It doth ſufficiently appear, That God hath made ſuch and ſuch Declarations of his Will to Man; therefore it was not needleſs, becauſe God doth nothing in vain. Farther, It is diſingenuous and ungrateful for Natural Reaſon thus to boaſt it ſelf upon its own ſufficiency, and not acknowledge its Benefactor, ſeeing it now owes its preſent improvement, in a great meaſure, to the Benefits and Advantages it has received from Divine Revelation. ——The Author of the *Diſcourſe of Human Reaſon, with relation to matters of Religion*, printed 1690. tells us, That *the whole Subſtance of Chriſtianity it ſelf, according to St.* John's *account of it, is moſt certainly founded upon that univerſal light, which enlightens every man that cometh into the World.* *Pa.* 4. of his *Prefatory Letter*. But to this I anſwer, 1. That St. *John* there doth not ſpeak of the Light of Nature, but of Chriſt; and tho' Chriſt be the Author of that Light, yet

yet his thus enlightning every one that comes into the World, doth not ſuperſede the neceſſity, or leſſen the excellency of Divine Revelation. 2. The whole Subſtance of Chriſtianity cannot be founded therein, becauſe Chriſtianity contains in it Articles of Faith, above the natural power of Reaſon to find out, as well as matters of Practice. 3. Tho' the practical part be founded in this univerſal Light of Nature, yet Chriſtianity may carry on the Superſtructure higher than meer Nature was ever able to do. 4. It is not moſt certain, that that is the right Tranſlation of that place of St. *John*; it may be alſo render'd thus, *He was that true Light*, which coming into the World, enlightens every man; that is, every man that hath the Happineſs to hear the glad tydings of the Goſpel.

The ſaid Author, *pag.* 92. having before made an exact and full enumeration (as he thinks it) of the Principles of all, or rather of meer Natural Religion, *In the Belief and Senſe*, ſays he, *of theſe general Truths, and in the practice of the Duties that reſult from 'em, according to their full extent and tendency, conſiſts all true Religion, and whatever elſe is introduc'd into any Religion, either notional or practical; I ſay, what either doth not neceſſarily*

ly flow from ſome of theſe Branches, or tend to enforce the obſervance of 'em; is no eſſential part of true Religion, but the meer Product of Superſtition, Folly, or Deſign. But according to his Scheme of Principles, what ſhall we think of thoſe Articles of the Chriſtian Faith the Trinity, the Incarnation and Reſurrection of the Body, for theſe are neither included in that Enumeration, nor do they neceſſarily flow from any Branch thereof. If he ſay, that theſe may tend to enforce the obſervance of thoſe Duties before-mentioned; this I grant, but it ſeems a prepoſterous way of proving Articles of Faith, to bring 'em in only by the by, becauſe the belief thereof may enforce the practice of Chriſtian Duties; though this alſo is true, that they do ſo, yet the true reaſon of our belief of 'em, is, becauſe they are revealed in Scripture.

What Monſieur *le Clerk*'s deſign (or whoever elſe was the Author of thoſe five Letters concerning the Divine Inſpiration of holy Scriptures, lately tranſlated into Engliſh) was, I ſhall not here enquire: Truth indeed forbids me to think him a Deiſt, in the firſt ſence before mention'd; but Charity it ſelf doth not forbid to think him one in the ſecond; that is, one who would bring Di-

Divine Inſpiration into as narrow a room as he could, and believe as little of it in Scripture as poſſible. Yet we ought not to be too ſevere, in charging the conſequences of an Opinion upon its Author, eſpecially when he diſowns 'em to be his Opinions; but on the other ſide we ought to be very watchful over our ſelves, that we do not broach or defend any Opinion, that may any ways tend to unhinge the Principles, and undermine the Foundations of Chriſtianity, and we ought the more to ſuſpect and carefully examine ſuch, from whence men generally draw dangerous conſequences.

That a Papiſt ſhould induſtriouſly ſet himſelf to leſſen the Authority of holy Scripture, and upon all occaſions ſeek advantage againſt it, is not ſo much to be wonder'd at, becauſe hereby he ſerves a turn, and by this means endeavours to advance the Authority of his own Church, that what is pretended to be wanting in Scripture, may be ſupplied by *Roman* Tradition. But then, why they who call themſelves *Proteſtants* ſhould joyn in ſuch a Deſign, and pick up all the little Arguments of ill-deſigning Men againſt Scripture; this is not ſo eaſie to give an account of.

Scripture

Scripture doth not go about meerly to beg a favourable reception in the World, as if it ſtood in need of ſuch mean methods of proceeding; ſeeing it may juſtly challenge a due regard and veneration from all ſober and conſiderate perſons, it doth not deſire to make uſe of any precarious Principles in its own defence, nor refuſes to joyn iſſue with its Adverſaries in the moſt ſevere method of Raciocination.

'Tis true indeed, as the Tranſlator tells us in his Preface, that it is *unbecoming the dignity of ſuch ſacred Truths as the Chriſtian Religion teaches us, to build them upon unſound Principles, or defend them by Sophiſtical Arguments.* If this be applied to the following Letters, deſigning thereby to reflect upon the contrary Opinion, and to magnifie the ſoundneſs of the Principles and Cogency of the Arguments contained in theſe; I doubt not but Mr. *Lowth*'s Anſwer is ſufficient to convince any conſiderate perſon to the contrary.

The ſum of the Author's Hypotheſis in the five Letters, ſeems to be this; he abſolutely rejects ſome of the Books of the Old Teſtament, and very much queſtions the Authority of others of the new: He doth not allow Scripture in general, either as to the mat-

matter, or as to the words, to be inſpired by the Holy Ghoſt, excepting only ſome few particular Inſtances: And as for the Difficulties that occurr therein, he doth not much concern himſelf about 'em, but takes this more eaſie way of ſolving all, by acknowledging, when any thing of that nature is objected, that the holy Pen-men were there miſtaken, and contradicted themſelves. And as the Tranſlator, in his *Preface, p. 6.* tells us, the uſe of all this is, *to ſettle our Chriſtian Religion upon a baſis not to be ſhaken by the Difficulties about the Scripture, which the Learned are forced to acknowledge to be inſuperable.* But I am apt to believe, that too little reading and conſidering the beſt Authors, and too great a Tincture of Prejudice upon the Minds of Men doth ſometimes make that ſeem an inſuperable difficulty, which is not ſo in it ſelf: Or, ſuppoſe there were ſome ſuch in Scripture, muſt we therefore reject the Divine Authority of the whole, becauſe we do not underſtand ſome parts of the Bible. *Vid. Letter* to a *Deiſt.*

But I do not ſee what ſufficient Anſwer he returns to that place, 2 *Pet.* 1. 17. *The holy men of God ſpake as they were moved by the Holy Ghoſt:* ἀπὸ πνεύματος ἁγίου φερόμενοι, *acted*

acted or carried by the Holy Ghoſt. Here *Beza* gives this ſeaſonable Caution; *Dextrè hoc intelligendum eſt, ne quis divini ſpiritûs rectè compoſitos & verè divinos afflatus comparet profanorum Vatum furoribus, &c.* But the aforeſaid Author comes ſhort of the true import of the Phraſe, when he makes this Impulſe or Influence of the Holy Ghoſt to be nothing more than the meer reſult of a pious and well-diſpoſed Mind, acting only by the ſtrength of Memory, and a well-inform'd Underſtanding. But for a man to eſpouſe ſuch a dangerous and unwarrantable Opinion, and when he is urged with plain and expreſs places of Scripture (ſuch as ſeem *non ſine numine*, and, as it were, purpoſely ſo worded, as if deſigned to obviate ſuch a Tenent) for him then to tell us, as this Author doth, *p.* 146. That *no Doctrine which we eſteem important, ought to be grounded barely on certain manners of ſpeaking, which we cannot be ſure they were exact, becauſe the Sacred Writers, not affecting exactneſs of Style, may have uſed that manner of expreſſion without any deſign.* This is only to ſtudy Evaſions, and to lay a Foundation of ſomething like Sceptiſm in Religion; for, after this way of arguing, a man may aſſert or deny any thing, having firſt thus taken off the edge of

of the Scripture ſo, as that he need to fear no danger thence.

But he tells us, *p.* 34. That St. *Luke* confeſſes himſelf, in the beginning of his Goſpel, That *he learned not that which he told us by inſpiration, but by information from thoſe that knew it exactly.* To this I anſwer, 1. Divine Grace is very well conſiſtent with the ſober and rational uſe of our Faculties, tho' perhaps it is not very eaſie to explain the way and method how 'tis done: Nor is ſuch an Inſpiration (as is here aſſerted) any ways contrary to thoſe ſubordinate means which St. *Luke* might make uſe of in that caſe; *Dubitandum non eſt, quin piam diligentiam Deus direxerit.* 2. St. *Luke* doth not ſay, that what he there writes he had only by Information; *It ſeem'd good alſo to me, who having had perfect knowledge of all things,* ab initio, *from the beginning*; the word is ἄνωθεν, *ſuperne, cœlitus, from above.* Thus *Ja.* 1. 17. *Every good and perfect Gift is from above*; ἄνωθεν. *Jo.* 19. 11. And this, the Criticks ſay, is the proper and uſual ſignification of the word, *Ut ſit adverbium loci, à quâ ſignificatione non temerè recedendum, illud autem à principio ſenſum anguſtiorem reddit, & includitur, in eo, quòd ſe omnia conſecutum eſſe & ſcripturum ordine, dicat.*

The

The ſaid Author is much offended at thoſe expreſſions in *Pſal.* 109. which, he ſays, are all Curſes and Imprecations: But he may as well ſay, that thoſe Woes which our Saviour denounces againſt impenitent Sinners, *Matt.* 23. 14. are all Curſes too; whereas they are rather tender-hearted Expreſſions and Commiſerations, for thoſe Evils which he foreſaw they would bring upon themſelves by their wilful Wickedneſs. And what he ſays further, in confirmation of his Opinion, is only this; That *if all theſe words were render'd in the future tenſe, to avoid making the Pſalmiſt pronounce ſuch Curſes, there are a great many more places in the Pſalms, where the Verſion would need to be reform'd.* But what if this were granted, would any thing of abſurdity or inconvenience follow thence?

'Tis further obſervable, that he boldly advances his own Opinion many times, without ever taking the leaſt notice of thoſe Anſwers that have been return'd to it both by ancient and modern Writers. Thus, 2 *Tim.* 3. 16. *All Scripture is given by inſpiration of God, and is profitable*, &c. But, *p.* 189. he ſays, this may be very well thus tranſlated, *All Scripture that is divinely inſpir'd is profitable*; but it cannot well be tranſlated thus,

thus, unleſs he can prove, that St. *Paul* did ſuppoſe ſome of the Books of the Jewiſh Canon not to be inſpir'd: Otherwiſe *Theophylact*'s Confutation of this very Opinion will ſtill *hold good,* where in anſwer to his way of reading the words, *Omnis ſcriptura, quæ divinitùs inſpirata eſt, illa eſt etiam utilis,* ἡ δὲ αὐτὸς, &c. *oportebat eos noviſſe, quòd cum ſuprà dixerit, ſacras literas noſti, nunc ait, omnis ſcriptura qualis? de quâ diſſerebat, & de quâ dixit, quòd ſacra eſt: omnis igitur hujuſmodi divinitùs inſpirata eſt, & utilis.*

He tells us, *p.* 48. That the Diſcourſes which the Apoſtles made before their Judges *did not contain any thing which one might not as well ſay without inſpiration.* But to prove the Apoſtles divinely inſpir'd, we do not only conſider what they ſaid, but alſo what they did upon thoſe occaſions. I do not here ſpeak of the Miracles done by the Apoſtles; but thoſe practical Reſolutions and pious Performances conſequent upon their inward Perſwaſions and Convictions. 2. What the Apoſtles ſaid and did in thoſe Circumſtances then, were greater and ſtronger Arguments of their being inſpir'd, than any thing of the like nature would be to us now; and the Reaſon is, becauſe the Goſpel was a Religion then newly reveal'd, and not

grown, as it were, habitual to 'em by a long-continued Belief of it; they acted not only againſt all the Power and Authority of the World, which was then vigorouſly ſet againſt 'em, but alſo againſt their own late Principles and Practices of a different Religion, and they ſucceſsfully attempted and perform'd ſuch things, which nothing but a Divine Impulſe could prevail with a prudent man to undertake.

Upon the whole, this Author ſeems very much to reſemble Mr. *Hobbs* in his Arguings; he would have the liberty of putting what Interpretations he pleaſes upon places of Scripture, and then puts his Adverſary to diſprove 'em; and this is that wherein the ſtrength of his Plea doth generally conſiſt. But I humbly conceive, that whereas he goes about to advance a novel opinion, he ought firſt by poſitive Arguments to confute the former, and prove, that thoſe Interpretations formerly put upon thoſe places of Scripture, are neither agreeable to the true ſenſe of the Words, nor to the analogy of Faith; and not think it ſufficient for him, in this caſe, to tell us, That ſuch or ſuch a place *may be* interpreted ſo or ſo.

Thus

Thus, *p.* 177. 'tis remarkable how induſtriouſly he labours to put the Proof upon Monſ. *Simon*, it being Mr. *N*'s (as this Author is call'd) uſual way, rather to ſuppoſe than prove any thing. Thus, in the very next Page, 178. he vigorouſly ſuppoſes theſe two things; 1. That St. *Paul*, *Acts* 23. ſpeaks not there as a Prophet, but as a meer private Perſon. 2. That he confeſſes himſelf to blame, in giving ſuch Language to the High-Prieſt, but offers not the leaſt thing in proof of either, only makes the one Suppoſal to prove the other; the latter to prove the former. But if St. *Paul* ſpoke as a Prophet, as the generality of Interpreters do aſſert, and nothing here offer'd to prove the contrary, then we cannot in reaſon ſuppoſe him to beg Pardon for what he ſpoke, as ſuch; and therefore ſome other Interpretation ought to be put upon that place.

ERRATA.

PAge 3. line 6. for *aed* read *and*; p. 6. l. 22. *a comma only*; p. 11. l. 22. r. *effectual*; p. 17. l. 28. for *diſpoſe* r. *depoſe*; p. 18. l. 26. for *the* r. *their*; p. 19. l. 28. make *a comma* at *Service*, l. 29. dele Semicolon; p. 33. l. 1. for *motions* r. *motives*; p. 42. l. 15. for *they* r. *thus*; p. 44. l. 25. for *it is* r. *is it*; p. 55. l. 26. dele *his*; p. 86. l. 26. for *and* r. *but*; p. 89. l. 14. dele Colon; p. 107. l. 12. after *God* add *ſays he*; p. 145. l. 19. for *it* r. *this*; p. 160. l. 28. for *awfully* r. *lawfully*; p. 184. l. 20. for *now* r. *more*; p. 188. l. 6. add *what* to the beginning of the line; p. 189. l. 14. r. *Martyr*; p. 190. l. 26. r. *contradiſtinction*; p. 194. l. 15. for *principal* r. *principle*; p. 196. l. 2. after *Kingdom* add *or*; p. 103. l. 23. for *viz. that* r. *and* p. 196. l. 26. add *to* in the beginning of the line; p. 57. l. 12. for *we* r. *he*; in the running Title of Chap. 8. for *of* r. *upon*; p. 141. l. 5. add, *For if Arguments drawn from Natural Reaſon have no force of themſelves to prove a God, antecedent to Divine Revelation, I do not ſee how they can have any afterwards; and if they be ſuch as any ways depend upon Divine Revelation, ſo far will they be of leſs force to convince an Atheiſt.*